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INTRODUCTION 
 
Aaron R. Petty* 
 
It is now critical that the theological assumptions underlying legal 
theories about religion be made more explicit.† 
 
Religion is like law: the more closely we try to define it, the more it 
slips through our grasp.‡ 
 
One problem of law—one may even say the problem of law—is that it 
must be expressed in and is limited by human language.  As useful as 
languages are, they are imperfect means of communication.  Sometimes 
language works well. For example, when I say “bird” or “fire” or “dark” 
most people will have some frame of reference to understand what I am 
talking about.  But when I say “honor” or “happiness” or “love,” the listener 
cannot be as certain.  If the listener shares an experience or background with 
me, it may be easier to decipher, but context is critical to understanding.   
The law, too, exists only as abstract concepts, and concepts are 
necessarily influenced by, products of, and speak to only certain times and 
places.  As the U.S. Supreme Court recently acknowledged, “The Court, 
like many institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time 
of which it is a part.”1  Even the most fundamental and elementary ideas 
describing the human experience are subject to the limitations posed by 
language and the necessity to find common ground to communicate an idea.  
Thus, what may initially seem a universal constant that requires neither 
explanation nor defense can fall flat or simply make no sense when 
transplanted to other places or other times. 
This dissertation is about the relationship between laws and ideas; the 
limitations that law faces insofar as it can only exist as an agglomeration of 
abstract concepts—concepts that derive meaning and color only from the 
individuals who are privy to and share its common meaning—who have the 
same experience of the same concept.  In other words, what the 
phenomenologist Alfred Schultz calls “universes of discourse.”2 
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007; 
M.St., University of Cambridge, 2012; Ph.D. candidate, University of Leiden.  
† Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Competing Theories of Religion and Law in the Supreme 
Court of the United States: An Hasidic Case, 43 NUMEN 184, 186 (1996).   
‡ Steven D. Jamar, Book Review, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 609, 609 (2001). 
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (June 26, 2015), slip op. at 11-12. 
2 Martin E. Marty, Religious Dimensions of Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, Part 1, 1, 7 (John Witte, Jr. & 
Johan D. van der Vyver, eds., 1996). 
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Here, I investigate the intersection of two of the most important areas 
governing how modern society is organized: the law governing religion.3  I 
investigate whether the purportedly (or presumptively) secular Western 
legal understanding of the idea of “religion,” as it is understood in court 
judgments, reflects any religious presuppositions or bias.   In other words, 
to what extent is the idea of “religion,” as it is understood by courts, 
sectarian rather than secular?4  If a bias exists, what should be done about it 
in order to bring our understanding, our definitions, and our approach to 
legal issues involving religion into conformity with broader legal norms 
concerning formal equality?5  “Trying to tease out relationships between 
law and religion is difficult not only because law draws upon many sources 
for its content, but also because of the variety of approaches to 
understanding law and to understanding religion.”6  The question is clearly 
important. “[L]aw has an important function to play not only in reflecting, 
but also in creating and sustaining, social life and shared values.”7 
To investigate whether such a bias exists I begin by examining two sets 
of court decisions: one from the United Kingdom and one from Israel, 
discussing the question “who is a Jew?” in a legal context.  There are two 
significant reasons for this approach to investigating the legal conception of 
“religion.”   
First, as I will further elaborate below, how courts understand 
membership of a religion is a window on how they understand “religion” 
writ large, and offers a tangible window into an amorphous concept.  By 
addressing only “who is a Jew?” the question of “religion” is narrowed 
from the entirety of beliefs, practices, institutions, loyalties, and ways of life 
that might be found in any given religion, to just the question of 
membership.  How one acquires and maintains membership in a particular 
religion, in turn, is a useful means by which religions can be categorized.  
As Zvi Gitelman has explained, “Relations between religion and ethnicity 
span a spectrum.  At one end are universal religions (Christianity and Islam) 
that are not specific to any ethnic group.  At the other end are ethnically 
specific or tribal religions (Judaism, Hinduism, Old Order Amish).”8  With 
3 Rowan Williams, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective, 10 
ECC. L.J. 262, 269 (2008) (“We touch here on one of the most sensitive areas not only in 
thinking about legal practice but also in interfaith relations.”) 
4 “Critical cultural studies of law . . . have contributed to a significant re-examination of 
modern law’s claims to secularity.”  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, et al., Introduction, in 
AFTER SECULAR LAW 1, 6 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al., eds. 2011). 
5 Rosemary J. Coombe, Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463, 
479 (1998) (“Legal fora are obviously significant sites for practices in which hegemony is 
constructed and contested-providing institutional venues for struggles to establish and 
legitimate authoritative meanings.”). 
6 Jamar, supra note ‡ at 609. 
7 Maleiha Malik, Faith and the State of Jurisprudence, in FAITH IN LAW: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL THEORY 129, 136 (Peter Oliver, et al., eds. 2000). 
8 Zvi Gitelman, The Decline of the Diaspora Jewish Nation: Boundaries, Content, and 
Jewish Identity, 2 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES, 112, 115 (1998).  In between are religions with 
some degree of affiliation with a particular ethnicity. 
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regard to membership, Judaism and Christianity are on opposite ends of the 
spectrum.  Thus, a legal understanding of religion that assumes Judaism 
defines (or ought to define) its membership in a manner parallel to how 
Christianity defines its membership may reveal an underlying Christian 
bias.9 
Second, in order to assess any religious bias inherent in courts’ ideas of 
“religion” it is necessary to investigate legal treatment of indisputably 
religious groups to isolate the underlying juridical assumptions and ensure 
that questions of legitimacy or the bona fides of the claimants are not the 
driving force behind any court decision.  There is no question as to 
Judaism’s status as a particular manifestation of “religion” in the popular 
sense.  Studying legal discourse on Judaism, therefore, avoids the much 
larger (and more difficult) logically prior question whether the object of 
study is a religion in the first place.  Because no court seriously doubts that 
in the popular or legal sense Judaism is indeed a religion, contrary to the 
way that legal status as a religion has sometimes been denied to, for 
example, the Church of Scientology or Wicca, it makes a useful illustration 
of courts’ approach to the idea of religion, and membership of a religion. 
Thus, using legal discourse concerning religious membership in 
Judaism as a window to courts’ conception of “religion” allows for a 
relatively focused inquiry with relatively broad implications.  How courts 
have addressed “Who is a Jew?” is likely to reveal the factors that courts 
consider determinative in what makes a religion a religion, and an 
investigation of these factors in the context of Judaism is unlikely to be 
clouded by suspicion of the sincerity of its adherents, or recent origin.   
In Chapter One, published as part of a symposium issue of the Elon 
Law Review, I examine the extent to which the idea of “religion” relied on 
by the British courts (High Court, Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 
and the United Kingdom Supreme Court) in the JFS case assumed that all 
religions define membership (or ought to define membership) in ways 
similar to Christianity, and especially Protestant Christianity, by assuming 
that at base all religions are (or should be) about the individual’s intellectual 
assent to a set of propositions of faith.  In other words, that religion is 
essentially a matter of supernatural belief, as opposed to anything to do with 
shared ethnicity, history, culture, or ritual. 
Chapter Two, published in the Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities, addresses a similar question, but looks at the line of cases in 
the Supreme Court of Israel beginning with the Rufeisen (Brother Daniel) 
decision, and subsequent cases interpreting the Right of Return.  The 
Supreme Court of Israel has come to a different conclusion on the question 
“Who is a Jew” than have Jewish religious authorities.  For the religious 
authorities, membership of the Jewish people is a matter of status, 
determined only by descent or conversion and, once conferred, is 
inalienable and irrevocable.  Personal belief and participation in rites is 
9 For obvious historical reasons, I assume that if Western law has a religious bias at all, 
it is a broadly Christian bias. 
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entirely irrelevant, as is conversion to another religion.  Neither a sincere 
belief that Jesus is the Messiah nor Christian baptism will undo one’s 
Jewish status in the eyes of the Orthodox Jewish religious authorities.   
Israeli civil courts, in contrast, have consistently held that affiliation 
with another religion revokes one’s Jewish status for purposes of the Law of 
Return and the automatic Israeli citizenship that comes with it.  These 
courts have insisted that as “secular,” civil courts, they must apply a 
“secular” definition of “religion,” and have therefore found that conversion 
to another religion forfeits one’s Jewish status and one’s right to make 
aliyah.  By (1) accepting that there exists a category called “religion,” 
largely defined by belief; (2) that Judaism is one such “religion” and (3) that 
this notion of “religion” is “secular,” the Israeli courts appear to have 
departed not only from Jewish orthodoxy, but also from the academic 
consensus on these issues.  This chapter will therefore ask to what extent 
Israeli law has subsumed the same idea that the British courts have: that 
“religion” is a trans-historical and trans-cultural concept detached from any 
particular religious framework or theological motivation. 
Having found in the first two chapters that the Western legal 
conception of “religion” has a tendency to assume a Christian (and, in large 
part, Protestant) weltanschauung, I attempt in Chapters Three and Four to 
discuss what the implications of those findings are, with particular regard to 
how “religion” as a legal term of art should be interpreted by courts.  How 
should judicial interpretation of fundamental guarantees of religious 
freedom take account of the Christian provenance of the criteria governing 
what it means to be a religion in the first place?  What can be done about 
the law’s largely Protestant conception of religion to ensure legal neutrality 
among religions and between religion and non-religion in multicultural 
societies?  How can this be done when the very language we use to describe 
religions in court decisions and legal instruments are shot through with 
anachronisms? 
“Religion” is notoriously difficult to define.  “In no field of human 
endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the 
communication of ideas.”10  But, because it is so often used in legal 
documents—constitutions, treaties, statutes, and the like—the need for a 
legal definition of religion (as opposed to one simply for the purpose of 
delimiting a scholarly field like “anthropology of religion”) is sometimes 
unavoidable.  At the very least, a court or other adjudicator may be called to 
make a determination whether a something is a religion or some action is 
religious, and therefore entitled to some legal privilege or protection.11  
10 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1975). 
11 Notably, persecution on account of religion is a basis for asylum under the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 
UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954), and the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 Jan. 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 
Oct. 1967). 
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Where religion is employed in this way, how should it be defined or 
interpreted so as to minimize inherent bias? 
Chapter Three, to be published in the Tennessee Law Review, discusses 
these problems in the context of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the 
religion clauses.  Chapter Four, to be published in the George Washington 
International Law Review, takes a similar approach in the context of the 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).12  Both 
will attempt to answer these questions in light of the tension between a 
definition that can be easily applied by courts and which can provide some 
measure of predictability for the public on the one hand, and accuracy in 
how that definition finds commonality among vastly disparate complex 
systems on the other.  Or, as Paul Valéry explained, the dialectic in which 
“[e]verything simple is false.  Everything which is complex is unusable.”13    
The U.S. Supreme Court has famously shied away from defining 
religion, and there are as many theories about how the Court should (or 
should not) define religion as there are commentators.  How should courts 
interpret the term “religion” in the First Amendment so as to minimize the 
effect that the unstated Christian background has on determining what is 
protected (or not) and prohibited (or not)?   
Unlike the First Amendment, Article 9 of the ECHR provides similar 
protection (broader in some respects, narrower in others) for individual 
freedom, without placing any limitation on the prerogative of member states 
to establish, officially or unofficially, a state religion.  Additionally, the 
existing jurisprudence of the ECHR under Article 9 is much less extensive 
than that of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Given this relatively clean slate on 
which to work, and in the absence of countervailing limitations on 
establishment, how does the analysis change?  Does the difference in the 
language used in the instruments affect the protection they afford?  How 
does the supranational character of the ECHR affect how “religion” will be 
understood in national courts? 
When judges and courts think of “religion” what are they really 
thinking of?14  What are the hallmarks of religion that they look for in 
separating religion from non-religion in the course of assigning legal 
benefits and burdens?  What are the legal consequences of those ideas, and 
12 Together, the decisions of these courts are of the highest importance because together 
the United States and the European Union represent the vast majority of “the West,” 
together their laws govern close to one billion people, and each is increasing in cultural 
diversity.   
13 PAUL VALÉRY, NOSTRE DESTIN ET LES LETTRES (1937).  This has also been referred 
to as “Bonini’s Paradox” and “Map-Territory relation.” 
14 “Few ask the question, ‘What is religion and how is it related to law?’ or ‘How can 
we best talk about religion?”  Sullivan, supra note † at 186.  A decade later, James Boyd 
White took up Sullivan’s challenge in HOW SHOULD WE TALK ABOUT RELIGION: 
PERSPECTIVES, CONTEXTS, PARTICULARITIES (James Boyd White ed., 2006). Later still, Ino 
Augsburg asked “How can we talk about religion from a legal point of view?”  Ino 
Augsburg, Taking Religion Seriously: On the Legal Relevance of Religious Self-Concepts, 
1 J. OF LAW, RELIGION & STATE 291, 291 (2012). 
12
do they result in any disparate or unfair treatment of minority religious 
groups?  The answers to these questions are important.  Legal judgments on 
the nature of religion have far-ranging societal consequences, and will 
continue to do so.15  I hope that a critical approach to the law’s 
understanding of religion will help to elucidate some of the judiciary’s more 
fundamental preconceptions about religion, and permit a more nuanced and 
self-reflective legal understanding of what religion is. 
 
 
15 This is true not just with respect to the rights in question, but more generally.  Alice 
Donald, Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: Grounds 
for Optimism?, 2 OX. J.L. & RELIGION 50, 55 (2013) (“A striking aspect of public 
discourse about religion or belief is the extent to which it has been shaped by certain legal 
judgments, in the sense that the judgments are adduced as evidence of wider patterns of 
experience or behavior.”) 
 
13
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“FAITH, HOWEVER DEFINED”: REASSESSING JFS AND THE
JUDICIAL CONCEPTION OF “RELIGION”
AARON R. PETTY*
The idea that religion is creed . . . is so deeply embedded in our legal culture that it
can be hard to see it as a particular, debatable view of what religion is.†
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1908, the eminent British legal scholar F.W. Maitland declared
that, “Religious liberty and religious equality are complete.”1  More re-
cent scholarship has suggested that Maitland’s declaration may have
been somewhat premature.2  But the last hundred years have witnessed
the “demise” of Christianity as the “dominant ideology of our aca-
demic discourses.”3  And—at least on the surface—the situation in law
is much the same.  But how does law conceive of “religion” itself?  And
does that conception reflect any religious bias or tacit suppositions that
affect how legal issues involving religion are framed, analyzed, or de-
cided?  The questions are hardly idle.  Legal conceptions of religion
“are not mere abstract intellectual exercises.  They are embedded in
* B.A. Northwestern University, 2004; J.D. University of Michigan Law School, 2007;
M.St. Jewish-Christian Relations, University of Cambridge, St. Edmund’s College, 2012;
Ph.D. candidate, Law, University of Leiden.  I thank Lars Fischer, Jay Geller, Rachel
Petty, and David Seymour for valuable criticism.  This article, which was initially a
master’s thesis, won first place in the 2012 Religious Freedom Student Writing Compe-
tition sponsored by the Brigham Young University Law School’s International Center
for Law and Religion Studies and the Washington, D.C. – Mid-Atlantic Chapter of the J.
Reuben Clark Law Society.
† Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1045
(2010).
1 F. W. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 520 (1908).
2 RUSSELL SANDBERG, LAW AND RELIGION 29 (2011).
3 JAY GELLER, ON FREUD’S JEWISH BODY: MITIGATING CIRCUMCISIONS 19 (2007).
(117)
14
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passionate social disputes on which the law of the state pronounces.”4
It is not, as Arie Molendijk explained, “a harmless affair.”5  Given that
the law often singles out religion for special benefits, it falls to the
courts to determine who qualifies and who does not.  For example,
now that the U.S. Supreme Court has definitively held that a “ministe-
rial exception” limits application of employment discrimination law to
the clergy,6 the courts will likely be faced with determining to whom
the exception applies.  How the courts understand religion, then, is of
utmost importance in determining how and to whom those benefits
are allocated.
In this paper, I challenge the unspoken assumption that the legal
category of “religion” is religiously neutral7—that is, that the concept
of “religion” employed by courts is essentially “transhistorical and
transcultural,”8 and may, therefore, be uncritically applied without re-
gard to the time, place, and context in which the idea of a thing called
“religion” arose.  To do so, I examine the series of judicial decisions in
the course of litigation between an anonymous student, “M,” and JFS
(formerly Jews’ Free School) regarding the school’s admission criteria,
which was ante litem premised on the Orthodox Jewish definition of
who is a Jew.9  I ask to what extent the idea of “religion”—and specifi-
cally the nature of membership in a religious body—on which the JFS
courts relied, favor religions in which membership is based largely, if
not exclusively, on confessing a particular faith at the expense of those
where membership is bound up to a significant extent with ethnicity
and lineage and where “faith” (in the sense of propositional faith or
“belief in” something) is not considered determinative of membership.
Didi Herman has called JFS “one of the most comprehensive judi-
cial engagements with Jewishness in English case law in the last 100 or
4 Talal Asad, Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s “The Meaning and End of Religion”,
40 HIST. OF RELIGIONS 205, 220 (2001) [hereinafter Asad, Reading a Modern Classic].
5 Arie L. Molendijk, In Defence of Pragmatism, in THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIG-
ION: CONTEXTS, CONCEPTS AND CONTESTS 3, 6 (Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk, eds.
1999) (internal quotation omitted).
6 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
7 Stolzenberg, supra note †, at 1045.
8 TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 28 (1993) [hereinafter ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION].
9 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] UKSC 15
(U.K.).
15
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so years.”10  “Legal judgments, especially those that function as ‘prece-
dent,’ are authoritative statements of official state discourse.”11  Thus,
the JFS decision is perceived as defining, to a significant extent, how
the U.K. government relates to Jews and how it conceives of Judaism.
Indeed, one Jewish leader suggested it was “potentially the biggest case
in the British Jewish community’s modern history.”12
Regrettably, however, JFS has received minimal academic scrutiny,
and the academic response has largely ignored the assumptions under-
lying the Court’s treatment of how membership in a religious group
can or ought to be determined.  Apart from two chapters in Herman’s
recent book, little of note has been written about this case.  What com-
mentary exists tends simply to agree or disagree with the Court’s judg-
ment without significant analysis.13 The commentary suggests that
religion in general should not be granted special protections,14 or it
addresses other, more doctrinal aspects of the decision.15  No academic
commentator has yet challenged at length the assumptions about the
nature of “religion” on which the Court relied.16
In Part II, I outline the dispute and provide an overview of the
findings of Mr. Justice Munby in the High Court, the terse opinion of
the Court of Appeals, and finally the 5-2-2 split decision of the U.K.
Supreme Court.  In Part III, I lay the groundwork for an evaluation of
those decisions by framing, as a historical matter, the development of
10 DIDI HERMAN, AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS & ENGLISH LAW
160 (2011).
11 Id. at 8.
12 Sarah Lyall, Who Is a Jew? Court Ruling in Britain Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/world/europe/08britain.html?page
wanted=all#.
13 Jason Ordene, Who Is a Jew? An Analytical Examination of the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom’s JFS Case: Why the Matrilineal Test for Jewish Identity Is Not in Violation of the
Race Relations Act of 1976, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 479 (2012); Geoffrey Bindman,
When Freedoms Collide, 160 NEW L.J. 320 (2010).
14 Aileen McColgan, Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace, 38 INDUS. L.J.
1 (2009).
15 Michael Connolly, Racial Groups, Sub-Groups, the Demise of the But For Test and the
Death of the Benign Motive Defence: R (on the Application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS, 39
INDUS. L.J. 183 (2010); Molly E. Swartz, By Birth or By Choice?  The Intersection of Racial and
Religious Discrimination in School Admissions, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 229 (2010).
16 Herman alludes to the underlying assumptions and J. H. H. Weiler discusses them
more directly, but briefly, in an online editorial.  J. H. H. Weiler, Discrimination and
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the idea of “religion” as a category.  I suggest both that the idea of
“religion” is historically contingent, and that the particular milieu in
which it originated suggests that the idea of “religion” takes Christian-
ity as its prototype.  In Part IV, I offer a critical analysis of JFS in light of
the ontological and semantic history of “religion” as a concept.  I con-
clude that the conception of religion reflected in the JFS courts’ ex-




JFS is a voluntary aided school under the School Standards and
Framework Act 1998.17  Such schools may, like JFS, have a “religious
character” designated by the Secretary of State for Children, Schools,
and Families.18  These schools (“faith schools”) are “exempted [by the
Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, §§ 88 and 88C] from the
prohibition against religious discrimination [in the Equality Act 2006,
§§ 45 and 47] because their purpose is to educate children in what are
generally the religious beliefs of their parents.”19  Faith schools are,
however, bound by the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976,
which prohibits discrimination on racial grounds in admission of stu-
dents,20 and which defines racial grounds to include “ethnic . . .
origins.”21
As Lord Phillips wrote,
JFS is an outstanding school.  For many years far more children have
wished to go there than there have been places in the school.  In these
circumstances it has been the policy of the school to give preference to
those whose status as Jews is recognised by the [Office of the Chief Rabbi,
hereafter “OCR”].22
The issue was whether this policy contravened the Race Relations Act.23
17 R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Another, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535, [119]
(Eng.).
18 Id. [121].
19 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 626, [10] (Eng.); R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others,
[2009] UKSC 15, [75] (U.K.) (Lord Mance).
20 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, §§ 17 & 19B(1) (U.K.).
21 Id. at § 3(1); JFS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535, [130].
22 JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [5] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers).
23 Id.
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M wished to go to JFS but, as the school was oversubscribed, it
limited its intake to those students who were recognized as Jewish by
the OCR.24  M’s father, E, was Jewish by birth; his mother was raised a
Roman Catholic but later converted to Judaism, prior to M’s birth,
under the auspices of a non-Orthodox synagogue.25  The OCR rejected
the validity of M’s mother’s conversion by the non-Orthodox syna-
gogue because it did not meet certain religious requirements.26  Under
Orthodox criteria, M’s mother never became Jewish and, therefore,
she could not have passed on Jewish status to M when he was born.27
Accordingly, JFS concluded that because M was not Jewish under the
OCR’s Orthodox standard, he would not be granted preferential
standing in admissions.28  And because JFS was oversubscribed and
could fill every seat with a halakhically Jewish student, the chance of M
being offered a place was essentially nonexistent.29
B. Before Mr. Justice Munby in the High Court
E sought judicial review both of JFS’s refusal to admit M and of
the School Adjudicator’s decision upholding the school’s admissions
policy.30  Justice Munby (hereinafter Munby J) delivered an exhaustive
judgment of 301 paragraphs that detailed the evidence put before
him, the parties’ arguments, and his own conclusions.31
Munby J began by reviewing evidence of how Jewish religious
groups define their own membership.32  Munby J received uncontro-
verted evidence from the OCR and the London Beth Din that “attend-
ance at the services of a synagogue has no bearing on a person’s status,
under Jewish religious law,” and that Jewish status “is thus different
from the notion of belonging to a faith in proselytizing religions such
as Christianity and Islam.”33  Moreover, it is incumbent upon observant
Orthodox Jews to teach the tenets of Judaism to Jews, even—and per-
haps especially—to those Jews who are not particularly observant.  This
24 JFS, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 626, [15].
25 JFS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535, [34]; JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [66] (Lady Hale of
Richmond).
26 JFS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535, [38]-[40]; JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [74] (Lord
Mance).
27 JFS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535, [35]; JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [6] (Lord Phillips).
28 JFS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535, [60].
29 Id.
30 Id. [73].
31 JFS, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 1535.
32 Id. [15], [20]-[21].
33 Id. [14].
18
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is the raison d’être of JFS, and the basis of its admissions policy that
favors students who are halakhically Jewish, regardless of their level of
commitment or observance.34
Munby J rejected E’s claims of both direct and indirect discrimina-
tion.35  With regard to direct discrimination, Munby J found that,
[b]eing Jewish can be a matter of race, but it can also be purely a matter
of religion.  One can be Jewish as a matter of religion (for example by
conversion) but not by racial [i.e., ethnic] origin.  Conversely, one can be
Jewish as a matter of ethnicity on account of a Jewish ancestor but, unless
that ancestor is in the direct maternal line or the individual converts in a
way recognized by the OCR, not Jewish as a matter of religion.36
The second scenario is the case of M, who is ethnically Jewish (through
his father), but not religiously Jewish according to the OCR because
his mother’s conversion is not recognized and he has not himself con-
verted.37  Munby J concluded that,
[t]he simple fact, in my judgment, is that JFS’s admissions policy is, as the
School Adjudicator correctly found, based on religious and not on racial
(ethnic) grounds, reflecting, as it does, a religious and not an ethnic view
as to who, in the eyes of the OCR and JFS, is or is not a Jew.  Such an
analysis . . . fits comfortably within the distinction drawn in Seide between
actions by or in relation to Jews based on religious grounds and actions by
or in relation to Jews based on racial (ethnic) grounds.38
With regard to indirect discrimination, Munby J found that JFS’s
admission policy did put those students who were not of Jewish ethnic-
ity at a disadvantage because such students were less likely to be Jewish
under the religious definition employed by the OCR.39  However, the
judge found that the admission policy had a legitimate aim that justi-
fied the policy, in part because “a policy which permitted preferences
based only on the basis of religious practice would prejudice religions,
such as Judaism, which define membership exclusively by status and
not by practice or observance.”40  Ms. Dinah Rose QC, for E, objected
that it would be absurd to think that the school could advance its relig-
ious character by giving preference to those students who were
halakhically Jewish (i.e., by maternal descent), but also were practicing
Christians or atheists, over a practicing and pious Masorti or Reform
34 Id. [13].
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Jew, not considered Jewish by the OCR.41  Munby J explained why “re-
ligion” must mean more than belief and practice:
The irrationality or absurdity to which Ms. Rose refers appears only if one
assumes that religion is necessarily a matter of belief, practice and obser-
vance and that it is only on those grounds that a faith-based school can
properly base its admissions policy.  But that . . . is simply not so; not so in
relation to Judaism, and not so in relation to other religions.  Moreover,
it gives a seriously limited and inadequate recognition to what may prop-
erly—rationally and sensibly—be implicated in the concept of being a
member of a religious community.42
Munby J further found that the policy was a proportionate means of
achieving that aim, and noted that it was not “materially different”
from a Muslim school giving preference to those born of a Muslim
father, or a Roman Catholic school giving preference to those who
were baptized in infancy.43  Moreover,
some alternative policy based on such factors as adherence or commit-
ment to Judaism (even assuming that such a concept has any meaning for
this purpose in Jewish religious law) would not be a means of achieving
JFS’s aims and objectives; on the contrary it would produce a different
school ethos.44
Thus, Munby J found that E’s claim for indirect discrimination failed
as well.45  The school’s admissions policy, although it disadvantaged
students who were not ethnically Jewish, was a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim.46
C. Before the Court of Appeal
E’s appeal was heard before Lord Justice Sedley (hereinafter
Sedley LJ), Lady Justice Smith, and Lord Justice Rymer in May 2009.47
Sedley LJ, writing for a unanimous Court, began by noting that a faith
school, when oversubscribed, may restrict entry “to children whom, or
whose parents, it regards as sharing the school’s faith. . . . [N]o school,
however, is permitted to discriminate in its admissions policy on racial
grounds.”48  The Court of Appeal appeared to have some difficulty in
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poses, but not for religious purposes, and vice versa.  For example,
Sedley LJ held that “[o]ne of the great evils against which the succes-
sive Race Relations Acts have been directed is the evil of antisemitism.
None of the parties to these proceedings want or can afford to put up a
case which would result in discrimination against Jews not being dis-
crimination on racial grounds.”49
The Court of Appeal summarized its decision in three points: ex-
plaining that Jews constitute a racial group; discrimination on the basis
of Jewish status is racial discrimination; and the motive for the discrimi-
nation, regardless of any religious character, is irrelevant.50  The Court
then analogized Jewish status to membership in the Christian Church.
The Court explained that “[i]f for theological reasons a fully sub-
scribed Christian faith school refused to admit a child on the ground
that, albeit practicing Christians, the child’s family were of Jewish ori-
gin, it is hard to see what answer there could be to a claim for race
discrimination.”51  Finally, the Court suggested that Jewish faith schools
could still give preference to Jewish children in admissions, but that “as
one would expect, eligibility must depend on faith, however defined
. . . .”52
D. Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court split three ways: Lord Philips, Lady Hale,
Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, and Lord Clarke upheld the judgment of the
Court of Appeal, concluding that JFS’s admissions policy based on the
OCR guidance and halakha constituted direct racial discrimination.53
Lords Hope and Walker concluded that although there was no direct
racial discrimination, there was indirect discrimination because the
school failed to prove that its admissions policy was a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim.54  Lords Rodger and Brown
agreed with Munby J, that there was no unlawful discrimination, direct





53 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] UKSC 15
(U.K.).
54 Id. [210]-[211], [218], [235].
55 Id. [232], [255]-[277].
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1. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
Lord Phillips began by explaining that although the phrase
“grounds for discrimination” is ambiguous, it has been interpreted to
mean the factual criteria applied by the discriminator, rather than the
discriminator’s subjective motivation for relying on those criteria.56  He
then noted that the Orthodox test for determining Jewish status fo-
cuses on matrilineal descent.57  He suggested that it is possible to iden-
tify a group who is Jewish according to the OCR standards and a group
who is Jewish according to the test of ethnicity outlined in a previous
case (the Mandla criteria).58  But the two are “virtually coextensive”
and, according to Lord Phillips, “[a] woman who converts to Judaism
thereby acquires both Jewish religious status and Jewish ethnic sta-
tus.”59  Accordingly, Lord Phillips concluded that the matrilineal test is
a prohibited “test of ethnic origin.”60
2. Lady Hale of Richmond
Lady Hale’s judgment focused more closely on the applicable dis-
crimination law, explaining that her decision to write separately de-
spite reaching the same conclusion as the other justices in the
majority, and for the same reasons, was because “the debate before us
and between us has called in question some fundamental principles
. . . .”61  She explained, first, that there is a difference between direct
discrimination, which stems from a difference in formal equality of
treatment, and indirect discrimination, which may exist where a for-
mally neutral rule adversely and disproportionately affects members of
a particular protected class.62  Lady Hale explained that while indirect
discrimination is justifiable where it is a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim, direct discrimination is, as a matter of law,
never justifiable.63  After reviewing the leading cases, Lady Hale con-
cluded that there is a difference between the ground and the motive
for a discriminatory act, and that the ground relied on by the OCR in
rejecting M was that his mother was ethnically Italian and not Jewish.64
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Lady Hale discounted the fact that M’s mother had not converted
under Orthodox auspices, holding that because his mother’s ethnic
origin was the sole criterion, the school still would have been basing its
admissions decisions on ethnicity, regardless of whether the conver-
sion was considered valid or not.65  In effect, Lady Hale concluded that
Jewish ethnicity and membership in the People of Israel are cotermi-
nous, either discounting entirely the possibility of conversion or, like
Lord Phillips, concluding that ethnicity is not immutable.  Lady Hale
went on to observe that “no other faith schools in this country adopt
descent-based criteria for admission” and that “[t]he Christian Church
will admit children regardless of who their parents are.”66  Lady Hale
concluded by suggesting that if special arrangements are to be made
for Jewish schools to apply Jewish principles in determining who is Jew-
ish, then such a step should be taken by Parliament; the courts should
not “depart[ ] from the long-established principles of the anti-discrimi-
nation legislation.”67
3. Lord Mance
Lord Mance agreed in large part with the judgments of Lord Phil-
lips and Lady Hale.  But his judgment reflected a significant concern
with the application of international and European law.  Lord Mance
explained, “I also consider it to be consistent with the underlying pol-
icy of s.1(1)(a) of the [Race Relations] Act [1976] that it should apply
in the present circumstances.  The policy is that individuals should be
treated as individuals, and not assumed to be like other members of a
group.”68  Lord Mance continued, that, notwithstanding Article 9(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights, which affords impor-
tance to the “autonomous existence of religious communities,” free-
dom to manifest one’s religion is subject to limitations prescribed by
law and which are “necessary in a democratic society for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others”; that the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child 1989 required the Court to treat the
interests of the child as a primary consideration; and that Protocol 1,
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provided par-
ents with a right to ensure education in conformity with their own re-




68 Id. [90] (Lord Mance).
69 Id.
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absence of direct discrimination, he would have found that “JFS has
not and could not have justified its admissions policy.”70
4. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore
Lord Kerr, like Lady Hale, began by distinguishing the ground of
a decision—the criteria applied—from the decision maker’s subjective
motivation.71  Lord Kerr then departed slightly from the other Justices
in the majority, concluding that Jewish religious law was not just the
motivation for the school’s decision, but was also its ground.72  Lord
Kerr, however, held that underlying that religious determination was
itself a question of ethnicity.73  He explained that “the reason that [M]
was not a Jew was because of his ethnic origins, or more pertinently, his
lack of the requisite ethnic origins.”74  Lord Kerr opined that when
religious questions have consequences under civil law, the lawfulness
of the action by religious authorities is subject to judicial process.75  Be-
cause the ground for the school’s decision ultimately rested on M’s
ethnicity, the fact that it was a religious ground did not insulate it from
the reach of the Court.76
5. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony
Lord Clarke agreed with Lord Kerr that the grounds in question
were religious, but that notwithstanding that categorization, could still
be unlawful if the religious grounds were based on ethnicity.77  Thus,
Lord Clarke concluded that both ethnic and religious grounds were
implicated in the school’s decision.78  And because “the ethnic element
is an essential feature of the religious ground,” the ethnic ground of
the school’s decision is inescapable.79  Lord Clarke also suggested that
the subjective intent of the OCR was irrelevant, noting that the ques-
tion of whether the subjective state of mind of the alleged discrimina-
tor had, until then, “not perhaps been as clearly identified in the
70 Id. [103].





76 Id. [120].  Lord Kerr joined in Lord Mance’s resolution of the question of indirect
discrimination.
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authorities as it should be.”80  Finally, Lord Clarke found apt Sedley
LJ’s analogy between Judaism and the South African Dutch Reformed
Church, which “until recently, believed that God had made black peo-
ple inferior and had destined them to live separately from whites.”81
Lord Clarke agreed with Lords Mance and Kerr on the issue of indi-
rect discrimination.82
6. Lord Hope of Craighead
Lord Hope offered a nuanced judgment, concluding that al-
though JFS had not engaged in direct discrimination, it had engaged
in indirect discrimination for which it had failed to offer a sufficient
justification.83  He began by noting that “[i]t has long been understood
that it is not the business of the courts to intervene in matters of relig-
ion,”84 and explained that the center of contention concerned how the
grounds for the school’s decision should be characterized.85  Lord
Hope explained that “the difficulty in this case arises because of the
overlap between the concepts of religious and racial discrimination
and, in the case of Jews, the overlap between ethnic Jews and Jews rec-
ognized as members of the Jewish religion,” and that perhaps the gov-
erning law was not equipped to deal with cases of discrimination that
were not “obvious.”86
With regard to direct discrimination, Lord Hope explained that
“[t]he development of the case law in this area has not been entirely
straightforward,” and that in new fields, such as discrimination law,
“the need for the court to clarify one issue may result in a principle
being stated too broadly,” making it difficult to resolve an interlocking
issue arising later in a consistent and principled way.87  Contrary to the
Justices in the majority, Lord Hope concluded that the existing case
law did not preclude the use of evidence of a discriminator’s subjective
80 Id. [132].
81 Id. [150].  Lord Clarke then insisted that, “any suggestion that [the Chief Rabbi,
the OCR, or JFS] acted in a racist way in the popular sense of that term must be dis-
missed.” Id. [156]. Either Lord Clarke is dissembling or he must not think that the
Dutch Reformed Church was racist in the popular sense of the term either.  The juxta-
position of the two propositions admits of no other interpretations.
82 Id. [154].
83 Id. [218].
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intent in determining the ground for the discrimination.88  Rather
than the majority’s blanket rejection of subjective intent, Lord Hope
held that subjective motive may be relevant, or even necessary, to de-
termine whether the grounds of the decision were premised on race,
but that a benign intent will not negate direct racial discrimination
where the grounds are, in fact, racial.89  He thus concluded that with
regard to the relevance of subjective motivation, “[i]t all depends on
the stage of the enquiry.”90
Lord Hope held that the Chief Rabbi, and thus JFS, made their
determination that M was not Jewish on entirely religious grounds.91
He provided two contrasting examples: one child, who is not in any
way affiliated with the Jewish community, has unimpeachable docu-
mentary evidence that his mother’s mother’s mother converted to Ju-
daism in an Orthodox synagogue (although he is descended from no
other Jews), and would be considered Jewish by the OCR; another
child is descended from Jews in every ancestral line except the direct
maternal line, participates fully in the Jewish community, and consid-
ers himself Jewish.  But his mother’s mother’s mother was converted in
a non-Orthodox synagogue.92  The OCR would not consider that child
Jewish.93  Thus, Lord Hope, in agreement with Lord Rodger, con-
cluded that the test the OCR applied was entirely religious; descent is
involved, but the determination is based entirely on religious criteria.94
Lord Hope also concluded, with regard to indirect discrimination,
that for the reasons given by Lord Brown, JFS had shown that its aim
was legitimate.95  He explained that a faith school is entitled to adopt
an admissions policy that gives effect to the principles of its faith,
which would include JFS’s interest in educating in the Jewish faith
those students it considers Jewish.96  But with regard to whether JFS
had shown that its policy was a proportionate means of achieving that
aim, Lord Hope concluded that—although it might be—JFS had not
shown that there were no less restrictive options available, largely be-
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any alternative policies.97  Lord Hope explained, “as JFS have not ad-
dressed [alternative measures], it is not entitled to a finding that the
means that it adopted were proportionate.”98
7. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
Lord Walker concurred in the judgment of Lord Hope, adding no
analysis of his own.99  He did express agreement with the import of
Lady Hale’s summary of discrimination law generally, but suggested
that the impossibility of ever justifying direct discrimination contrasted
with the constant availability of a defense to indirect discrimination
was somewhat “arbitrary.”100
8. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
Lord Rodger wrote a stinging dissent.  He began (perhaps in re-
sponse to Lord Mance’s suggestion that the European Convention on
Human Rights supported E’s claimed right to send his child to a Jewish
school) that the point of religious schools “is not to ensure that there
will be a school where Jewish or Roman Catholic children can be segre-
gated off to receive good teaching in French or physics. . . . Rather, the
whole point of such schools is their religious character.”101  In the case
of JFS, the religious character is Judaism and, specifically, Orthodox
Judaism, and the admission policy is, therefore, based on guidance
from the Chief Rabbi, who applies the matrilineal test to determine if
an applicant is Jewish.102  “[N]o other policy would make sense. . . .
[I]n its eyes, irrespective of whether they adhere to Orthodox, Masorti,
Progressive or Liberal Judaism, or are not in any way believing or ob-
servant, these are the children—and the only children—who are
bound by the Jewish law and practices.”103
Lord Rodger suggested that this case reflected a dispute between
rival religious authorities regarding who constitutes the Jewish people,
and that the majority was wrong to conclude that a question of ethnic-
ity was involved in any respect.104  He said, “to reduce the religious ele-
ment in the actions of those concerned to the status of a mere motive
97 Id. [211]-[212].
98 Id. [212].
99 Id. [235] (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe).
100 Id. [236]-[237].
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is to misrepresent what they were doing.”105  He explained that the
question before the Court was whether the religious matrilineal test
was necessarily also based on ethnic origins and that, although Lady
Hale found that the school rejected M because of his mother’s Italian
and Roman Catholic ethnic origins, M’s “mother could have been as
Italian in origin as Sophia Loren and as Roman Catholic as the Pope
for all that the governors cared: the only thing that mattered was that
she had not converted to Judaism under Orthodox auspices.”106
9. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Lord Brown dissented as well, but less vociferously, suggesting that
the arguments on both sides were “entirely coherent and entirely re-
spectable.”107  Lord Brown agreed that Jews, including converts, consti-
tute an ethnic group, but found no support for the proposition that
the Race Relations Act prohibited intra-ethnic discrimination.108  And,
in light of the unavailability of a defense of justification in the case of
direct discrimination, Lord Brown thought it advisable to limit its
reach in borderline cases.109  Lord Brown also found persuasive the fact
that Jewish religious law concerning who is a Jew would be irrelevant
for purposes of admission to Jewish schools, and chastised the Court of
Appeal for inventing a non-Jewish definition of who is Jewish, particu-
larly given that the matrilineal test is, in practice, not so different from
a Catholic school giving priority to children who have been baptized,
since a child without at least one Christian parent is unlikely to be
baptized.110  Lord Brown explained that to hold that Jewish religious
law cannot be applied in determining admission to a Jewish school
“would be to stigmatise Judaism as a directly racially discriminatory re-
ligion.”111  With regard to indirect discrimination, Lord Brown agreed
with Lord Rodger that a religious practice test, in addition to being
“invasive, difficult to measure and open to abuse, would be contrary to
the positive desire of schools like JFS to admit non-observant as well as
observant Jewish children.”112  He concluded that it could be no more
disproportionate for a Jewish school to give priority to children it
105 Id. [227].
106 Id. [228].
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deems Jewish, regardless of commitment, over a sincere and commit-
ted child it did not recognize as Jewish “than it would be to refuse to
admit a boy to an oversubscribed all-girls school.”113
E. The Reaction
Reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision was mixed.  As Lord
Brown noted, JFS became obliged to apply a non-Jewish test to deter-
mine whether an applicant was Jewish.114  Indeed, all maintained Jew-
ish schools had to do so, because all Jewish denominations define
membership according to descent or conversion (the chief difference
among them being whether patrilineal descent alone is sufficient).115
Didi Herman went further, suggesting that “by insisting on a test of
religious observance rather than matrilineal descent, the Court . . .
impos[ed] a model of Christian worship on Jewish people.”116  Simi-
larly, Rabbi Michael Simon claimed that the remedy ordered by the
Court of Appeal and approved by the Supreme Court focused on belief
and practice “[b]ecause those are the criteria for determining religion
in the Christian world.”117  Once in place, the “religious-practice test”
was found to lead to “all sorts of awkward practical issues.”118  For ex-
ample, Orthodox Jews do not write on the Sabbath, so a child signing
in to record attendance at religious services in order to demonstrate
religious commitment for school admission purposes, presented some-
thing of a problem.119
But it was not just Jewish schools that were affected.  The Daily
Telegraph reported that the Secretary of State warned that other faith
schools might be affected by the JFS decision as well because religion is
often “closely related” to ethnicity.120  Roman Catholic schools, in par-
ticular, expressed concern that baptism, long their criteria for mem-
bership, might have to be suspended in favor of a practice-based test
focused more on belief than on participation in rites.121
113 Id. [256].
114 Michael Simon, Who Decides ‘Who is a Jew’, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 2010, at 38.
115 Frank Cranmer, Who is a Jew: Jewish Faith Schools and the Race Relations Act 1976, 164
LAW & JUST. 75, 80 (2010).
116 HERMAN, supra note 10, at 168.
117 Simon, supra note 114, at 38.
118 Lyall, supra note 12.
119 Id.
120 Cranmer, supra note 115, at 80.
121 Id. at 81-82.
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Despite significant coverage in the popular press, the volume of
commentary from legal scholars has been surprisingly small and has
generally failed to address the assumptions concerning the nature of
“religion” underlying the Court’s decision.122  Indeed, much of the le-
gal commentary, even from notable practitioners, has been venomous
in its criticism of the school and, by implication, of Jewish law gener-
ally.  Mark Hill QC (editor of the Ecclesiastical Law Journal), writes that
all of the members of the Court agreed that “faith schools can, and
should, adopt selection policies based on genuine religious adherence
and practice,” strongly suggesting that the matrilineal test is either not
genuine, not religious, or both.123  Geoffrey Bindman (the noted
human rights solicitor whose law firm represented E), echoed this, ex-
plaining that “the irony of the situation was that the boy’s exclusion
was not an issue of faith at all.”124  Bindman goes on to suggest, in lan-
guage that one could fairly term antisemitic, that “[i]t is profoundly
paradoxical that the orthodox method of preserving racial exclusivity
has survived.  It seems primitive and out of touch with modern reality
. . . .”125  Perhaps the better question is whether modernity is suffi-
ciently mature and self-reflective to consider the possibility that its con-
ception of “religion” is the product of development in particular times
and places, rather than a neutral and static category of human
existence.
III. THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF “RELIGION”
When I mention Religion, I mean the Christian Religion; and not only the Chris-
tian Religion, but the Protestant Religion; and not only the Protestant Religion,
but the Church of England.
122 But see Weiler, supra note 16.  Other literature has addressed other aspects of the
Court’s decision.  McColgan, supra note 14; Connolly, supra note 15; Swartz, supra note
15.
123 Mark Hill, What the JFS Ruling Meant, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/dec/21/judaism-jfs-faith-
schools-discrimination.
124 Bindman, supra note 13, at 320.
125 Id.  Jewish exclusivity has long been a theme in British antisemitism, particularly in
response to Jewish claims to be the “chosen people.”  TONY KUSHNER, THE PERSISTENCE
OF PREJUDICE: ANTISEMITISM IN BRITISH SOCIETY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 93-94
(1989).  Although clearly to his client’s benefit, the distinction Bindman tries to draw
between determination of Jewish status in Orthodox circles and in other branches of
Judaism is at best tendentious and misleading.  Even the JFS majority recognized that
descent and conversion are the criteria used by all branches of Judaism, not just Ortho-
doxy.  R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] UKSC 15,
[41] (Lord Phillips), [76] (Lord Mance), [119] (Lord Kerr) (U.K.).
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—Mr. Thwackum126
“[D]efining religion for legal purposes has always been difficult in
the U.K.”127  Neither legal academic commentary nor judicial opinions
have taken into consideration the historical, sociological, or anthropo-
logical literature addressing the problem of conceptualizing “religion”
as a category.128  A. Bradney characterizes the attitude of British law
toward religion as a “mixture of bias and muddle,”129 the origins of
which James A. Beckford traces “back to the late medieval and early
modern tendency to equate religion with a particular form of Christi-
anity,” à la Mr. Thwackum.130  The confusion this shift in terminology
created has been exacerbated, Beckford says, by the “rapid growth of
non-Christian faith communities and philosophies of life in the U.K. in
the second half of the twentieth century.”131  In light of these develop-
ments, a reassessment of the meaning of “religion,” and an investiga-
tion of the presuppositions that judges bring with them to the bench
about what religion necessarily entails would seem to be in order.
A. The Religious Subtext of JFS
Given the current state of the law, it may not be immediately ap-
parent why the idea of “religion” is relevant to the analysis of JFS.  “Re-
ligion” is not mentioned in the Race Relations Act of 1976;132 the
question before the courts was whether the school discriminated on
grounds of ethnic origins.133  Nor is this a case where there is any doubt
about the religious nature of the group in question.
The idea of “religion” manifests itself in this case in subtler and
more insidious ways.  The clearest example of this in the Supreme
Court is Baroness Hale’s comment that “[t]he Christian Church will
126 T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in Interna-
tional Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189 (2003) (quoting HENRY FIELDING, TOM JONES
83 (Sheridan Baker ed., Norton 1995) (1749)).
127 James A. Beckford, The Politics of Defining Religion in Secular Society, in THE PRAGMAT-
ICS OF DEFINING RELIGION:  CONTEXTS, CONCEPTS AND CONTESTS 23, 28 (Jan G. Platvoet
& Arie L. Molendijk eds., 1999).
128 HERMAN, supra note 10, at 6-7.  For more on the distinction between general con-
cepts and specific conceptions see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 70-71 (1986); RON-
ALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 134-36 (1977).
129 ANTHONY BRADNEY, RELIGIONS, RIGHTS AND LAWS 132 (1993).
130 Beckford, supra note 127, at 29.
131 Id.
132 See generally Race Relations Act, 1976 (U.K.) (amended 2000).
133 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] UKSC 15
(U.K.).
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admit children regardless of who their parents are.”134  Although she
“is the only [Supreme Court] judge to explicitly compare Christianity
with Judaism, finding the latter wanting,”135 Lady Hale’s reasoning ech-
oes the statement by Sedley LJ that “[i]f for theological reasons a fully
subscribed Christian faith school refused to admit a child on the
ground that, albeit practicing Christians, the child’s family were of Jew-
ish origin, it is hard to see what answer there could be to a claim for
race discrimination.”136  Indeed, the Court of Appeal went on to ex-
plain that admission to Jewish faith schools must “as one would expect
. . . depend on faith, however defined, and not on ethnicity.”137  What
would be the basis for such an expectation?  The assumption that faith
is the only proper criterion on which membership in a religious group
can be based is striking.
Although the courts pay token respect to the evidence concerning
how Jewish law defines the Jewish people, that evidence does not figure
into their analyses in any meaningful way.  The subtext of the judg-
ments suggest that the judges and justices view “religion” as a category
where (1) membership cannot be inherited, but is instead a matter of
individual choice that (2) depends on faith, which (3) can be largely
identified by proxy through public worship.  How broadly the idea of
“religion” is construed and, in particular, how membership in a relig-
ion can be attained and identified, is relevant to whether JFS’s refusal
to admit M was a decision taken on religious grounds alone.  What it
means to be a member of a religion is therefore of central importance
in determining whether the grounds for the discrimination were relig-
ious, and not ethnic.
B. The Development of the Idea of “Religion”
For many years, “religion” as a category was “left largely unhis-
toricized, essentialized, and tacitly presumed immune to or inherently
resistant to critical analysis.”138  More recently, a scholarly notion of re-
ligion that gives primacy to propositional belief has been called “a
modern, privatized Christian one because and to the extent that it em-
phasizes the priority of belief as a state of mind rather than as consti-
134 Id. [69] (Baroness Hale).
135 HERMAN, supra note 10, at 168.
136 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 626, [32] (Eng.)
137 Id. [33].
138 TOMOKO MASUZAWA, THE INVENTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS 1-2 (2005).
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tuting activity in the world.”139  The reasons for this change can be
illustrated by reference to both the semantic and ontological history of
the idea of religion.
Scholars differ on the extent to which “religion,” as it is generally
understood, is a product of post-Enlightenment Protestantism or of
the early Christian period in late antiquity.140  But the idea of religion
itself, as it “is generally recognized, derive[s] from Western cultural
traditions and experiences.”141  One also might add Western linguistic
traditions because how an idea is understood requires both an idea
and the means to express it. Religion “is originally from the Latin re-
ligio, a term that eventually was used in a great variety of senses, even by
a single writer, without precision.”142  Thus, although Benson Saler
warns us that “the semantic history of religio better serves us as a cau-
tionary tale than as an encouraging paradigm” because “the derivation
of religio is hidden from our view by the layered fog of millennia,”143 it is
not the term’s origin, but the changing nature of its referent over time
(and the causes for such change) that are relevant to rooting out any
in-built bias in the modern legal understanding of “religion.”
Scholars are also divided on whether religio “first designated a
power outside man obligating him to certain behavior under pain of
threatened awesome retribution, a kind of tabu, or the feeling in man
139 ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION, supra note 8, at 47.
140 DANIEL BOYARIN, BORDER LINES: THE PARTITION OF JUDAEO-CHRISTIANITY 11 (2004)
[hereinafter BOYARIN, BORDER LINES].
141 Benson Saler, Religio and the Definition of Religion, 2 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 395,
395 (1987).  See also Jan G. Platvoet, Contexts, Concepts and Contests: Toward a Pragmatics of
Defining Religion, in THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIGION: CONTEXTS, CONCEPTS AND
CONTESTS 463, 463-64 (Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk eds., 1999) (“[T]he modern
terms ‘religion’ and ‘religions’ are diffuse and untidy prototypical concepts of recent
Western origin.”); Russell T. McCutcheon, The Category “Religion” in Recent Publications:
A Critical Survey, 42 NUMEN 284, 285 (1995).
142 WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION 19 (1963) [herein-
after SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION]. One cannot escape reliance on
Smith’s work when discussing the development of the idea of religion in the West.
Even his critics acknowledge that his “attempt to address the old question of the nature
of religion by denying that it has any essence was truly original,” Asad, Reading a Modern
Classic, supra note 4, at 206, and that his recommendation against using “religion” as a
reified concept has gained acceptance, McCutcheon, supra note 141, at 286, even if his
further conclusions have not.  Other important works in this vein include Ernst Feil’s
four-volume series Religio (in German) and Michel Despland’s La religion en Occident:
Évolution des ideés et du vécu (in French).  Jan Platvoet summarizes (in broad strokes) and
synthesizes much of what these seminal works have found (especially Feil).  See generally
Platvoet, supra note 141.
143 Saler, supra note 141, at 396.
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vis-à-vis such powers.”144  Either way, “an emphasis on isolating various
beliefs and making them central to an analytically distinct department
of culture termed religion is not a markedly ancient tradition.”145  Gavin
Langmuir takes the former position, suggesting that, “religio primarily
indicated recognition of a system of supernatural constraints or obliga-
tion (oblige, to bind or tie), while religiositas denoted action in conform-
ity with those obligations.”146  Wilfred Cantwell Smith seems to take this
position as well.  He notes that, “the early phrase religio mihi est is illumi-
nating.  To say that such-and-such a thing was religio meant that it was
mightily incumbent upon me to do it [or not].”147  For example,
“[t]here is no evidence in the New Testament that the early Christians
were conscious of being involved in a new religion.  They . . . simply
did not think in such terms.”148  There were certain beliefs or postu-
lates (i.e., the existence of gods) that provided both the framework for
religio and the impetus for activities that constituted religiositas, but
there was no conception that holding particular beliefs was either nec-
essary or sufficient to make one a member of a community bound by a
particular religio or that practiced religiositas in a particular manner.  In
first-century Roman Judea, “being a Judean [which included participa-
tion in the Temple cult] and being a follower of Jesus were incommen-
surable categories, rather like being a Russian or a Rotarian, a
Brazilian or a Bridge player.”149  In short, “the concept of religion, which
is fundamental to our [contemporary] outlook and our historical re-
search, lacked a taxonomical counterpart in antiquity.”150
The advent of Pauline Christianity began to change this under-
standing of religio as personal piety.  “Pauline Christianity placed itself
against a Jewish notion of ‘inherited contract,’ replacing it with a dif-
ferent narrative—one about consent.”151  Thus, we begin to see nostra
religio and nostrae religiones as against vestra religio and vestrae religiones,
early post-Christian terms used by some Church fathers, including
Arnobius of Sicca.152  Thereafter, the “ours/theirs” distinction becomes
144 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 20.
145 Saler, supra note 141, at 395.
146 GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, HISTORY, RELIGION, AND ANTISEMITISM 70 (1990).
147 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 20.
148 Id. at 60.
149 Steve Mason, Jews, Judeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization in Ancient
History, 38 J. FOR THE STUDY OF JUDAISM 457, 512 (2007).
150 Id. at 482 n.55 (listing sources noting that the modern category religion has no
equivalent in ancient Greek or Latin (or any other language)).
151 HERMAN, supra note 10, at 167.
152 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION supra note 142, at 27-28.
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vera religio/falsa religio (but here using vera in the sense of “correct” or
“proper,” rather than “true”), adding a layer of normativity to what was
previously a matter of differing tribal or regional customs.153  Thus, the
patristic understanding of religio still referred chiefly to personal piety
(even if to the correct form of piety).154
Medieval usage of religio appears multifaceted.  Among Latin
Christians in the West, religio became equated with the particular obli-
gations of monastic life.155  Later, it came to signify (as it does to this
day) the monastic life itself, including, but not limited to, its attendant
obligations.156  But the ancient connotations of religio still had currency,
even into the late medieval period.157  For example, in 1474, Marsilio
Ficino wrote De Christiana Religione—“‘Christian religion,’ not ‘the
Christian religion’”—the “kind of religion [as action] exemplified by
Jesus.”158  And Ernst Feil has claimed “an astonishingly strong attach-
ment to a classical and Roman concept of religio” even later, well into
the sixteenth century.159
The Protestant Reformation redefined religio to correspond to in-
dividual beliefs concerning the supernatural.  This was not the result of
a conscious effort at redefinition, but the logical conclusion of some
novel aspects of Protestant theology coupled with technological devel-
opment.  Robert A. Yelle explains that “[t]he triumph of an antino-
mian concept of religion . . . was . . . largely a product of the
Reformation.”160  Protestants, buoyed by the development of the print-
ing press, sought to encourage direct relation between the individual
and God; sacraments and rites decreased in importance.161  “[T]he po-
153 Id. at 27; see also Robert A. Yelle, Moses’ Veil: Secularization as a Christian Myth, in
AFTER SECULAR LAW 25 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, et al. eds., 2011).
154 Platvoet, supra note 141, at 474.
155 LANGMUIR, supra note 146, at 70.
156 Id.; Platvoet, supra note 141, at 475.
157 Platvoet, supra note 141, at 475.
158 PETER HARRISON, ‘RELIGION’ AND THE RELIGIONS IN THE ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT
12-13 (1990).
159 Ernst Feil, From the Classical Religion to the Modern Religion: Elements of a Transforma-
tion between 1550 and 1650, in RELIGION IN HISTORY: THE WORD, THE IDEA, THE REALITY
32 (Michel Despland & Gérard Vallée eds., 1992).
160 Yelle, supra note 153, at 34.
161 JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN
AMERICA 23-24 (1985) (“The ensuing orgy of creed making probably owed something to
the advent of printing. . . . But it owed much more to the Protestant spokesmen and
Catholic apologists who chose to use the press (and councils and synods) to draw lines
of division along ever finer points of creedal logic.”).
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sition and functions formerly controlled by the church came to be
transferred to the individual and his or her conscience.”162
Luther seems not to have concerned himself with a concept of
religion.163  Rather, his interest was in personal faith.164  But “an imme-
diate consequence of Luther’s objections to Church authority was a
growing, and eventually obsessive, focus on doctrinal disputes.”165  The
transition did not occur overnight.  John Calvin, for example, pro-
pounded doctrines, practices, and interpretations of biblical passages
that he hoped would induce a personal relationship with God, which he
called—quite in keeping with predecessors like Ficino—Christiana re-
ligio.166  A century later, though, those doctrines, practices, and inter-
pretations—the system intended to foster religious sentiment—was
itself called “religion,” regardless of whether those practices had the
intended effect.167
Rather than a sense of immanent transcendence, religion increas-
ingly became identified with the (largely doctrinal) means used in pur-
suit of that end.168  The doctrines propounded in some statements
themselves, including, for example, those of the Council of Trent, ac-
celerated this process by bringing “about an understanding of religion
that was based less on piety and ritual than on intellectual assent.”169
And the emergence of the contemporary understanding of “religion”
was pushed further by “sectarian doctrinal controversies over justifica-
tion, the resistibility or irresistibility of grace, and the like . . . .”170
Competing truth claims became the watchword of religion.  In contrast
to Ficino’s De christiana religione, by 1627, Grotius could write De veritate
religionis Christianae.171  “Christian religion” had become both “the
162 Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1869, 1878 (2009).
163 Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 975 (2010).  Even now German theologians and the German
language show a certain reluctance to embrace the term. Id.
164 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 35.
165 Koppelman, supra note 163, at 975.
166 See SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 39.
167 Id. But see TURNER, supra note 161, at 24 (suggesting that the Protestant notion of
religion as belief in the articles of a particular creed occurred early in the
Reformation).
168 See SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 39.
169 Koppelman, supra note 163, at 975. See also TURNER, supra note 161, at 24 (“Belief
in God . . . came to depend more heavily on cognition and intellectual assent.”).
170 Saler, supra note 141, at 395.
171 Published initially in Dutch as BEWIJS VAN DEN WAREN GODSDIENST in 1622.
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Christian religion” and the true religion: Christianity was reified as a
truth-claim.
The English Reformation, most pertinent to understanding the
assumptions of the judges presiding over the JFS case, provides a good
illustration of this process.  Peter Harrison writes that “[t]he new role
which creeds and catechisms played in the religious lives of English
Protestants shows how ‘religion,’ now imagined to be a set of beliefs,
came to displace ‘faith and piety.’”172  The Thirty-Nine Articles (1563),
the Elizabethan charter of the Church of England still in use today, for
example, was described as “a [b]rief of that Religion, which amongst
themselves was taught and believed, and whereby through the mercy of
God in Christ they did hope to be saved.”173  Salvation came to be
linked with knowledge and belief.  The Westminster Confession (1647)
similarly emphasizes that salvation can be attained only through knowl-
edge of God, which itself requires an understanding of the proposi-
tions of faith that underlie the religion.174
But it was not until the Enlightenment that the construct of “relig-
ion”—as a category broader than Christianity alone—was “forged into
a recognizably modern form . . . .”175  The category of “religion,” as it
came to be used during the Enlightenment, “drew heavily upon prior
Christian understandings.”176  Indeed, it is only during the Enlighten-
ment that the term “Christianity” became standard, when it increas-
ingly came to refer to “a system of beliefs.”177  By the Eighteenth
Century, after the Roman Catholic monopoly on European Christian-
ity failed, the term “religion” “came to be applied to the beliefs of the
competing religious societies into which Europe had been
fragmented.”178
172 HARRISON, supra note 158, at 20.
173 Id.; see also THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES OF RELIGION (1563), available at http://www.
thirtyninearticles.org/religion/.
174 See HARRISON, supra note 158, at 20-21.
175 Saler, supra note 141, at 395. See also HARRISON, supra note 158, at 1. (“The concepts
‘religion’ and ‘the religions’ . . . emerged quite late in Western thought, during the
Enlightenment.”)
176 Michael L. Satlow, Defining Judaism: Accounting for Religions in the Study of Religion, 74
J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 837, 841 (2006).
177  SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 74, 75.
178 LANGMUIR, supra note 146, at 70. See also Molendijk, supra note 5, at 5. Molendijk
suggests that “Deists turned religion into ‘a natural object constituted primarily by pro-
positional knowledge,’ . . . .” but no other sources have been found which suggest that
the reification of “religion” can be ascribed solely, or even primarily, to Deists.
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One of the earliest attempts at a definition of “religion” is found
in Lord Herbert’s work, De veritate, which provided an account of what
would later be called “Natural Religion,” “in terms of beliefs . . . and
ethics . . . said to exist in all societies.”179  Lord Herbert’s emphasis on
belief “meant that henceforth religion could be conceived as a set of
propositions to which believers gave assent . . . .”180  As a result, various
creeds could be compared and judged with regard to how precisely
they track Natural Religion.181  This focus on belief, coupled with “the
Enlightenment’s encounter with world cultures,” resulted in the mod-
ern conception of “religion” as an “isolable category.”182  It is only
when the idea of religion is reified and becomes a method for compar-
ison that “the plural ‘religions’” becomes possible (“piety, obedience,
[and] reverence” have no plural).183
Most scholars would agree that religion, in its contemporary under-
standing, both popular and academic, is “an intellectual construction,
a device through which the rationalist passion for classifying and pige-
onholing expresses itself.”184  In particular, it was nineteenth-century
scholars who gave “religion . . . ontological status,” exemplified by
“Marx’s conclusion that religion is the opium of the working classes.”185
And it is for this reason that, apart from the special case of Islam, one
is hard-pressed to find any “named religion earlier than the nineteenth
century.”186  As Jonathan Z. Smith explains:
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their
intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define.  It is a second-or-
der, generic concept that plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary
horizon that a concept such as “language” plays in linguistics or “culture”
plays in anthropology.187
179 ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION, supra note 8, at 40.
180 Id. at 40-41.
181 Id. at 41.
182 Mason, supra note 149, at 512.
183 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 43.
184 McCutcheon, supra note 141, at 286. See also W. Richard Comstock, Toward Open
Definitions of Religion, 52 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 499, 504 (1984) (“Whether man made
his gods or the gods made man may still be to some a matter of controversy. There can
be no doubt that it is the scholar who makes ‘religion.’”).
185 LANGMUIR, supra note 146, at 70-71.
186 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 61.
187 Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS
STUDIES 269, 281-82 (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998) [hereinafter Smith, Religion, Religions,
Religious]. See also Satlow, supra note 176, at 838.
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The scholars who created the concept, though, were all Western and,
we may assume, largely Christian.188  Thus, Bryan Rennie can conclude
that Daniel Dubuisson’s thesis that the “concept [of] ‘religion’ was
produced in the West and imposed upon the anthropological study of
human cultures in such a way as to ensure and maintain the domi-
nance of the culture of its production” is “unexceptional.”189  Tomoko
Masuzawa adds that the category “world religions” (as it is used, for
example, in university course listings) belies a pervasive, unexamined,
and “rather monumental assumption . . . that religion is a universal, or
at least ubiquitous, phenomenon to be found anywhere in the world at
any time in history . . . .”190  And Tim Murphy has suggested that, “uni-
versalized categories as ‘religion’—defined as essence or manifesta-
tion, are part of the baggage of Occidental Humanism.”191  The
prominent features of a “religion,” then, are those that are important
in the religion of the dominant culture.192  Therefore, application of
the idea of religion without regard for its provenance risks limiting
understanding of the “other” to those facets that can be analogized to
one’s own religion.  A fulsome application would consider the emic
understanding of the “other” religion as well.
C. The Christian Construction of Judaism
Judaism is perhaps the prototypical “other” religion and, from a
theological perspective, the Christian project of constructing and re-
ifying “Judaism” is an ancient one.  Westerners, both lay and scholarly,
speak of “Judaism” and “Christianity” as members of the same cate-
gory, “religions” (or worse, “faiths”).193  Daniel Boyarin notes that this
practice, and particularly the equation of religion with faith, reveals
that the notion of “Judaism” and a particular “religion” “involves the
reproduction of a Christian worldview.”194  Boyarin explains that, “[i]t
has become a truism that religion in its modern sense is an invention
of Christians,”195 and the same could be said of “Judaism” as well.
188 Molendijk, supra note 5, at 4-5.
189 Bryan Rennie, Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowl-
edge, and Ideology, 87 J. RELIGION 315, 315 (2007) (book review).
190  MASUZAWA, supra note 138, at 1.
191 McCutcheon, supra note 141, at 286 (citing Tim Murphy, Wesen und Erscheinung in
the History of the Study of Religion: A Post-Structuralist Perspective, 6 METHOD & THEORY
STUD. RELIGION 119, 119-46 (1994)).
192 Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, supra note 187, at 269.
193 BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra note 140, at 8.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 11.
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Many scholars have explained that in the ancient world there was
no cognitive equivalent to the modern English term Judaism.196  Jewish
sources from antiquity uniformly use Ioudaismos to mean something
“akin to ‘Judeanness,’” a combination of traits that would fall under
the modern heading of ethnicity (premised on a real or imagined kin-
ship), with some that would be called “religious,” pertaining to a par-
ticular way of life.197 twdhy [Yahadut], the rough Hebrew equivalent, is
found in 2 (and 4) Maccabees, but then disappears from the historical
record for four hundred years (and even then is found only in two
inscriptions).  It is not used at all by Philo or Josephus (despite the
enormous volume each wrote on the ways of the Ioudaioi), or in any
known work authored by their contemporaries.198  And even in 2 Mac-
cabees, Ioudaismos refers to “the entire complex of loyalties and prac-
tices that mark off the people of Israel.”199
The roots of the modern concept of Judaism begin to arise nearly
in step with the early spread of Christianity.200  Sts. Paul and Ignatius,
for example, used /Ioudaismus on occasion,201 and, for Igna-
tius, ÈIonδaı̈smoς consisted of personal qualities, not institutions.202  But
in the third through sixth centuries, the Church Fathers gave a new
and different import to the forerunner to the modern “Judaism,” and
its use increased dramatically.203
Tertullian took the most significant step, in the third century,
when he severed the Jews’ connection to the land, their history, and
their common culture from their particular beliefs and practices—in
196 Id. at 8; Daniel Boyarin, The Christian Invention of Judaism: The Theodosian Empire and
the Rabbinic Refusal of Religion, 85 REPRESENTATIONS 21, 47 (2004) [hereinafter Boyarin,
The Christian Invention of Judaism]; Daniel Boyarin, Rethinking Jewish Christianity: An Argu-
ment for Dismantling a Dubious Category (to which is Appended a Correction of my Border
Lines), 99 JEWISH Q. REV. 7, 8 (2009) [hereinafter Boyarin, Rethinking Jewish Christianity];
Mason, supra note 149, at 460.  Indeed, Judaism was not used by Jews in a self-referential
way until quite late: the Medieval period, according to Satlow; the Nineteenth Century,
according to Boyarin.  See Satlow, supra note 176, at 840; BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra
note 140, at 8.
197 Satlow, supra note 176, at 839-40. See also SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIG-
ION, supra note 142, at 72 (defining Ioudaismos in 2 Maccabees as “Jewishness”).
198 Mason, supra note 149, at 460-61, 465-68.
199 BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra note 140, at 8; Boyarin, The Christian Invention of
Judaism, supra note 196, at 21; Boyarin, Rethinking Jewish Christianity, supra note 196, at 8.
200 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 72-73.
201 Mason, supra note 149, at 461.
202 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 73.
203 Mason, supra note 149, at 461, 471.
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short, from “what had made it different in kind from Christian belief.”204
Most ethnoi in the ancient world had a national cult, but the cult was
inseparable from the ethnos itself because the “temples, priesthood,
and cultic practices were part and parcel of [the] people’s founding
stories, traditions, and civic structures.”205  Thus, although Iudiasmus in-
itially is meant to refer to an ossified system made redundant by the
risen Christ, Tertullian’s usage “abstract[s] only an impoverished belief
system” that persists in modern references to the Jewish faith.206  By the
Fourth Century, /Ioudaismus refers only to a disembodied
system of thought disconnected from “real life in Judea, an abstraction
to be treated theologically.”207
The Church Fathers constructed “Judaism” to serve as the “other”
in their process of defining what it meant to be a Christian.  And (even
perhaps especially), an important part of being a Christian was not to
be a Jew.208  Judaism came to represent a system of adherence to an
external discipline superseded by an internal, subjective, spiritual
Christian consciousness.209  Christianity, as a systematic and organized
community, was a novel creation, not just in content, but also in form;
it was a new way of being religious, not just a new expression of religi-
osity.210  Importantly, the boundaries of this new concept, not being a
national cult but instead claiming to transcend divisions between Jews
and Greeks, were demarcated by “faith.”  Membership in the Church
was a matter not of nationality, but of assent.211
D. Judaism
The emic understanding of Judaism is quite different from its con-
struction by Christian heresiologists.  For Jews, notions of Judaism “as a
faith that can be separated from ethnicity, nationality, language, and
204 Id. at 473; see also Boyarin, Rethinking Jewish Christianity, supra note 196, at 10.
205 Mason, supra note 149, at 484.
206 Boyarin, Rethinking Jewish Christianity, supra note 196, at 10 (referencing Mason,
supra note 149, at 472).
207 Mason, supra note 149, at 475; see also Satlow, supra note 176, at 840.
208 Mason, supra note 149, at 476. For an extended topic of this reasoning see Rose-
mary Radford Ruether, The Adversus Judaeos Tradition in the Church Fathers: The Exegesis
of Christian Anti-Judaism, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN CONFLICT:
FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE REFORMATION 174-89 (Jeremy Cohen ed., 1991).
209 Yelle, supra note 153, at 26.
210 SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION, supra note 142, at 23, 26.
211 Id. at 27; see Molendijk, supra note 5, at 5 (“Does the notion [of ‘religion’] not
preserve a one-sided—Schleiermachian—focus on the inner religious sentiment as
well?  The alleged eurocentricity, especially, makes Western scholars feel uneasy.”).
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shared history have felt false.”212  For example, “when Jews teach Juda-
ism in a department of religious studies, they are as likely to be teach-
ing Yiddish literature or the history of the Nazi genocide as anything
that might be said (in Christian terms) to be part of a Jewish relig-
ion!”213  And, “[f]or most Jews, religious observance is a means of iden-
tifying with the Jewish community, rather than an expression of
religious faith.”214
Importantly, in the Jewish context, “religion cannot be so easily
identified with the affirmation of a given content of belief.”215  Indeed,
plurality of belief and of observance have been identifiable features of
the Jewish experience since at least the destruction of the Second Tem-
ple.216  “To be a Christian,” in contrast, “is to assent, however tacitly, to
a creed or set of beliefs.”217  This is not so in Judaism.  “Judaism is not
and has not been, since early in the Christian era, a ‘religion’ in the
sense of an orthodoxy whereby heterodox views, even very strange
opinions, would make one an outsider.”218  Amos Funkenstein suggests
that, “no written or oral commandment forbids an orthodox Jew even
now to believe in the messianity of Christ.”219  Similarly, one’s level of
observance is irrelevant with regard to membership.  Rabbi Yitzchak
Schochet, chairman of the Rabbinical Council of the United Syna-
gogue, explained that “having a ham sandwich on the afternoon of
Yom Kippur doesn’t make you less Jewish.”220
Only status is relevant to membership in the Jewish people.221  And
this status is generally thought to be “inalienable,” even for converts.222
212 BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra note 140, at 8.
213 Boyarin, The Christian Invention of Judaism, supra note 196, at 47.
214 Zvi Gitelman, The Decline of the Diaspora Jewish Nation: Boundaries, Content, and Jewish
Identity, 2 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 112, 119 (1998) (internal quotation omitted).
215 Victoria S. Harrison, The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World, 59
INT’L J. FOR PHIL. OF RELIGION 133, 134 (2006) (internal quotation omitted).
216 Hayim Lapin, The Origins and Development of the Rabbinic Movement in the Land of
Israel, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JUDAISM: VOLUME IV: THE LATE ROMAN-RABBINIC
PERIOD 206 (Steven T. Katz ed., 2006).
217 MODERN JUDAISM: AN OXFORD GUIDE 11 (Nicholas de Lange & Miri Freud-Kandel
eds., 2005).
218 BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra note 140, at 13.
219 AMOS FUNKENSTEIN, PERCEPTIONS OF JEWISH HISTORY 170 (1993).
220 Lyall, supra note 12.
221 MODERN JUDAISM, supra note 217, at 6-7.  See also BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra note
140, at 12 (“[T]he end of rabbinic heresiology constituted an ultimate refusal of that
[Judaism’s] membership [in the category ‘religion.’]”).
222 Gerald J. Blidstein, Who Is Not a Jew?—The Medieval Discussion, 11 ISRAEL L. REV.
369, 372, 374 (1976) (“Jewish status is irreversible and inalienable.”).
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“There is now virtually no way that a Jew can stop being a Jew, since the
very notion of heresy was finally rejected and Judaism (even the word is
anachronistic) refused to be, in the end, a religion.”223  Jewish law con-
tinues to recognize apostates as Jews,224 regardless of “adher[ence] to
the Torah, subscrip[tion] to . . . precepts, or affilia[tion] with the com-
munity.”225  Although certain actions may result in the curtailment of
particular privileges and practices, the Talmud contemplates neither
the total and permanent expulsion of a Jew from the community nor
the possibility that one could forfeit one’s status as a Jew.226  Even bap-
tism does not irrevocably cut one off from the Jewish community.227
And even the dissenting voices within the Jewish community conclude
that where Jewish status might be subject to forfeiture, that loss would
be “based on association and assimilation, not propositional faith.”228
“ ‘Religion’ and its cognate terms seem self-evidently meaningful
because they are so deeply embedded and widely used in everyday lan-
guage.  But their meaning is loose and heavily influenced by tradi-
tional—and conflicting—religious preconceptions.”229  “If historians
categorize Judaism and Christianity as instances of the same kind of
basic human activity, as ‘religion,’ despite the obvious differences in
the beliefs and actions of Jews and Christians, they should recognize
that they themselves are deciding what they mean by religion.”230  “[I]t
is not the case that Christianity and Judaism are two separate and dif-
ferent religions, but that they are two different kinds of things alto-
gether.”231  Christianity is a religion.  Judaism “refuses to be one.”232
IV. A CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING
The extent to which the JFS courts relied on a conception of relig-
ion that favors confessing faiths, like Christianity, over others can be
seen both in explicit statements by individual judges, and obliquely by
examining the reasoning of judges in rendering their decisions.  Both
223 Boyarin, The Christian Invention of Judaism, supra note 196, at 47.
224 Edward Fram, Perception and Reception of Repentant Apostates in Medieval Ashkenaz and
Premodern Poland, 21 AJS REV. 299, 300-01 (1996).
225 Boyarin, The Christian Invention of Judaism, supra note 196, at 22.
226 Blidstein, supra note 222, at 370, 373; Aharon Lichtenstein, Brother Daniel and the
Jewish Fraternity, 12 JUDAISM 260, 263 (1963).
227 Fram, supra note 224, at 301-02.
228 Lichtenstein, supra note 226, at 266.
229 LANGMUIR, supra note 146, at 6.
230 Id. at 46.
231 BOYARIN, BORDER LINES, supra note 140, at 13.
232 Id. at 8, 12.
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the rhetoric and the rationale suggest that the conception of religion
employed by the Court of Appeal judges and the Supreme Court Jus-
tices in the majority reflects a Christian bias to a rather significant ex-
tent.  Their explicit statements would otherwise make little sense, and
the internal logic of their reasoning would not stand.
A. Explicit Comparisons
Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court (per Lady
Hale) offer explicit comparisons between Judaism and Christianity that
suggest religion, as the courts conceive of it, is incompatible (or at least
is very difficult to reconcile) with how Judaism functions.  First, the
Court of Appeal analogized Jewish status to membership in the Chris-
tian Church, explaining that “[i]f for theological reasons a fully sub-
scribed Christian faith school refused to admit a child on the ground
that, albeit practicing Christians, the child’s family were of Jewish ori-
gin, it is hard to see what answer there could be to a claim for race
discrimination.”233  Frank Cranmer responded to this contention in
language worth repeating:
But that ducks the question, “Who is a Jew?” by equating it, at least by
implication, with the question “Who is a Christian?”  However arresting a
rhetorical device it might be to stand the problem on its head in this way,
from a theological perspective it confuses two issues that should be kept
quite separate.  The overwhelming majority of Christians hold that one
becomes a Christian not by inheritance but by baptism; and a baptized
person of Jewish parents is as much a Christian as someone whose family
has been Christian since New Testament times.  The whole point of the
JFS/OCR argument, on the other hand, is precisely that Jewishness is ac-
quired not by general racial origins, nor even by religious practice, but
specifically by matrilineal descent in accordance with very strict
criteria.234
In effect, the Court of Appeal suggests that the Jewish method of deter-
mining who is Jewish cannot be religious, because such determinations
necessarily must be made with regard to practice (presumably because
that is how Protestant Christianity works).  The Court of Appeal also
mandated that preference to Jewish students must be based on “faith,
however defined,”235 notwithstanding the fact that faith is irrelevant in
determining who is and is not a Jew in all Jewish traditions (but highly
relevant in Christianity).
233 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] EWCA
(Civ) 626, [32] (Eng.).
234 Cranmer, supra note 115, at 81-82.
235 JFS, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 626, [33].
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In the Supreme Court, Lady Hale (with whom the other Justices
in the majority agreed) similarly explained that, “no other faith
schools in this country adopt descent-based criteria for admission” and
that “[t]he Christian Church will admit children regardless of who
their parents are.”236  Lady Hale suggests, at the very least, that there is
something alien, if not suspicious, about applying a test of descent to
determine religious status and, again, contrasts the matrilineal test
with universality of Christianity, concluding that Christianity is
superior.237
These statements demonstrate that for an entire panel of the
Court of Appeal, and a majority of the Supreme Court, religion is not
just something that can be separated from ethnicity, but also ought to
be separate from it because religion, properly understood, is an indi-
vidual matter of faith and faith alone.  This position perpetuates a
Christian worldview.  “Relations between religion and ethnicity span a
spectrum.  At one end are universal religions (Christianity and Islam)
that are not specific to any ethnic group.  At the other end are ethni-
cally specific or tribal religions (Judaism, Hinduism, Old Order
Amish).”238  To hold that, as a matter of law, religion and ethnicity can
and should be segregated off from one another, denying religious le-
gal status to the ethnic component of non-universal religions, privi-
leges universal religions at the expense of others.  And with respect to
Judaism in particular, it continues the project Tertullian began nearly
two millennia ago—stripping Jewish civilization of its uniqueness, of its
Jewishness, except to the extent that it resembles an inferior sort of
Christianity.
B. Tacit Assumptions
The JFS courts’ understanding of religion in a way that privileges
Christianity is also reflected in the tacit assumptions they make.  The
decisions reflect at least two such assumptions: (1) that religion is an
individual, rather than group, matter and therefore is necessarily sever-
able from ethnicity, and (2) that religion is, specifically, a matter of
belief and practice.
236 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] UKSC 15,
[69] (U.K.).
237 Id.
238 Gitelman, supra note 214, at 115.
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The assumption that religion is a matter of individual conscience
and, therefore, distinct from ethnicity, can be seen in Lord Mance’s
invocation of international and European law.  Relying chiefly on one
of Lady Hale’s opinions in an earlier case, Lord Mance wrote that the
policy of Race Relations Act 1976 was “that individuals should be
treated as individuals, and not assumed to be like other members of a
group.”239  Lord Mance finds support for this principle in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides that
the interests of the child are paramount, and in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which—although it grants importance to the
existence of autonomous religious communities—provides that the
freedom to manifest religious beliefs may be limited by laws “necessary
in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”240  Lord Mance thus appears to suggest that the matrilineal test
is incompatible with democratic society; that group-based rights, even
if religious, necessarily infringe on the rights and freedoms of others.
Didi Herman has called this a “‘civilizational’ argument.”241
“[O]n the one hand, there is the law of the Jews—archaic and discrimi-
natory [and, I would specify, group-oriented].  On the other hand,
there is the law of the Christians . . . modern, just, and protective of
individual rights.”242  Of course, “[m]any traditions, such as Judaism
and Hinduism, historically have placed greater importance on commu-
nal religious practice or observance.”243 “Modes of life based upon the
primacy of communal ritual have been ghettoized, rhetorically and so-
cially, devalued, and, in some cases, eliminated altogether.”244  Lord
Mance’s judgment reflects an understanding of religion limited to the
individual.  The possibility that ethnicity can exist as an essential part
of religion is discounted entirely.
As a corollary to the primacy of the individual over and against the
group in the context of religion, Lord Mance’s judgment also suggests
that, in particular, it is the individual’s conscience that matters most;
that the individual exists as an individual believer.  This is reflected in
the Court of Appeal’s remedial order as well.  But as explained above,
239 JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [90] (Lord Mance).  What assumption the school made with
regard to M is never explained.
240 Id.
241 HERMAN, supra note 10, at 163.
242 Id.
243 Yelle, supra note 153, at 33.
244 Id.
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the understanding of religion as primarily a matter of “belief in” or
“propositional faith” is a peculiarly Christian and largely Protestant un-
derstanding of what constitutes a religion.
V. CONCLUSION
Talal Asad has noted that the “conceptual geology” of “Christian
and post-Christian history” have “profound implications for the ways in
which non-Western traditions are able to grow and change.”245  In this
paper, I have suggested that one such implication is a Christian (or at
least universalizing) bias in how the JFS courts understood what it
meant to be a member of a religion.  Religion, as the courts under-
stand it, is a matter of propositional faith—i.e., belief—in the correct-
ness of a particular creed.  But this is not how Jews define themselves as
a group, and restricting the legal understanding of religion to a gener-
alized notion of Christianity privileges universalizing religions at the
expense of those religious groups with a more substantial connection
to ethnicity.  Further, excavation of the judicial conception of “relig-
ion” may prove helpful in assisting courts called upon to adjudicate
such disputes in a more consciously neutral manner.
Last year, the Rt. Hon Lord Justice Munby246 declared that, “the
laws and usages of the realm do not include Christianity, in whatever
form.”247  The courts insist that “[t]he precepts of any one religion, any
belief system, cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any
louder in the general law than the precepts of any other.”248  But JFS
suggests that this is not the case with regard to how courts understand
“religion” itself.  In this respect, at least, it is not Munby J’s statement,
but Lord Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale’s 1676 declaration that Chris-
tianity was indeed “parcel of the laws of England,” that still rings
true.249  Even 103 years later, Maitland’s suggestion that religious equal-
ity in Britain is complete still seems premature.
245 ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION, supra note 8, at 1.
246 Munby J was elevated to the Court of Appeal in 2009.
247 Johns & Another R (on the application of) v. Derby City Council & Another,
[2011] EWHC (Admin) 375, [39] (Eng.).
248 McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 880, [22] (Eng.).
249 Peter Cumper, The United Kingdom and the U.N. Declaration on The Elimination of
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 13, 13
(2007) (quoting Taylor’s Case, (1676) 86 Eng. Rep. 189 (K.B.)).
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The Concept of "Religion" in the Supreme
Court of Israel
Aaron R. Petty*
[L]egal principles may have a strong relationship to a particular
religious heritage-a relationship which is so deep that we do not
always recognize it.t
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, Joseph Dan reminded us that "there is no 'neutral'
linguistic expression, one which does not reflect various layers of cultural
and conceptual meanings."' Legal discourse is no exception. "The cultural
study of law shows that legal controversies and legal reasoning often
reflect underlying cultural perceptions." 2 And how law accounts for,
responds to, and is imbued with cultural phenomena is far more important
than "mere abstract intellectual exercises"' that the lack of neutral
expression may cause in other disciplines. In law, cultural conceptions and
common understandings are "embedded in passionate social disputes on
which the law of the state pronounces."' So where the language of law is
imbued with common terms and concepts, and neutrality is assumed rather
than demonstrated, "it is not . . . a harmless affair."'
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007; M.St.,
University of Cambridge, 2012; Ph.D. candidate, University of Leiden. This article is dedicated to the
memory of Julius 0. Isler.
t Margaret Davies, Pluralism in Law and Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 72, 80 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008).
1. Joseph Dan, Jewish Studies and European Terminology: Religion, Law and Ethics, in JEWISH
STUDIES IN A NEW EUROPE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF JEWISH STUDIES IN
COPENHAGEN 1994 UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR JEWISH STUDIES
xxiii, xxiii (Ulf Haxen et al. eds., 1998).
2. DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ, OUTLAWED PIGS: LAW, RELIGION, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 7 (2007).
3. Talal Asad, Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion, 40
HIST. RELIGIONS 205, 220 (2001).
4. Id.
5. Arie L. Molendijk, In Defence of Pragmatism, in THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIGION:
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In this Article, I suggest that "religion," both as it is commonly
understood, and as it is understood and applied by courts as a legal term of
art, refers chiefly to belief. This understanding of "religion" is incorrectly,
if tacitly, assumed to be both neutral and broadly applicable. Building on
previous work focusing on British courts, I now turn to investigating how
Israeli courts understand the concept of religion. And, as before, I focus on
cases addressing the question "who is a Jew?" as a window into how
courts understand religion and membership in a religion more generally.
"Among the Western-style modern democracies there is no other
country which experiences more intensely the problem of religion's place
in the state than Israel."' The country contains a "deeply divided society"'
and, as a result, where the state and religion meet "even simple matters
become complicated."'
One such complication is Israel's status as both a Jewish and democratic
state. "The Jewish-Israeli case-that of the Jewish people, the Jewish
national movement-Zionism-and the Jewish nation-state-Israel-is . .
. often said to be unique."o This is because "[b]eyond the ordinary tasks
of a modern secular democratic state, Israel's specific mission is to
constitute the national state of the Jews and to preserve and further Jewish
national culture."" Reconciling these dual and perhaps sometimes
incompatible roles "is an issue with which Israeli courts have been
struggling ever since the establishment of the state in 1948."l2 And within
that legal discourse "[n]o single problem . . . has received as much
attention as the definition of the word 'Jew."' 1 3
Israeli law uses the term "Jew" in relation to the jurisdiction of
rabbinical courts, the law of return, and matters of personal registration.14
In particular, while "Jew" as a legislative term of art "has been accorded a
religious definition in matters pertaining to the rabbinical courts, other
6. Aaron R. Petty, "Faith, However Defined": Reassessing JFS and the Judicial Conception of
Religion, 6 ELON L. REV. 117 (2014).
7. Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 185, 185 (1987).
8. Gila Stopler, Religious Establishment, Pluralism and Equality in Israel-Can the Circle be
Squared?, 2 OXFORD J.L. & REL. 150, 150 (2012).
9. Amnon Rubenstein, State and Religion in Israel, 2 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 107, 107 (1967).
10. Alexander Yakobson, Jewish People and the Jewish State, How Unique?-A Comparative
Survey, 13 ISRAEL STUD. 1, 1 (2008).
I1. Englard, supra note 7, at 187.
12. Daniel B. Sinclair, Introduction, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL
POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 1, I (Daniel B. Sinclair ed., 2000).
13. Id.; see also S. ZALMAN ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA: JEWISH RELIGION IN THE JEWISH
STATE 270 (1976) ("Of the many controversies periodically agitating public opinion in Israel, none is
more acute and more fraught with emotion than the legal, religious, and historical definition of a Jew.
No other issue has engendered so much dissention and public debate as this one."); Amy-Jill Levine,
Reflections on Reflections: Jesus, Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations, 8 STUD. JEWISH-
CHRISTIAN REL. 1, 9 (2013) ("The question 'who is a Jew' was a problem in antiquity, and it remains
a problem today.").
14. Menashe Shava, Comments on the Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970 (Who Is a




definitions have been applied to the same term in other contexts." 5
As Judaism is the dominant religion in Israel, how Israeli courts
understand "who is a Jew" in a legal context says a great deal about how
those courts understand religion more generally. This legal understanding
reveals factors that the courts would likely find relevant in deciding what
makes a religion a religion. Accordingly, I am not particularly concerned
with the answer to the question "who is a Jew"-if there is one (or even if
there are many).16 Instead, I am interested in how the question has been
answered by courts of law and what the shape of the legal discourse has
been in responding to that question; I am interested in what assumptions
have been made, and in what factors have been determinative.
To set the legal issues in context, in Part II, I briefly trace the emergence
of the State of Israel. Part II.A discusses the early Zionist movement with
particular attention to the philosophy of Theodor Herzl. Part II.B traces the
early legal foundations of the State of Israel from the Balfour Declaration
through the Proclamation of the State. Part III concerns the legal system
created by the State. Part III.A introduces the legal structure of the state of
Israel. Part III.B details the function and authority of the courts within that
structure. Part III.C addresses the legal status of religion in the state, and
Part III.D looks at the Law of Return, a unique feature of Israeli law
applicable only to Jews (and certain relations). Part IV concerns the
substantive debate on "Who is a Jew" under Israeli civil law. Part IV.A
discusses in detail three seminal cases addressing the legal relationship
between Judaism and the State-Rufeisen (also known as Brother Daniel),
Shalit, and Beresford-along with significant legislation passed in the
wake of Shalit. Part IV.B attempts to reconcile these decisions and tease
out the factors that the Israeli Supreme Court has considered significant
and the assumptions that it has made in adjudicating issues of religious
identity.
Part V turns to the historical validity and neutrality of the understanding
of "religion" applied by the Israeli Supreme Court. Part V.A offers an
overview of the Christian origins of the modern concept of "religion" as
primarily a matter of belief. Part V.B reflects on how the Jewish state,
through its secularist Supreme Court, could have come to a Christian
understanding of religion. Finally, Part VI takes a step back to place the
findings in the wider debate on secularization. Part VI.A provides the
15. Id.; see also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 270 ("[I]n Israel the problem has been focused ...
on the legal definition of who a Jew is.").
16. As Gad Barzilai has persuasively argued, the question of "Who is a Jew" is "not a static
question or a fixed dilemma but rather a dynamic construction of political interests amid struggles of
communities over political power. Thus the issue of 'who is a Jew' is not an autonomous problem
waiting to be politically and legally resolved but rather a social language that serves the political
purposes of social engineering." Gad Barzilai, Who is a Jew? Categories, Boundaries, Communities
and Citizenship Law in Israel, in BOUNDARIES OF JEWISH IDENTITY 27, 28 (Susan Anita Glenn &
Naomi B. Sokoloffeds., 2010).
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necessary background on this secularization paradigm, and Part VI.B
suggests that these cases may point to a useful refinement. Part VII offers
a brief conclusion.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
The modem state of Israel claims an ancient pedigree. In 586 B.C.
Babylonians captured the land of Israel and forced a significant portion of
the population to relocate to Babylon." After the return from exile the
Israelite population flourished for several centuries, but the conversion of
Constantine to Christianity in the fourth century signaled a period of
decline in both population and status of Jews.' 8 Over the ensuing
centuries, "Jews became united ... by a sense of unique isolation,
periodically accentuated by outbursts of active anti-semitism."" And it
was in this context of "shared persecution, made more bitter by frustrated
attempts at assimilation, that Zionism grew." 20 The discussion of "Who is
a Jew?" in the Supreme Court of Israel "takes place within the Zionist
narrative of history."21
A. The Zionist Movement
"The Zionist movement arose in the context of nineteenth-century
European nationalism and defined itself in opposition to the idea that Jews
could be full members of a modem nation-state, whether French, German,
or Russian, while adhering to their Jewish religion in their private lives."2 2
Instead, Zionism claimed that Jews constituted a nation themselves,23 and
aimed to create a state for that nation.24 Over time, three main strands of
Zionist thought emerged: religious, socialist, and "Zionism as refuge." 25
What united all Zionists, however, was their agreement "on the need to
17. S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the Integration of Secular and Spiritual
Laws Affects Human Rights and the Potential for Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 118 (1997).
18. Id. at 119.
19. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 107.
20. Id. See also MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 14 (2011) (noting that
Zionism was a response to both "the distressing conditions of Jewish existence in Eastern and central
Europe" and "an answer to the grave cultural crisis that Jews faced in the nineteenth century."). On the
historical development of secular Judaism generally, of which Zionism is part, see ABRAMOV, supra
note 13, at 272-73.
21. Daphne Barak-Erez, Collective Memory and Judicial Legitimacy: The Historical Narrative of
the Israeli Supreme Court, 16 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC'Y. 93, 109 (2001).
22. LEORA BATNITZKY, How JUDAISM BECAME A RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
JEWISH THOUGHT 147 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Zvi Gitelman, The Decline of the Jewish Nation: Boundaries, Content, and Jewish Identity, 4
JEWISH Soc. STUD., NEW SERIES 112, 112 (1998).
25. Lucy Endel Bassli, The Future of Combining Synagogue and State in Israel: What Have We




recreate a Jewish State-that is what made them Zionists."26
Religious Zionists rejected the Orthodox Jewish religious tenet that the
Jews will return to the land of Israel en masse only when the Messiah
comes, and instead focused on the biblical promise of the land of Israel to
the people of Israel. 27 Socialist Zionism, by contrast, "rejected any
association with traditional Judaism, including such basic tenets . . . as
observance of the Sabbath and dietary laws." 28 But "[t]he mainstream of
Zionism," which ultimately led to the creation of the state, "tried to
introduce an element of normalcy into an abnormal situation." 29 That is, it
viewed Zionism as the preferable response to "the Jewish question" in
Europe.30
In the late nineteenth century, "[fjaced with the rise of anti-Semitism
throughout Europe, Zionism, or Jewish nationalism, was revived by
Theodor Herzl, an educated Western European Jewish journalist and
author." Herzl was born in 1860 in Budapest to an assimilated Jewish
family.32 He studied law in Vienna and, as a young man, left an
unpromising career as a playwright to take up journalism. 3  In 1892 he
became the Paris correspondent for Vienna's New Free Press, and in this
capacity two years later he reported on the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus.
Following Germany's 1871 annexation of Alsace-Lorraine under the
terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt, French support for Russia increased
steadily. 34 In this context, French Jews who were not favorably disposed
toward Russia (as many were not, on account of anti-Jewish pogroms)
26. Martin Edelman, A Portion of Animosity: The Politics of Disestablishment of Religion in
Israel, 5 ISRAEL STUD. 204, 205 (2000).
27. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 147.
28. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 37.
29. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 107. See also BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 56 ("Zionism claims
to seek the normalization of the Jewish people.").
30. Bassli, supra note 25, at 481. "The Jewish Question" broadly concerns the debate in Europe at
the end of the nineteenth century concerning the appropriate treatment and status of Jews in society,
with particular reference to political rights, and the extent to which Jewish identity (especially Jewish
national identity) did or should prevent or limit integration and political participation in European
states. The phrase appears to have entered broad usage following Bruno Bauer's 1843 work Die
Judenfrage (The Jewish Question), and Karl Marx's 1844 response Zur Judenfrage (On the Jewish
Question). The phrase, however, appeared much earlier in both English and French (la questionjuive),
and at least the idea of Jewish emancipation had entered discussion in Germany close to a century
earlier. See Gad Freudenthal, Aaron Salomon Gumpertz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and the First Call
for an Improvement of the Civil Rights of Jews in Germany (1753), 29 AJS REv. 299 (2005). Even
ancient origins have been suggested. Avi AVIDOV, NOT RECKONED AMONG NATIONS: THE ORIGINS
OF THE SO-CALLED "JEWISH QUESTION" IN ROMAN ANTIQUITY (2009).
31. Id. at 479. Although Herzl's contribution was undoubtedly more significant to the creation of
the State of Israel, he was not the first to call for the establishment of a state. In 1882 Leo Pinsker
published a pamphlet entitled Auto-Emancipation, which advocated for the creation of a Jewish state.
See ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 44.
32. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60; BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 152.
33. Id.
34. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 152.
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were seen as pro-German and, therefore, anti-French.3 1 Coupled with a
simultaneous rise in French nationalism, the perceived anti-French attitude
of French Jews heightened an atmosphere of antisemitism that culminated
in the trial of Dreyfus.36
Dreyfus, like Herzl, was an assimilated Jew.37 He hailed from Alsace (a
German-speaking region) and was a career officer in the French Army.38
Accused of treason for allegedly communicating French military secrets to
the German embassy in Paris, Dreyfus was subjected to a trial closed to
both the public and journalists. 3 9 Despite his claims of innocence and the
lack of any reliable evidence against him, Dreyfus was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. 40 After the verdict was announced, "mobs
crowded the streets of Paris for days, shouting 'Death to the Jews."' 4 1
The turning point in Herzl's life was his coverage, as a journalist, of the
Dreyfus affair and "its attendant outbursts of antisemitism." 42 He later
claimed, "The Dreyfus trial ... which I witnessed in Paris in 1894, made
me a Zionist." 43 He claimed that this injustice, and the public sentiment
that followed, demonstrated the ultimate futility of Jewish assimilation in
Europe. If the most enlightened of European countries-in his words,
"republican, modern, civilized France one hundred years after the
declaration of the Rights of Man"-could not tolerate even the most






40. Id. Dreyfus spent almost five years as a prisoner on Devil's Island in French Guiana. In 1896,
Colonel Georges Picquart, the head of counterespionage in the French Army, identified Major
Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy as the real spy. For this discovery, Picquart was transferred to Tunis.
Esterhazy was tried, but acquitted, and some historians theorize that Esterhazy was, in fact, a double
agent. After Esterhazy's acquittal, both Dreyfus and Picquart faced charges related to the documents
implicating Esterhazy.
In January 1898, Emile Zola published Jaccuse, an open letter claiming that Dreyfus was framed.
Leading intellectuals began to call for the case to be reopened. Dreyfus was returned to France in
1899, re-tried, and again convicted. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment but pardoned and set
free shortly after the trial. It was not until 1906 that Dreyfus was fully exonerated. He was reinstated
as a Major in the French Army, served during World War 1, and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel.
Picquart, who had left the Army, was reinstated and promoted to Brigadier General and later served in
the Clemenceau cabinet as Minister of War.
There is a wealth of literature on the Dreyftus affair. For the broad outlines, see, for example, LOUiS
BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (2009); MICHAEL BURNS, FRANCE AND THE DREYFUS
AFFAIR: A BRIEF DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1999); PIERS PAUL READ, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR (2012).
41. BATNITSKY,supra note 22, at 152.
42. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108.
43. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 152 (quoting THEODOR HERZL, ZIONIST WRITINGS: ESSAYS
AND ADDRESSES 2:112 (Harry Zohn trans., 1973). Batnitzky notes that some recent scholarship has
cast doubt on Herzl's claim about the centrality of the Dreyfus affair to the development of his own





no hope for assimilation of any Jews anywhere in Europe. 4 An alternative
was required. In the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, Herzl wrote his
seminal essay, Der Judenstaat, in which he proposed "the Jews 'be
granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the
rightful requirements of a nation."' 4 5 This 1896 publication "brought the
concept of creating a Jewish homeland to the attention of international
leaders and politicians."46
Herzl prioritized the physical survival and political emancipation of
individuals over the survival of Jewish religion or culture.47 Indeed, in Der
Judenstaat, Herzl "depicted the future state in terms of the European
atmosphere which he knew among the liberal assimilated Jews of Central
Europe." 48 Even the title of his work, although often translated into
English as "The Jewish State" means something closer to "the Jews'
state." 49 In other words, for Herzl, "the state is for the sake of the survival
of Jews, and not for the sake of the survival of Judaism or some form of
Jewishness."o And as in other European states, religion, as he understood
it, was to be subordinated to the state:
Are we eventually going to set up a theocracy? No! Belief holds us
together, science makes us free. We are not going to allow our
rabbis even to think about theocratic ideas. We are going to know
how to restrict them to their synagogues just as we are going to
retain our army within their bases. Army and rabbinate shall be
honoured deeply as is becoming to their high function and merits.
They have no word to say in the affairs of the State which has thus
honoured them because they would bring about internal and
external complications."
This subordination of religious authority to the state was "the very
foundation" of the secular Zionist movement.52 But if Judaism could
acquire a secular meaning, then who was a Jew? And could, for instance, a
Jew who converted to another religion still be a Jew and a member of the
Zionist movement? 53 The following year, Herzl participated in convening
the World Zionist Congress, held in Basel on August 29, 1897. The
44. Cf MAUTNER, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that Zionism was precipitated by "the rejection of
the Jews' attempt to be accepted as equals by the non-Jewish societies in which they lived.").
45. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60; see also Bassli, supra note 25, at 479 n.9.
46. Bassli, supra note 25, at 480.
47. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 154.
48. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108.
49. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 154; ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60 ("This was nationalism
pure and simple, in itself devoid of any religious content.").
50. Id.; see also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60.
51. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108.
52. Id. See also Englard, supra note 7, at 187 ("The mainstream of modem political Zionism,
which led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, was ... guided by this idea of a national
secular Jewish state.").
53. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108. Herzl's response to the latter question was "no." Id. at 109.
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Congress, in turn, created a permanent Zionist Organization (now known
as the World Zionist Organization) through which it could work to
implement its policy decisions.54
B. Early Legal Foundations
1. The Balfour Declaration
The work of the Zionist Organization eventually resulted in the support
of the British government. On November 2, 1917, British Foreign
Secretary Arthur Balfour, in a letter to Lord Rothschild, President of the
British Zionist Federation, called for the establishment of a national
Jewish homeland." Balfour's letter, which later became known as the
Balfour Declaration, was preceded by significant pressure from Zionist
groups,"o but was also intended to raise Jewish support and capital for the
British war effort, to ensure British control over strategically-important
Palestine if the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the wake of the war,57 and to
garner support from both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although the Declaration was in some ways cautious, preferring the term
"national home" to "Jewish state" and avoiding mention of specific
geographical boundaries, it was nevertheless a significant victory for the
Zionist movement.59
2. The League ofNations Mandate
As the British government had anticipated, the Ottoman Empire did
collapse after the war, and in 1922 the nascent League of Nations granted
the United Kingdom a Mandate for Palestine, legitimizing British rule in
the Levant.60  The text of the Mandate incorporated the Balfour
Declaration.6 1  The Mandate continued the policy set out in the
Declaration, but stopped short of preparing the way for an independent
Jewish state. 62 Jewish immigration to Israel during the Mandate period,
54. Bassli, supra note 25, at 480.
55. Id. The Declaration noted that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object. . . ." ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 85.
56. Nancy Caren Richmond, Israel's Law of Return: Analysis of Its Evolution and Present
Application, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 n.7 (1993); ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 84 (noting the
Declaration was the result of "[a] series of well-coordinated diplomatic moves on the part of Zionist
leaders in London, Paris, Rome, and Washington").
57. Bassli, supra note 25, at 483.
58. JAMEs GELVIN, THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: 100 YEARS OF WAR 82-83 (2005).
59. Bassli, supra note 25, at 482.
60. Id. at 483. The Mandate was assigned to the United Kingdom in 1920, the terms were
approved by the League of Nations in 1922, and it came into effect in 1923.
61. Richmond, supra note 56, at 96 n.8.




until 1937, was based on the ability of the territory to economically absorb
Jewish immigrants without significantly shifting the social make-up of the
territory between Jews and Arabs.63
3. The MacDonald White Paper
At the same time that the British government had been negotiating with
Zionists regarding the establishment of a Jewish homeland, it had also
promised to Arab leaders an independent Arab state in the same territory
in exchange for support against the Ottomans. By the late 1930s, though,
Hitler's Nuremburg Laws had triggered mass Jewish exodus from
Germany and the influx of Jewish refugees had spawned Arab revolts in
Mandatory Palestine. By 1939, the British government believed that
Jewish support was either guaranteed or unnecessary, while losing the
support of the Arab world would be disastrous."
Thus, that year Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald issued a White
Paper declaring that the resettlement of 450,000 Jews had fulfilled the
Balfour Declaration's promise of a homeland for the Jewish people, and
called for the creation of a state to be governed by Jews and Arabs jointly,
providing that it should not be a "Jewish State," that further Jewish
immigration would be restricted, and that the transfer of land from Arabs
to Jews also be restricted.65 Lloyd George called the White Paper an act of
perfidy and Winston Churchill voted against the Paper and the government
in which he was a minister. Even the League of Nations' own Permanent
Mandates Commission abstained from endorsing the White Paper, and
several of its members thought MacDonald's views inconsistent with the
Mandate. 66 The British government's new policy led to significant illegal
immigration by European Jews and eventually a naval blockade. The
significance of the situation was highlighted by James Rothschild MP,
who said, "[fjor the majority of Jews who go to Palestine it is a question of
migration or of physical extinction. "67 And so it was until the end of the
Second World War.
For many, "Zionism alone emerged as a viable Jewish response" to the
Holocaust. 68 The near-total annihilation of European Jewry seemed to
confirm Herzl's doubts about the possibility of assimilation.69 It also
63. RUTH GAVISON, THE LAW OF RETURN AT SIxTY YEARS: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, JUSTIFICATION
21 (2010).
64. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 716 (1961).
65. Bassli, supra note 25, at 483. See also GAVISON, supra note 63, at 21 (noting that the British
government established stricter limits on Jewish immigration to Mandatory Palestine after the 1936-39
Arab uprisings).
66. HILBERG, supra note 64, at 717 n.7.
67. 347 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) (1939) 1984 (U.K.).
68. Richmond, supra note 56, at 95 (internal quotation omitted).
69. BATNITZKY, supra note 22, at 94 ("For Fackenheim, the Holocaust discredits the false
promises of secular modernity, including the notion that Jews can be integrated as full citizens in a
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"demand[ed] that secular and religious Jews unite in resisting any future
threat to the existence of the Jewish people."70 Zionism promised safety
and security for Jews that the countries of Europe had failed to provide. As
the Jewish Agency put it:
When we say "Jewish independence" of a "Jewish state" we mean
Jewish country, Jewish soil; we mean Jewish labour, we mean
Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture, Jewish industry, Jewish sea.
We mean Jewish language, schools, culture. We mean Jewish
safety, security, independence, complete independence, as for any
other free people. '
4. The Proclamation of the State ofIsrael
On November 27, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of an independent
Jewish state in Palestine, but the British Mandate remained in place until
midnight on May 15, 1948.72 "The establishment of Israel was the
successful culmination of the Zionist movement" that Herzl had revived
just fifty years earlier.73 And "when David Ben-Gurion read the Israeli
Proclamation of Independence in Tel-Aviv" the preceding afternoon,
"everyone understood that the Zionists were establishing the first Jewish
State in Palestine in two thousand years, but no one-not even the
founders themselves-could indicate with certainty what was meant by
the words 'Jewish State."' 74 The Proclamation did provide, however, that
"Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and the Ingathering of the
Exiles." 75 And, almost immediately, aliyah from numerous overseas
communities began.76 "In the state's first years . . . tens of thousands made
Aliyah from every comer of the world."77
For many Israelis, the Proclamation "appears to embrace the Herzlian
vision of a secular democratic state, thus representing the fulfillment of the
Zionist dream. But the one lesson to be gleaned from any comprehensive
history of the Jewish people is that there are several competing Zionist
modem nation-state.").
70. Id.
71. Bassli, supra note 25, at 485 (quoting THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, THE JEWISH
CASE 66 (1947)).
72. Richmond, supra note 56, at 95 n.3; Strong, supra note 17, at 119-20 & n.54; G.A. Res. 181
(II) at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 29, 1947).
73. Edelman, supra note 26, at 204-05.
74. Id. at 205.
75. Proclamation of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3 (1948).
76. GAVISON, supra note 63, at I1.
77. Id. For example, "nearly the entire Jewish community of Bulgaria moved to Israel, as did the
old established communities of Yemen, Iraq, and Libya, and the vast majority of those who had
survived in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Tens of thousands came from Morocco,




visions: the Zionist dream does not exist."18 The most that can be said is
that the Proclamation embodies a commitment to individual rights, as well
as a vision of the Jewish people collectively as a nation. 79 "[T]he rights of
individuals are in important and perhaps contradictory ways bound up
with the organic nature of the community and its constituent parts."so The
tension inherent in Israel's dual status as a "Jewish and democratic" state,
concerned with both individuals and the Jewish people as a whole, has
never been resolved.8'
III. THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM
One place this tension manifests is in the preferential treatment
accorded to Jewish immigrants under the Law of Return. "The Law of
Return serves as a focus for controversy, both with respect to the
justification for the preference given to Jews in Israeli immigration
policy,8 2 and with respect to the internal Jewish question regarding the
essence of the Jewish collective and the standards for identifying its
members or becoming one."83
A. The Constitutional Structure
Any discussion of Israeli law must begin with the most distinctive
feature of its legal system: the lack of a formal constitution." Although the
Proclamation promised a constitution, the Knesset was never able to pass
one. Instead, a number of Basic Laws have been passed, which have a
quasi-constitutional status.85 For many years, it was thought that Basic
Laws were not inherently superior to ordinary legislation because absent
an "entrenchment provision" requiring some specified supermajority to
modify or repeal a Basic Law, they could be modified or repealed at the
pleasure of the Knesset.86 But at the same time, Basic Laws were thought
78. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSON, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1993).
79. Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Book Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (1993).
80. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 8.
81. Edelman, supra note 26, at 218 ("Israel has never resolved the relationship between Judaism
(the religion of the Jews) and Jewish national identity."); Barzilai, supra note 16, at 29 ("Zionism, as
an aggregate of various Jewish national aspirations, has not clearly differentiated Jewish ethnicity
from religious or from nationality. Consequently, public contentions over the issue 'who is a Jew'
have been paramount for allocations of citizenship rights in Israel since the formal inception of the
state in 1948."); JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 8 ("the achievement of liberal goals pertaining to
individual rights will have to accommodate communitarian goals with which they will often be in
conflict.").
82. See, e.g., Stopler, supra note 8; GAVISON, supra note 63, at 37-59.
83. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 11.
84. Englard, supra note 7, at 190; Strong, supra note 17, at 135.
85. Strong, supra note 17, at 135. The Proclamation is also legally binding, but only to the extent
that it "expresses the vision of the people and its faith." Id at 136.
86. Id. at 135.
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"fundamental in some ill-defined sense."87
B. The Role of the Courts
Although the Israeli Supreme Court has been functioning since shortly
after the foundation of the state, its role was codified in a Basic Law only
in 1984. The Israeli Supreme Court serves two functions. It is an appellate
court of last resort, and also a court of first instance for claims against the
state in matters not under the jurisdiction of any other tribunal." "Any
person who has reason to believe that a particular state action denies her
legal rights may petition the court and ask it to issue an order nisi," which
the court will "consider rapidly and inexpensively."" A single judge
reviews the petition, and may direct the respondent to show cause why the
relief requested should not be granted." After a hearing, the court may
grant permanent injunctive relief.91
For many years, the absence of a written constitution led the Supreme
Court to "develop a position of judicial restraint[,] . . . preferring to leave
many fundamental questions to the legislature." 92 And despite its initially
limited authority to review legislation passed by the Knesset, the Supreme
Court was able to "ensure that public officials and agents of the state [did]
not abuse their powers of discretion"93 because "a high percentage of laws
in Israel consists not of primary legislation but of secondary legislation
passed by administrative bodies to implement primary enactments." 94 (In
1995 the Supreme Court "took the revolutionary step of declaring that
Israel no longer lacked a written constitution" and that "[h]enceforth ...
the Eleven Basic Laws that had been periodically enacted by the Knesset
would function as the nation's constitution," 5 but this development
postdates the decisions under consideration here.)
C. The Legal Status ofReligion
Israel is not a theocracy, nor is there even any established religion.96
87. Id at 113 n.10 (quoting MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 30
(1994)).
88. Ronen Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel's
High Court ofJustice, 24 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 781, 784 (1990); Strong, supra note 17, at 137.
89. Shamir, supra note 88, at 784.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Stroman, supra note 79, at 1548.
93. Shamir, supra note 88, at 784.
94. Strong, supra note 17, at 138.
95. Edelman, supra note 26, at 209 (citing CA 6821/93 United Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Coop.
Vill. 49(4) PD221 [1995]. Having declared the existence of a constitution, the Supreme Court took it
upon itself to review Knesset legislation for conformity with the constitution, arrogating to itself an
American style ofjudicial review.
96. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206; Natan Lerner, Religious Liberty in the State of Israel, 21




Nominally, at least, Israel "is a secular state."97 However, Israel does not
maintain the separation between religion and the state that characterizes,
for example, the French and American legal regimes." Much of "Israeli
law rests on the foundations of the legal system instituted during the
British rule in Palestine between 1917 and 1948,"9 which itself preserved
a vestige of Ottoman rule-the millet system-under which "[t]he courts
of each [religious] community have exclusive jurisdiction over specific
matters of personal status, particularly marriage and divorce."'" This
remnant of religious authority in personal matters means that the state
"does more than simply recognize the existence of certain religions."'ol
Indeed, the government "maintains formal links with the institutional
organs of 14 religious denominations, and legally subjects individuals to
religious rules by vesting the religious courts of those religions with the
authority to resolve certain matters."l02 And because the vast majority of
residents of Israel are Jewish, "Orthodox Judaism has functioned in the
Israeli polity as if it were the official state religion," notwithstanding the
modern, Western, secular outlook that dominated Israeli culture in the
early twentieth century.'0 3
Given this delegation and decentralization, "[t]he provisions of law
relating to religion in Israel are not governed by any general scheme.
History, political expediency, party politics and, even more, chance are
responsible for an amorphous body of laws which baffles outsiders as well
as some Israelis."'" The state itself has even referred to its own
relationship with religious bodies as "labyrinthine" and conceded that it
consists of "a patchwork of laws and practices that are not easily
susceptible to generalization."' 0 One area in which this confusion is
manifest is the Law of Return, which permits Jews and certain non-Jewish
relatives of Jews to immigrate to Israel and obtain Israeli citizenship.
an established religion; it has a multiple establishment." Edelman, supra note 26, at 206.
97. Lerner, supra note 96, at 244 (quoting HAIM COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW 17
(1984)); BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 4 ("In principle, Israeli law is a secular system with few
exceptions.").
98. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 23.
99. Id. at 246.
100. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206. See also BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 4 ("In matters of
marriage and divorce [Israeli law] makes the law of the various religious communities binding on their
individual members, thereby preserving the approach of the British Mandate's legislation."). Article 9
of the Mandate for Palestine "scrupulously preserved . .. the personal law and the system of religious
community courts" by providing that "respect for personal status of the various peoples and
communities and for their religious interests shall be guaranteed." ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 93,
175.
101. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206.
102. Id. This model of interaction between the state and religion has been characterized as "state-
organized pluralism." See Paul Cliteur, State and Religion Against the Backdrop of Religious
Radicalism, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 127, 132 (2012).
103. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206.
104. Amnon Rubenstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 380, 380 (1967).
105. Lerner, supra note 96, at 239 (internal quotation omitted).
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D. The Law of Return
"Jewish aliyah and kibbutz galuyot ('the ingathering of the exiles') are
two of the primary goals of the Zionist enterprise and of the State of
Israel."O6 Like the Zionist project itself, "[a]liyah and the struggle for
aliyah began years before the foundation of the state."o 7 Indeed,
"[d]eliberations on the subject of Aliyah have accompanied the Zionist
enterprise from the beginning."' 0 8
But it was not until two years after the Proclamation that Ben-Gurion
fulfilled its promise that "Israel will be open for Jewish immigration."' 0 9
Speaking before the Knesset on July 3, 1950, Ben-Gurion affirmed that
Israel is a "state for all Jews wherever they may be" and emphasized that
Israel's "gates are open to every Jew.""o He explained that the Law of
Return, which was then being debated, embodies the raison d'itre of the
state.' Two days after Ben-Gurion's address, on Herzl's memorial day,
the Knesset enacted the Law of Return by unanimous vote.11 2
As Ben-Gurion explained in his address to the Knesset, the Law of
Return "is regarded as one of the pillars of the (unwritten) Israel
constitution, in the sense that it gives effect to one of the basic purposes of
the very establishment of the state."' 13 That is, it "was enacted in order to
secure a safe place for all Jews in their own homeland after the
Holocaust."" 4 But more than simply providing refuge for Jews, wherever
they may be, "[t]he Law of Return is one of the main legal instruments
designed to make Israel the state of the Jews."" 5 In this respect, the Law
106. GAVISON, supra note 63, at I1.
107. Id
108. Id at 20.
109. See supra note 75.
110. Tiffany Pransky, Boundaries of Belonging: Conversion in Israel's Law of Return 5 (2012)
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, Central European University),
http://www.etd.ceu.hul2012/pransky tiffany.pdf. Last accessed May 1, 2014.
111. Id. See also GUY BEN-PORAT & BRYAN S. TURNER, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ISRAELI
CITIZENSHIP II (2011).
112. Pransky, supra note I10, at 5; GAVISON, supra note 63, at 24.
113. Bernard S. Jackson, Brother Daniel: The Construction of Jewish Identity in the Israel
Supreme Court, 6 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS LAW 115, 123-24 (1993).
114. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 83; see also GAVISON, supra note 63, at 17 ("The 1950 Law
of Return was the political, symbolic and legal instrument with which the state fulfilled its
obligation.").
I 15. Nahshon Perez, Israel's Law ofReturn: A Qualified Justification, 31 MODERN JUDAISM 59,
60 (2011). See also id. ("The Law of Return aims to enable the immigration of all Jews to Israel,
regardless of. . .any other characteristic."); Claude Klein, The Right of Return in Israeli Law, 13 TEL
AVIv U. STUD. Law 53, 56 (1997) ("The State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and,
therefore, its gates are completely open to Jewish immigration."); Shalev Ginossar, Who is a Jew: A
Better Law?, 5 ISRAEL L. REV. 264, 265 (1970) ("As everyone knows, the main concern of the State of
Israel is to keep its gates wide open for every prospective oleh, i.e. for every Jew returning to settle in
the land of his forefathers."); Yfaat Weiss, The Golem and Its Creator, or How the Jewish Nation-
State -Became Multiethnic, in CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP: GERMAN AND ISRAELI
PERSPECTIVES 82, 82 (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss eds., 2002) (noting the Law of Return and the




of Return enabled the State to provide an answer to the "Jewish question,"
not just in Europe (to the extent that the Holocaust had not already
rendered it moot) but everywhere. Accordingly, The Law of Return "is
perceived by many as one of the major expressions of the state's
Jewishness."' "
"Section I of the Law of Return provides that every Jew has the right to
immigration to Israel.""' "In practice, in order to realize his or her right of
return, an entitled individual must obtain a special visa known as an oleh's
visa."" 8 Under Sec. 2(b), an oleh's visa "shall be granted" to every Jew
who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel (provided the applicant
does not fall within one of three little-used exceptions on which a visa
may be denied for reasons of public health or security)."l 9 Thus,
[i]n principle, where an applicant is a Jew and where he or she
does not fit into one of the three categories enumerated in section
2(b), the Minister of the Interior has no discretionary power. An
oleh's visa must be granted to the individual, since the right of
return is an inherent right for every Jew.' 20
The Law of Return itself does not deal with the granting of citizenship,
but rather only with aliyah."l2' But the Citizenship Law provides that
"[e]very oleh by virtue of the 1950 Law of Return will be a Israeli
citizen."' 2 2  This has been interpreted to mean automatically and
immediately.123 Other avenues to citizenship exist, and include citizenship
by residence (the primary path to Israeli citizenship for Arabs who had
been citizens of Mandatory Palestine), birth, and naturalization (other than
under the Law of Return).124 But the essentially unlimited right of every
Jew to immigrate to Israel and the availability of immediate and automatic
Israeli citizenship for every oleh means that "for purposes of the Law of
Barzilai, supra note 16, at 29 (noting the Law of Return and Citizenship Law "were more important in
Israel than any other piece of legislation, including the Basic Laws, since they were supposed to
entrench Jewishness as the main political force in state ideology, legal ideology, and public policy").
116. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 11. But see Sinclair, supra note 12, at 2 ("[T]he actual legal
issues involved, i.e. automatic citizenship and registration, are not of any great practical significance.
In this respect, this area is a relatively 'safe' one for the conduct of high-level legal debate as to the
State of Israel's Jewish character.").
117. Shava, supra note 14, at 141.
118. Klein, supra note 115, at 56. This was perhaps not always so. Slovenko suggests that, at one
point, a Jew could immigrate "without passport or number." Ralph Slovenko, Brother Daniel and
Jewish Identity, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 3 (1964).
119. Klein, supra note 115, at 56.
120. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
121. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 30.
122. Id.
123. Id. See also Perez, supra note 115, at 60 ("Immigrants entering Israel under the Law of
Return are eligible immediately for full citizenship.").
124. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 30-31. Both Jews and non-Jews may be naturalized outside of
the process used for the Law of Return, but it does require a longer period of residence and a favorable
exercise of discretion by the Minister of the Interior. Id. at 31; Slovenko, supra note 118, at 3-4.
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Return the answer to the question 'Who is a Jew?' is of great
importance."1 25
"In the period before the founding of the State and in the first years
following it, the authorities did not define the term 'Jewish' but rather
made do with a declaration from the aliyah applicant that he or she was
Jewish." 26 The assumption was that few people would identify as Jews,
much less immigrate to a besieged and struggling state, if they were not
actually Jewish.127 As Ruth Gavison writes, "[w]hen the Law of Return
was formulated, shortly after the fall of Hitler, it was hardly thought,
especially by those who shared Heinrich Heine's belief that 'Judaism is
not a religion but a misfortune,' that there would be people claiming to be
Jews."' 28 Ben-Gurion himself explained:
I was in the Jewish Agency for fifteen years and I do not recall that
anyone raised this question. I was in the Jewish Agency for
thirteen years together with Rabbi Maimon and Mr. Moshe
Shapira. When a Jew arrived, I never once heard either of them
asking who his mother and father were. Nobody asked this. If a
Jew came and said he was a Jew-that was sufficient.129
During the discussions on the draft bill, the Knesset rejected the
proposal of the religious Agudat Israel party to define "Jew"
halakhically--one whose mother is Jewish or who converts to Judaism-
and Ben-Gurion expressed opposition to such a definition several times.' 3 0
Ultimately, the Knesset did not define "Jew." Some have suggested that
125. Shava, supra note 14, at 141. See also GAVISON, supra note 63, at 61 ("Accordingly, the
questions, 'Who is a Jew'and 'Who is a member ofthe Jewish people'are of decisive importance.").
The number of Jews that have immigrated to Israel under the Law of Return is substantial. Perez,
supra note 115, at 61. Approximately 1.4 million immigrated between 1948 and the mid-1950s
(mostly Holocaust survivors and those living in Muslim states), and almost one million from the
former U.S.S.R. in the 1990s. Id. "It is unlikely that another massive wave of immigrants will arrive in
Israel, short of an unforeseen event." Id. In recent years, immigration under the Law of Return has
been modest: between 10,000 and 15,000 immigrants annually. Id.
126. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 62.
127. Id.
128. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 4. Or, as anther writer put it, with reference to Brother Daniel,
.'You actually sued to be known as a Jew? Give me your hand, brother, and welcome aboard."' Id.
129. Asher Maoz, Who is a Jew? Much Ado About Nothing, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION
STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 75, Ill (Daniel
B. Sinclair ed., 2000).
130. Amnon Rubenstein, The State of Israel as a Jewish State, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION
STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 17, 18 (Daniel B.
Sinclair ed., 2000). Ben-Gurion's opposition to defining "Jew" halakhically for purposes of the Law of
Return was probably "based on his desire for new immigrants to settle in Israel." OSCAR KRAINES,
THE IMPOSSIBLE DILEMMA: WHO IS A JEW IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 2 (1976). As early as the 1940s,
Ben-Gurion had supported free aliyah to "impede the possibility of an anti-Zionist solution to the
Palestine question upon the end of the mandate." GAVISON, supra note 63, at 22. Ben-Gurion's view
gained consensus after World War II. Id. And in the context of the military threats the state faced in its
first years, turning away prospective immigrants who probably had some connection to the Jewish




the omission was intentional"3 ' and others claim that the omission allowed
individuals who self-identify as Jews but who were not halakhically
Jewish to "throw in their lot with Israel." 3 2 Still others claim that a
halakhic definition was universally assumed, so that any definition would
have been redundant 3 3 (though this seems difficult to square with the
Knesset's rejection of, and Ben-Gurion's robust opposition to, Agudat
Israel's proposed amendment).
IV. WHO IS A JEW?
"From the year 70 C.E. when the ancient State of Israel was destroyed
by the Romans until the establishment of the modem State of Israel in
1948 the question 'Who Is a Jew?' was hardly ever posed." 34 "In the face
of the Crusader, the Cossack, and the Nazi, it was all the Jew could do
merely to maintain his identity. . . . [T]he emergence of the state has
radically changed the character of the problem."' 3 5
"The term 'Jew' appears in various pieces of legislation: ss. 1, 2, 4A and
4B of the Law of Return; s. 3A(b) of the Population Registry Law 1965;
the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law 1953,
etc."' 3 6 And with respect to these, and other, laws, "[t]he question of 'who
is a Jew' has been the subject of endless, well-known discussions in
Israel." 37 Some of the Supreme Court's decisions on this subject have
"had strong political repercussions.""3 The issue has more than once led
to a cabinet crisis. 39
The recurrence of the problem is hardly surprising. While it had
always had a general relevance-increased somewhat by the
growing secularization of European Jewry in the wake of the
Haskalah-the emergence of the State of Israel as an independent
131. Amnon Rubenstein, Who 'sa Jew and Other Woes, ENCOUNTER 84, 86 (Mar. 1971).
132. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 3-4.
133. Id.
134. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 1.
135. Aharon Lichtenstein, Brother Daniel and the Jewish Fraternity, 12 JUDAISM 260, 261
(Summer 1963). See also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 271 ("The question of what or who a Jew is did
not arise until the end of the eighteenth century, when the advent of Emancipation led to a revaluation
of the nature and essence of Judaism.").
136. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 17.
137. Klein, supra note 115, at 58. See also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 270; Ginossar, supra note
115, at 264 ("Few internal problems of Israel have aroused such heated and widespread controversy,
as that of defining the term 'Jew"'.); Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 260 ('Who is a Jew?' Twice
within recent years this troublesome question has been a matter of public Jewish concern."); Perez,
supra note 115, at 61 ("The disagreement about 'who is a Jew' is one of the biggest controversies in
Israel."); Shava, supra note 14, at 140 ("The question 'Who is a Jew?' raises a thorny problem with
which the Israeli public and the Knesset has been much preoccupied for some twenty years."). But see
JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 56 ("For most Israelis, the issue of 'Who is a Jew' seems about as
interesting as the question 'Who is a Sagittarius?'.
138. Englard, supra note 7, at 190.
139. Shava, supra note 14, at 140.
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socio-political entity, defined by fixed geographical bounds, has
lent its treatment a rather different and generally sharper
character.140
Crucially, the discussion is framed by the traditional Orthodox
understanding of who constitutes the Jewish people. "By the emergence of
rabbinic Judaism in the late Second Temple period, anyone born to a
Jewish mother was automatically considered a Jew." 141 And even now,
"[t]he religious definition of a Jew refers exclusively to two alternative
elements: either the Jewishness of the individual's mother or his personal
conversion to Judaism." 42 Recently, "[t]he fact that emphasis was placed
on the origin of a person and that his beliefs were ignored has proved a
source of furious arguments and sharp accusations." 4 3
One focus of particular difficulty in this respect is the status of
"apostates" under Jewish law, particularly "apostates" to Christianity
because of the different way in which Christianity defines the Church, and
the fact that belonging to community that defines itself by a common
belief is not necessarily in conflict with simultaneously belonging to
another community that defines itself by common ancestry.
The prevailing view' 4 is that "[u]nder halacha. . . , an apostate is
regarded as a Jew, but all rights and privileges accorded a Jew are, so to
speak, suspended." 45  But "[t]he apostate's rejection . .. does not
necessarily imply, however, that ... he is considered a Gentile." 46 In the
view of Orthodox Judaism a converted Jew, hated and despised as he may
be, is nevertheless a Jew. "Judaism, like some nationalities, is a club
which one can join but from which no one can escape."l47
However, "[t]he premise that a person born to a Jewish mother who
140. Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 260.
141. Ruth Langer, Jewish Understandings of the Religious Other, 64 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 255,
258 (2003). See also Benjamin Akzin, Who Is a Jew? A Hard Case, 5 ISRAEL L. REv. 259, 261 (1970)
("Sharing with Roman law the realistic view that mater semper certa est, Jewish religious law views
descent from a Jewish mother as decisive in this connection.").
142. Englard, supra note 7, at 194.
143. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 18. For a recent example, see Petty, supra note 6, at 120-35
(discussing the JFS case in the U.K. Supreme Court).
144. In addition to the majority of the Orthodox movement, both the Reform and Conservative
movements in the United States have formally adopted this position as well. See Drifting Apostate,
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA (July 1986), http://ccarnet.org/responsa/carr-105-
107/ (last visited May 1, 2014); Apostate in the Synagogue, TESHUVOT FOR THE NINETIES: REFORM
JUDAISM'S ANSWERS TO TODAY'S DILEMMAS, http://ccamet.org/responsaltfn-no-5753-13-81-85/ (last
visited May 1, 2014); Gerald L. Zelizer, The Return ofSecond Generation Apostates (June 14, 1995),
http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19912000/zelizer apos
tates.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014) ; Kassel Abelson & Reuven Hammer, The Status of Messianic
Jews (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20I1-2020/abelson-
hammer-messianic-jews.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014).
145. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 263
("Halachically, a meshumad is barred from fulfilling certain tasks.").
146. Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 263.




converts to Christianity remains halackhically a Jew (even if an apostate)
is not universally shared."1 48 "A baptized Jew is known in Hebrew,
especially in medieval parlance, as 'meshummad' meaning an 'extinct'
one. His close relatives had to undergo for him the mourning rites for the
deceased . . . . [F]or the nation, he was 'dead and buried."'1 49 "The
meshummad was regarded as worse than a thief; he was regarded as the
lowest kind of creature." 5 o
Aharon Lichtenstein, an Orthodox rabbi, has noted the complexity of
this status. "'Who is a Jew?' . . . admits of no single answer. A
meshummad-of what type? A Jew-for what purpose?"5"' Lichtenstein
maintains that there is a "Halachic principle that an apostate can become a
Gentile and that Jewishness is not an absolutely irrevocable status."l 52
And, as will become apparent in the pages to follow, Justice Landau is
similarly convinced.'5 1
But apart from the halakhic view of things, "a significant proportion of
Israeli society . . . defines its Jewishness in secular rather than halakhic
terms . . . [and] it is natural that secular Israelis should seek a legal
definition which is inclusive of their non-halakhic ideology."' 54 Although
there are "relatively few cases where a gap between the two concepts
created a practical problem,"155 several of the "most famous cases in
Israeli judicial history center on the question of who is a Jew."l 56
A. Cases and Legislation
Three seminal cases have tested the bounds of who is considered a Jew
under Israeli civil law. The first, that of Oswald Rufeisen (later, Brother
Daniel) concerns the right of a man, born and raised in the Jewish
community in what became Poland, who performed heroic deeds during
World War II, and who was persecuted as a Jew, but who later also
became a Catholic monk and priest, to return to Israel under the Law of
148. Shava, supra note 14, at 142 n.20 (citing S. Meron, Apostate: Jew or Person of Dual
Religion, 23 HAPRAKLIT 164 (1967), and A.H. SHAKI, WHO IS A JEW IN THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 154-169 (1976) [Heb.]); see generally Lichtenstein, supra note 135 (suggesting Jewish status
may be lost through total alienation from the Jewish community).
149. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15.
150. Id.
151. Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 262.
152. Id at 266. As he explained: "[t]here is an apostasy not of action but of person, an
estrangement manifested not merely by the commission of various sins but by the complete severance
of personal bonds with Jewry; by total alienation from the Jewish people and its history as a spiritual
and physical community; and finally, by thorough assimilation into the mainstream of Gentile society.
Such persons are not simply disqualified because of some apostate act. Nor are they merely treated as
if they were foreign. They are-'They have betrayed God, for they have begotten strange children.' . .
There is, then, a point beyond which the apostate cannot go and yet remain a Jew." Id.
153. Jackson, supra note 113, at 123.
154. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 1.
155. Englard, supra note 7, at 194.
156. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 63.
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Return. "The decision of the Court-together with Brother Daniel's
paradoxical identification of himself as a Jew-. . . brought into sharp
focus certain questions of Jewish identity that continue to be vexing both
in Israel and throughout the Diaspora."' 5 7
The second addresses the right of an officer in the Israeli Navy, who
married a non-Jewish woman, to have his children registered as Jews on
their identity cards. The third, following a legislative amendment,
addresses whether Jews who have adopted a belief in Jesus as the
Messiah, but who have not been baptized or otherwise formally affiliated
themselves with Christianity remain Jews for purposes of the Law of
Return. A close examination of these cases offers a view into how the
Supreme Court of Israel understands who is a Jew, and thus what
constitutes "Judaism," and more broadly "religion," under law.
1. Rufeisen (Brother Daniel)
"The story of Oswald Rufeisen is an extraordinary one in itself."1 8
Some of Rufeisen's background is brought out in the Supreme Court's
opinions. But for a full account, I rely heavily here on Nechama Tec's
biography of Rufeisen because his persecution during the Holocaust bears
on one central reason why the State of Israel was created: to provide a
refuge for Jews. A thorough account of Rufeisen's experience is therefore
relevant to the ultimate outcome of his court case. In any event, it is
indeed extraordinary. As one reviewer put it, "[w]ere [Tec's] book not so
heavily documented, one would be inclined to dismiss it as the musings of
an incredibly creative mind. Were it a novel, one might be inclined to
suggest that [she] has strayed into the realm of the improbable."' 59
a. Becoming Brother Daniel
Oswald Rufeisen, a short man with unimposing features and a humble
demeanor who "liked to do favors for people,"'60 was born in Zadziele, a
village in the south of what is now Poland.161 Rufeisen's father had fought
for the Germans in World War I. That, along with the high status that the
German language carried in Poland at the time meant that German was
Rufeisen's primary language at home. Unusually for Jews of limited
means, Rufeisen finished school in 1939 and was awarded his matura.'62
His education and his fluency in German would both prove invaluable.
In September 1939, the Germans invaded Poland. Rufeisen, his brother,
157. Marc Galanter, A Dissent on Brother Daniel, COMMENTARY 10, 10 (July 1963).
158. Jackson, supra note 113 at I15.
159. Deborah E. Lipstadt, Book Review, 97 AM. HIST. REv. 160, 160 (1992).
160. NECHAMA TEC, IN THE LION'S DEN: THE LIFE OF OSWALD RUFEISEN vii-viii (1990).
161. Id. at 3.




and their parents fled north before the parents (his mother already ill) gave
Rufeisen and his brother their money and instructed them to continue on
without them. The brothers would never see their parents again.'63
Rufeisen first went to Lviv, in what is now Ukraine, where about one
hundred members of his Zionist youth group, Akiva, had found refuge.
From there, Rufeisen made his way to Vilna (now Vilnius, Lithuania)
where he remained for a time.'" On June 22, 1941, the Germans bombed
Vilna. After initially taking shelter in a basement, Rufeisen, without
saying a word to anyone, went out into the streets to join a makeshift
search-and-rescue team while the bombs continued to fall. 165
Eventually Vilna fell to the Nazis, and Rufeisen was detained. Many of
his companions at this time were murdered,'" but Rufeisen was spared
because he had learned the shoemaking trade as a youth and the Nazis had
confiscated a large quantity of leather that required skilled labor he could
provide. Additionally, because Rufeisen spoke German, he was appointed
the representative for this group of forced laborers, and because of his
education (which was far in excess of most shoemakers) he was also
appointed the shop foreman, taking orders and doing the bookkeeping.' 67
When feeding Rufeisen and the other prisoners became too costly, the
Nazis left them to fend for themselves, but permitted them to live
unconfined. One day, a man Rufeisen passed in the street asked if
Rufeisen would like to come work on his farm, where he would be safe.
Rufeisen hesitated initially, but after seeing a crowd being led off to their
deaths, he resolved to live the rest of the war as a gentile. He knew he
could pass as a Pole, spoke good German, and had a school identification
card that did not identify him as a Jew. He invented a story that he was
half-Polish and half-German, and that his parents were dead.16 8
Just before the supply of leather ran out, and his fellow leather-workers
were all murdered, Rufeisen walked the six miles to the man's farm. He
remained there for several months, but when it became too dangerous to
remain near Vilna, he went East to the home of the farmer's brother, in
Belorussia.'69 The Germans in that area were short of translators, and it
was suggested that he go work for them.170
The head of the regional police dragooned him into the police force to
serve as a personal assistant and translator, and he shortly thereafter was
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id. at 16-17.
165. Id. at 26-27.
166. Id. at 35-37.
167. Id at 38.
168. Id. at 45-47.
169. Id. at 47-61.
170. Id at 61-62.
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made the secretary of the regional police.17 1 Once established, Rufeisen
sought and was granted an official identification card. He could have
claimed to be of German ethnicity (volksdeutsche) based on his fictitious
German father, and this would have carried certain advantages; Rufeisen
concluded that it might also raise additional questions and suspicions.
Instead, he claimed Polish ethnicity, which (since German ethnicity was
an option open to him) resulted in locals viewing him as a patriot and a
principled man who valued his Polish heritage above material gain.' 72
While working for the regional police in Mir, Rufeisen had special
access to information because of his language skills and education, and his
position as secretary.' 73 When he recognized a Jew he knew from Vilna,
he began to construct a network to provide information to the Jews in the
area. When Rufeisen learned that the Mir ghetto was to be completely
liquidated on a particular date, he organized an "anti-partisan raid" that
took the would-be persecutors in the wrong direction, to fight Russian
partisans that did not exist, leaving time for those in the ghetto to escape.
Although Rufeisen had also armed the Jews in the ghetto, fewer than 300
escaped successfully.174
After the raid, Rufeisen was denounced to his superiors.' He admitted
that he was a Jew and started running. He found shelter in a convent,
where he read the New Testament and various Carmelite publications.' 76
Less than three weeks later, Rufeisen asked the mother superior to baptize
him.17 7 He felt that it was not a rejection of his Jewish heritage; he wanted
a stronger connection to the New Testament, which he read as a Jewish
document. In particular, the account of the death and resurrection of Jesus
helped him to cope with the horrors of the Holocaust.'17  He had less
interest in the Church as an institution and the writings of Catholic
theologians. 79
When he felt he might be placing the nuns at risk, Rufeisen left the
convent and joined partisan militants.'80 Initially believing Rufeisen to be
a German spy, the partisans condemned him to death, but he was saved by
one of the Jews of Mir who had been able to escape the ghetto on account
of Rufeisen's assistance.' 8 ' After the Russians forced a German retreat and
reclaimed the area, they indicated that they had no interest in detaining
171. Id at 66, 85.
172. Id at 87-88,
173. Id. at 89-91.
174. Id. at 132-148.
175. Id. at 151-56.
176. Id at 166.
177. Id. at 169.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. Id. a 191.




Rufeisen despite his former employment with the Germans. Rufeisen then
made his way to Czerna where he applied to join a Carmelite
monastery.18 2 He chose the Carmelites deliberately because he knew from
his time with the nuns they had a chapter in Israel.183 After a period of
preparation, Rufeisen took his final vows as a monk in 1949 at age 27.18
He was later asked to prepare for the priesthood, and became a priest as
well.1ss
After many unsuccessful attempts, the Carmelites gave him permission
to relocate to Israel. But when he met with the Israeli ambassador, he was
told that he could not emigrate to Israel as a Jew because he was a
Christian monk, and that the determination of Jewish status under Israeli
law was a contentious point in Israel at the time.'8 1 Instead, Rufeisen was
granted a one-year visa based on his brother's residency there.' 87 He
entered the Carmelite monastery on Mt. Carmel in Haifa, to serve as a
counselor to members of mixed marriages.' 88
In Israel, Rufeisen was received warmly by those he knew during the
war, even if they were unhappy or disappointed by his conversion to
Christianity. He was invited to family gatherings by his brother and treated
as a close friend by many of his former Akiva companions. But, while
loved dearly, he was also an outsider.189 Not recognized as a Jew by the
Israeli authorities before leaving Poland, he applied for an oleh's
certificate after arriving, and was refused.
b. Before the Supreme Court
After receiving permission from the relevant authorities in Rome,
Rufeisen sought injunctive relief against the Minister of the Interior before
the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice. He claimed that
because, despite his conversion, he remained a Jew as a matter of halakha,
he was entitled to residency and citizenship under the Law of Return.
"Under halachic law he was without question a Jew, born of a Jewish
mother. The tradition was 'once a Jew, always a Jew': you could be a
wicked Jew, a deserting Jew, a treacherous Jew, but a Jew you
remained." 90
In Rufeisen, the Court had to decide "whether the term 'Jew' in the Law
182. TEC, supra note 160, at 207.
183. See infra, note 196, at 26 (opinion of Berinson, J.) (quoting Rufeisen's passport application).
184. TEC, supra note 160, at 213.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 220.
187. Id. at 221.
188. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 3. Some Orthodox communities concluded that Rufeisen had
come to Israel to convert Jews to Christianity. TEC, supra note 160, at 225.
189. TEC, supra note 160, at 224.
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of Return carried a religious-halakhic, or secular meaning."' 9' One
observer suggested that "[f]rorn the opening argument until the last word
of the judgment, the courtroom was less the scene of legal debate than a
pageant of 2,000 years of Jewish history, philosophy, and religious
thought; for the judges were being called upon to define-although in the
admittedly specific context of the Law of Return-what the broad concept
of Jewishness meant." 92 "Appearing before the Supreme Court in brown
habit and sandals," Rufeisen spoke of "the sufferings and ordeals he
endured as a Jew and the pride he felt in being Jewish and in the State of
Israel.",9 3
But suffering and pride were not enough to carry the day. "[T]he
Supreme Court ruled that an individual who was born a Jew but converted
to Catholicism and became a monk was not entitled to benefit from the
Law of Return and could not be registered in the population register as
being of Jewish nationality." 94 On Rufeisen's identity card, under the
heading of "nationality," it says not "Jewish," but "Not clear."' 9 5
The Court, composed of five justices, produced four separate
opinions.'96 All members of the Court agreed that the Law of Return was a
secular law; there was no disagreement that the halakhic definition did not
govern the interpretation.197 The Court held that because "the Law of
Return is secular legislation, . . . [it] must be interpreted according to
secular principles."' 98 Focusing on the need for a secular definition of
"Jew" for a secular piece of legislation "enable[d] [the Court] expressly to
affirm the nontheocratic nature of the state." 99 And "since the Law of
Return contained no definition of 'Jew,' ordinary usage, 'the language of
men,"' the Court determined, "must be the governing factor." 200
191. Shava, supra note 14, at 142.
192. Slovenko, supra note 18, at 5 (internal quotation omitted).
193. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 24.
194. Klein, supra note 115, at 59.
195. TEC, supra note 160, at 231. See also Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88 n.6 (noting that
Rufeisen was allowed to settle in Israel and acquire Israeli citizenship, but not under the Law of
Return as a Jew); Klein, supra note 115, at 59 ("Rufeisen did actually apply for and was granted
Israeli nationality through the naturalization process.").
196. HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.), translated in
SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL VOLUME 1-34 (Asher Felix
Landau ed., 197 1) [hereinafter Ruifeisen]. Justice Manny concurred in the opinions of Justices Silberg
and Landau. Id. at 24.
197. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5; Shava, supra note 14, at 142-43 (noting that "the majority
opinion espoused an objective secular test-'in common parlance' and 'as used as the present time by
the people' [while] H. Cohn J. favored the adoption of a subjective secular test") (citations omitted).
198. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15.
199. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 64.
200. LESLIE, supra note 190, at 39. See also JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 65 (noting that for the
majority, "the secular meaning of the term 'Jew' in the Law of Return is to be derived from the
common understanding of the 'ordinary simple Jew."'); L.C. Green, Book Review, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.





The Justices split, however, on how to determine the ordinary, secular
meaning of the word "Jew." The majority favored a combination of what
they viewed as common understandings used in everyday language
coupled with some notion of traditional bounds of collective identity.20'
Applying this test, the Court concluded that the secular view "treated
conversion as decisive and excluded the convert from the Jewish
community.202 Justice Cohn, dissenting, favored a wholly subjective
approach based on the individual's preference.203
Justice Silberg began, after noting Rufeisen's deeds during the
Holocaust, to review the religious law on the matter, and concluded that
the Jewishness of a convert is "indivisible and absolute." 204 But whereas
the term "Jew" means a Jew according to Jewish law under the Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, Silberg saw the same
word as bearing a "secular meaning, as it is usually understood in common
parlance-and this I emphasize-by the ordinary simple Jew."205 He
explained that the purpose of defining the jurisdiction of the rabbinical
courts is to make Jewish law applicable to Jews, and defining Jews any
other way than by halakha would defeat the purpose of the law.206 On the
other hand, "[fjor all its immense historical importance, [the Law of
Return] is a secular law, and in the absence of definition either in the
statute itself or in the decided cases, we must interpret its terms according
to their ordinary meaning." 207 The question then, is whether the "ordinary
Jewish meaning of the term 'Jew' . . . include[s] a Jew who has become a
Christian?" 208
Silberg held the answer was a clear "no." 209 "Justice Silberg, writing for
the majority, concluded that the communal understanding of the term does
not include a Jew who has become a Christian." 210 He suggested that
"Jew" and "Christian" are incompatible statuses. 211 "The deeply rooted
belief that Jew and Christian are contradictory terms is shared alike by
simple people and scholars."2 12 On this view, Rufeisen "has deserted, not
merely lapsed." 213 Framing the issue of return in the context of Zionism,
Silberg explains that it is the Jewish people's "historic culture as Jews
201. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5; Shava, supra note 14, at 142-43.
202. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
203. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5; Shava, supra note 14, at 142-43.
204. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 2-10 (opinion of Silberg, J.).




209. Id. at 11.
210. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 66.
211. Jackson, supra note 113, at 120.
212. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 12 (opinion of Silberg, J.).
213. Jackson, supra note 113, at 122.
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which entitles them to the land." 2 14 Silberg wrote:
Whether he is religious, non-religious or anti-religious, the Jew
living in Israel is bound, willingly or unwillingly, by an umbilical
cord to historical Judaism from which he draws his language and
its idiom, whose festivals are his own to celebrate, and whose great
thinkers and spiritual heroes-not the least of whom are the
martyrs of 1096 and those who perished at the stake in Spain-
nourish his national pride. 215
Because the adoption of Christianity is inconsistent with the
maintenance of Jewish cultural ties, Silberg concluded that Rufeisen had
forfeited his right to return to Israel as a member of the Jewish people.216
Justice Landau joined in Silberg's opinion and added some commentary
of his own. 2 17 "[T]he main thrust of the judgment of Landau J. is to stress
the importance for this case of the manner of construction of Jewish
identity by the founders of Zionism." 2 18 He suggested that the position of
halakha toward the convert was not one of forbearance, but of contempt,
and thus Rufeisen should not have invoked it in aid of his cause.2 19 In any
event, he agreed that the question was not to be decided by religious law
because the Law of Return "is a secular Law of the State of Israel."220
Looking to the Zionist roots of the state, Landau noted that Herzl had
refused admission to the Zionist Organization of a Jew who had converted
to Christianity,22 and that Ahad Haam222 rejected the notion that even an
entirely secular Israeli could deny the influence and importance of
historical Jewish practice on its current constitution-to deny that past
would be to deny what made Jewish nationalism Jewish.223 Thus, Landau
concluded that "[a] Jew who, by changing his religion, cuts himself off
from the national past of his people ceases thereby to be a Jew in the
national sense to which the Law of Return gives expression."224 "The
stress placed by Landau J. upon identification with the religious sentiment
of the past is not based upon any assertion of the religious value of the
past, but rather upon its sociological function in constituting group
214. Id. It has been suggested that the case was regarded as a cause c6l6bre, in part, because it
"pose[d] questions, not only about Jewish identity, but also about Zionism, and about the relations
between them." Id. at 120.
215. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at I (opinion of Silberg, J.).
216. See Jackson, supra note 113, at 122.
217. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 18-19 (opinion of Landau, J.).
218. Jackson, supra note 113, at 120.
219. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 19 (opinion of Landau, J.).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 20.
222. For more on the intellectual contribution of Ahad Haam to Zionism, see BATNITZKY, supra
note 22, at 155-60.
223. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 20-21 (opinion of Landau, J.).




identity." 225 In becoming a Christian, Landau, J., concluded that Rufeisen
"excluded himself from the common fate of the Jewish people and has
linked his destiny to other forces whose precepts he honours both in
thought and in observance."226
Justice Berinson likewise "explained the popular view as based upon the
(mutual) denial of community which occurs when a Jew converts to
another religion." 227 And, like Silberg, Berinson took the relevant
understanding of "Jew" to be that of the man on the street.228
Berinson began by observing, almost wryly, that the "usual case" of
conversion-"for reasons to which we have become accustomed"
assimilation, mixed marriages, improvement of social or material status,
public career, etc., do not apply; "material comforts and worldly
pleasures" hold no attraction for the monk.229 After summarizing the
particulars of Rufeisen's conduct during the War and his attempts to
immigrate to Israel, 230 Berinson noted that he was not free to simply grant
the request, which he would if he were so empowered. 231 He noted that the
parties agreed that the Law of Return must be given a "secular-national,
and not a religious connotation," but diverged on what that connotation
was. 232 He further conceded that had Rufeisen been captured by the Nazis
after his conversion, the conversion would have made no difference "and
he would have fallen victim to them as a Jew."233 Interestingly, Berinson
suggests that "had he declared that he believed in Buddhism which does
not require a change of religion and lived as a Buddhist monk, he would
apparently have been recognized as a Jew. Thus as a Buddhist monk yes,
but as a Christian monk no!" 234 Berinson also maintains that Ahad Haam
would not have viewed a Jew who converted to another religion, but who
in all other respects was deeply Zionist, as outside the bounds of the
Jewish people.235
But despite this, Berinson concluded that "[t]he people themselves ...
have decided otherwise. . . . For them a Jew who has embraced another
religion has withdrawn himself not only from the Jewish faith but also
from the Jewish nation and has no place in the Jewish community. "236 The
common understanding of the Jewish people is that "a Jew and a Christian
225. Jackson, supra note 113, at 126.
226. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23 (opinion of Landau, J.).
227. Jackson, supra note 113, at 128.
228. Id at 126.
229. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 24 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
230. Id at 24-26.
231. Id at 27-28.
232. Id. at 28.
233. Id. at 29.
234. Id at 31.
235. Id at 31-32.
236. Id at 32.
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cannot reside in one person" 237 because of "the (mutual) denial of
community which occurs when a Jew converts to another religion." 238 it
was this "popular meaning" that Berinson believed the Knesset intended
when it enacted the Law of Return. 23 9 Justice Berinson noted that even as
early as 1947, the position of the Jewish Agency, in testimony given
before the United Nations Special Committee for Palestine, was that
formal conversion to another religion would exclude one from the Jewish
people for political purposes.240
Justice Cohn dissented.24 1 He agreed that according to Jewish religious
law a converted Jew remains a Jew, agreed that the Law of Return (and
related registration laws) should not be construed according to Jewish
religious law, and agreed that the Law of Return should not be construed
to negate the principles on which the State of Israel was founded.24 2 But he
differed on whether permitting Rufeisen to become an Israeli citizen under
the Law of Return would do so. Instead, he would permit anyone who
declared in good faith that he was a Jew the privileges granted by the Law
of Return, regardless of whether the applicant had no other religion. 24 3 Just
as Jewish religious law cannot claim to be the proper lens through which
to view the Law of Return's ambiguous terms, Cohn held that it would be
equally improper to consider the religious law of any other religion, as his
colleagues had done in examining the effect of Rufeisen's participation in
Catholic sacraments, in determining who is a Jew for purposes of secular
legislation.244
Rufeisen's aim in going to court was to establish a precedent.245 He was
offered immediate citizenship by the Minister of the Interior if he would
drop the case, but refused.246 Later, Rufeisen regretted having taken the
case to court. He suggested, "had my position been accepted this would
have created a revolution in conventional concepts."247
The Rufeisen decision, although its result was broadly applauded in
Israel, was not without its critics and detractors. For example, by tying the
legal definition of "Jew" to common understanding, some complained that
the "majority's definition was both vague and impermanent." 24 8 It also
turned on the supposition that "a single 'common' meaning [of 'Jew']
237. Id
238. Jackson, supra note 113, at 128.
239. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 32 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
240. Id.
241. Id at 13-18 (Cohn, J., dissenting).
242. Id at 13-14.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id at 16.
245. TEC, supra note 160, at 227.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 231




exists and can be found." 24 9 And even assuming such a definition can be
discerned, a further question remains with respect to who is permitted to
offer an answer in order to determine the common understanding.
"Israelis? If so, only Jewish Israelis, or, since this is a secular law, all
Israelis? The Diaspora as well? Contemporary Jews or those throughout
history?" 25 0
Moreover, apart from problems of determining who is a Jew according
to a common understanding, the majority's reasoning with respect to
collective identity "rests on the theory that Jewishness and Christianity are
incompatible."251 And this theory rests in turn on the premise that while
irreligion does not vitiate one's connection to the Jewish people,
conversion to Christianity does.252 This conception of Jewishness "tends to
visualize all of Jewish history in relation to Christianity."253 Finally, the
decision "in no way answers the question of who is a Jew under the Law
of Return; it only asserts that an apostate such as Brother Daniel is not a
Jew."254
2. Shalit
The next case was not long in coming. The use of halakhic standards to
determine who is a Jew for purposes of registration was a longstanding
controversy. Initially there may have been a tacit understanding that
halakhic standards governed, but as early assumptions that determination
of Jewish status would be a simple matter turned out to be incorrect, any
understanding that previously existed began to break down before the state
was a decade old.
"On March 10, 1958, Minister of the Interior Bar-Yehuda from the
Labour Party, issued new guidelines on registration, whereby 'a person
who declares himself to be Jewish, in good faith, should be registered as
Jewish.' . . . As a reaction to those guidelines all the religious parties left
the Coalition."2 5  The prime minister established a committee to study the
situation, and the committee consulted eminent scholars and public
249. Galanter, supra note 157, at 11.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 15.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 66.
255. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 20; Lawrence S. Nesis, Who is a Jew?, 4 MANITOBA L.J. 53,
61 (1970). Bar-Yehuda's guidelines formalized the existing practice of accepting a declaration that
one was a Jew as sufficient for registration. For example, in 1953, Abraham Samuelov, a Catholic
Monk, was registered as Jewish on the basis of his own representation that he was a Jew of the
Catholic faith. Z. Warhaftig, Who is a Jew?, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XI: LAW,
JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 23, 25 (Daniel B. Sinclair ed.,
2000). However, under directives dating to 1956, children of mixed marriages were to be registered
under their mother's religion. Nesis, supra, at 62.
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figures. 256 A significant majority of those consulted favored the halakhic
definition. 257 "Forty-five replies were received, and of them, thirty-seven
scholars argued in favor of the halakhic test. . . . Only three replies
supported the view that the meaning of 'Jew' in a secular and in a
religious context were different." 2 5 8 The prime minister then assigned a
member of a religious party to be Minister of the Interior and henceforth
halakhic criteria were applied to registration as a matter of policy. 259
Benjamin (or Binyamin) Shalit was born in Haifa in 1935.260 While
studying in Edinburgh, he met and married his wife Anne (or possibly
Ann), who was not Jewish and who did not convert to Judaism. 26 ' Both
husband and wife were non-believers, and their marriage was a civil
one. 26 2 The couple returned to Israel in 1960, Anne became a naturalized
citizen, and together they had a son in 1964 and a daughter in 1967.263 In
the meantime, Shalit, a psychologist, had become an officer in the Israeli
Navy. 264
The Shalits registered their children in accordance with the Registration
of Inhabitants Ordinance 1949 (the forerunner to the Population Registry
Law 1965).265 "Registration, as such, does not confer any benefit upon the
persons registered, nor does it alter their legal status in any way. It means
nothing beyond the fact of registration."2 66 The details to be registered
included the children's dat (literally "law" but connoting "religion") and
le 'uM.2 67 Le'um is "an untranslatable term which was probably derived
from Central and Eastern Europe. It means something akin to
'peoplehood' and designates a common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
256. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 4.
257. Id. at 4-5; ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 292.
258. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 20-2 1.
259. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5.
260. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53.
261. Id. Anne was, however, the granddaughter of Sir Patrick Geddes, a Zionist who collaborated
with Chaim Weizmann to establish the Hebrew University. See Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 84.
262. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46; Nesis, supra note 255, at 53 (noting the Shalits considered
themselves atheists).
263. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46.
264. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46. By the time of the Supreme
Court's decision in 1970, he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant Commander. Rubenstein, supra note
131, at 84; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 26.
265. Nesis, supra note 255, at 60.
266. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 84.
267. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53. It should be noted that "[t]he Hebrew language does not have a
word for 'religion."' Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi. The word dat, which in Modem Hebrew denotes the
concept of religion, is a Persian loan-word that entered ancient Hebrew in late biblical times, and
which originally referred to simply "law," i.e., the law of the gentile king. Id. at xxvi & n.5. In Modem
Hebrew, however, it denotes "divine law." Id "[T]he concept, as used today, is a translation from
European languages rather than an intrinsic development." Id. As will be explained more fully below,
"[t]he use of the term 'religion' in a Jewish context is . .. an external imposition rather than an




origin."2 68 "Ethnic group," "nationality," and "people" have all been used
269as English translations.
In keeping with their atheistic convictions, the Shalits declined to
designate a religion for their son's registration, and listed his le'um as
"Jewish." The registration clerk amended the religion to "Father-Jewish,
Mother-non-Jewish" and amended the entry for le'um to read "not
registered." 27 0 Later, a different clerk, following new guidance, reversed
these designations when the Shalits' daughter was registered. For her, the
clerk designated "Father-Jewish, Mother-non-Jewish" under le 'um, and
"not registered" under religion.271
In February 1968, Shalit applied to the Supreme Court to order the
Minister of the Interior to register both children as "Jews" under le'um and
"without religion" under dat.272 After the first hearing, a special court of
five justices was convened, but later, the President of the Court, Justice
Agranat, took the unprecedented step of convening the entire court to hear
the case. 273 "As soon as Shalit applied to the Court, the judges sensed that
they were dealing with an explosive issue."274 "Both parties were armed
mainly with non-legal authorities, invoking the writings of Jewish
philosophers, statesmen, and scholars. It was the least legal case ever
argued." 275
Shalit argued, first, that the registration must be made in accordance
with the declaration of the declarant, and that the registration clerk was not
authorized to change what was declared.276 Second, he maintained that
one's le'um is something different from one's religion, and that belonging
to the Jewish ethnic group need not be determined halakhically, which
268. Rubenstein, supra note 13 1, at 84. See also id. at 103 n. I (noting near-equivalency with the
German concept of Nationalitdt).
269. Nesis, supra note 255, at 54.
270. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46.
271. Id. This was in error, and the Minister of the Interior later specified that he was ready to
correct the daughter's registration to be identical with the son's. Nesis, supra note 255, at 55.
272. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46; Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
273. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88; Shava, supra note 14, at 144. Other sources suggest that
the Court at that time had a tenth member who was not on the panel. Gideon Hausner, The Rights of
the Individual in Court, 9 ISRAEL L. REV. 477, 490 (1974); KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46. The
Supreme Court typically hears cases in panels of three justices. Exceptionally, a panel of five justices
may be convened, as happened in Rufeisen. Larger panels have been convened only twice: a panel of
seven was seated in HCJ 51/80 Cohen v. Rabbinical High Court of Appeals 35(2) PD 8 [1980] (Isr.),
and the panel of nine that heard Shalit has never been replicated. The reason why larger panels are
convened so infrequently is the staggering workload of the court. In contrast to most courts of last
resort (and especially the Supreme Court of the United States, which exercises almost exclusively
discretionary jurisdiction), the Supreme Court of Israel not only hears appeals as of right from most
civil and criminal matters, but also acts (in its capacity as the High Court of Justice) as a court of first
instance in most public matters. Gidon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal With a Primary Question That
the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy Over Who Is a Jew as an Illustration, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1233, 1241 n.30, 1242 n.34 (2006).
274. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
2 7 5. Id.
276. Nesis, supra note 255, at 55.
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could not fully apply to Israeli conditions, but could be evidenced by
subjective identification with Jewish-Israeli culture and values.277 Shalit
asked whether "Kamal Nimri, the terrorist, [would] be regarded as a Jew
while my children, who get a Hebrew and Israeli education and who
would fight for Israel, [would] be considered as non-Jews?" 278 The
Attorney General, in response, tied the Jewish religion to the Jewish
nation as inseparable elements of Jewish existence, with religion taking
primary importance.279
In November 1968, after the case had been under consideration for
several months, the entire court asked the Government to intervene by
deleting the requirement that le'um be listed in registration documents. 280
"The court's plea was brought to the cabinet and rejected in what was later
described by one of the judges as 'a summary procedure."' 2 8 1 It was
reported that the rejection was based upon security grounds: le'um is the
only way to quickly and easily distinguish between Jews, Arabs, and
Druze because dat is not printed on identity cards.282
The Shalit majority held by a vote of five-four that le'um, as
nationality/ethnicity, need not follow the halakhic view of who belonged
to the Jewish people. 283 And "[s]ince the issue was only registration and
not a substantive right such as citizenship, the majority was also prepared
to adopt the purely subjective definition advocated by Cohn J. in
Rufeisen."284 The Court ordered the Minister of the Interior to register the
277. Id. See also KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46 ("What Shalit, in effect, was trying to
accomplish was to have the Supreme Court declare that there is a Jewish nationality separate from the
Jewish religion.").
278. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88. Nimri was the commander of the Fatah movement in East
Jerusalem. See TOM SEGEV, 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR, AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE
MIDDLE EAST 499 (2005) (Jessica Cohen trans., 2007). Nimri's mother was Jewish; his father, an
Arab Muslim.
279. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 47.
280. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88-89.
281. Idat89.
282. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89; Shalit, infra note 283, at 106 (Kister, J., dissenting). This
would confirm Ben-Gurion's 1958 explanation that "[i]n light of our special situation, when there is
no practical possibility of a thorough and permanent control of the country's borders to prevent the
entry of infiltrators from the hostile neighboring countries, who are a source of grave and constant
danger to the peace of the country and its population, it is essential that a legal resident in Israel should
be able to identify himself at all times by means of a document supplied by an official authority."
Nesis, supra note 255, at 61 (internal quotation omitted). Under the Registry of Inhabitants Ordinance
1949, during times of emergency, every male resident was required to carry his identity card. Id. at 60.
283. See HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) PD 477 [1969] (Isr.), translated in
SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL VOLUME 35-191 (Asher Felix
Landau ed., 1971) [hereinafter "Shalit"]. The nine justices produced eight opinions: Justices Sussman,
Berinson, Witkon, and Manny agreed (with Manny simply joining in the opinions of Sussman and
Cohn) that the primary question concerned the authority of the registration officer; Cohn concurred,
but would accord less authority to the registration officer than the other justices in the majority;
President of the Supreme Court Agranat, Deputy President Silberg, and Justices Landau and Kister
dissented, addressing the question of nationality more directly. See also Green, supra note 200, at 191.
284. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 7; see also Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 84 ("As legal battles go,




Shalit children as Jews under le'um.285 Justice Sussman, delivering the
opinion of the Court, explained that "[t]he determination of the affiliation
of an individual to a given religion or a given nation derives principally
from the subjective feeling of the person concerned."286
"Sussman (and even more explicitly, Justice Berinson) underscored the
secular orientation of the earlier Court. It is implicit in their opinions that
the divisive nature of the issue raised by Shalit effectively removed the
last barrier to the adoption of a secular and subjective interpretation." 287
Sussman explained that the registration officer refused to register the
Shalit children as Jewish by nationality because the category
"embraces . .. the norms of Jewish nationality and of the Jewish religion
together, and accordingly no person is to be regarded as being of Jewish
nationality if the Jewish religion does not regard him as a Jew at all."288
And, in turn, the respondents claimed that the Jewish religion embraced
only a person whose mother is Jewish or who has been converted
according to religious law, and who is not also a member of another
religion. 28 9
Sussman disclaimed any suggestion that the Court was determining who
was a Jew; rather, he proposed that the only matter before the Court was
whether the registration officer was required to register the children in
accordance with the instructions of the parents, or whether "they can be
justified in their refusal."2 90 Sussman held that the registration officer had
not been statutorily authorized to "decide any question," and as a citizen
who provides information to the officer in accordance with law is
presumed to be stating the truth (unless the statement is clearly false on its
face, as an adult wishing to register as a five-year old child).29 ' Sussman
explained that while the registration officer was acting in accordance with
earlier directives of the Minister of the Interior, they are administrative
only, and to the extent they are inconsistent with or extend beyond powers
granted by statute, they are invalid.292
After noting that the purpose of registration is largely statistical, and
that some matters of registration are largely subjective, and therefore the
legislative purpose was not effectuated by refusing to register bona fide
285. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89.
286. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 48.
287. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 72.
288. Shalit, supra note 283, at 64.
289. Id. It is interesting to note that the respondents asserted the primacy of the halakhic
definition, while at the same time narrowing that definition to exclude members of other religions
using, essentially, the secular definition the Court created in Rufeisen. See id. at 72 ("[Bly not
registering as a Jew anyone born a Jew who is a member of another religion... they deny the very
religious principle according to which they purport to act.").
290. Id. at 64-65 (opinion of Sussman, J.).
291. Idat66.
292. Id. at 66-67.
Petty 243
80
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
claims, Sussman turned to application of Rufeisen.293 Sussman recalled
that Rufeisen established that the term "Jew," as a legal term of art, has no
settled meaning; Rufeisen was Jewish under the Rabbinical Courts
Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 1953, which was based on
halakha, but not under the Law of Return of 1950.294 Sussman concludes
that given the largely statistical purposes of the Population Registry Law,
the malleable and subjective nature of "nationality," and the limited scope
of the registration officer's discretion, the officer was required to register
the Shalit children in accordance with the application.2 95
Justice Berinson concurred in Sussman's opinion,296 but proceeded to
explain why his judgment in favor of Shalit was consistent with his views
expressed in Rufeisen.29 7 Berinson explained that in Rufeisen, he
concluded that the definition of "Jew" for purposes of the Law of Return
was not the halakhic definition, but instead rested on popular
understanding. 298 Applying the same principle here, Berinson concluded
that "[t]he term 'nation' is to be interpreted according to the popular
notion of our place and times."299 Berinson found it inconceivable that the
children of an officer of the Israeli Defense Forces, raised in Israel, and
whose mother, while not Jewish, comes from Zionist stock and has
"bound her fate with that of the people of the State of Israel," would not be
recognized as of Jewish nationality while the "head of the terrorists in East
Jerusalem, born of a Jewish woman and a Moslem, who has striven to
destroy and annihilate the State of Israel" would be "considered a son of
the covenant." 3 00
The bulk of Justice Witkon's opinion was spent refuting Justice
Landau's contention that the non-Jewishness of Shalit's children was
evident on the face of the application, and explaining that the subjective
notion of Jewish nationality divorced from halakhic standards was a
"legitimate and serious" one.301
Justice Cohn, like the other judges in the majority, concluded that the
Jewishness of the Shalit children did not present itself for consideration,
and that the question was limited to the authority of the registration officer
applying the Minister of the Interior's directives. 302 "[I]t is immaterial
whether by virtue of instructions or directives he received from the
Minister of the Interior, or out of his abundant knowledge of the law or his
293. Id. at 67-71.
294. Id. at 71-72.
295. Id. at 72-77.
296. Id. at 185 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
297. Id at 186.
298. Id.
299. Id at 188.
300. Id. at 187-88.
301. Id. at 98-102 (opinion of Witkon, J.).




erudition in the Talmud and the Poskim, the registration officer knows (or
thinks he knows) with certainty what is or is not the 'nationality' of the
person concerned."303 Cohn, in accordance with views on subjective
identity he expressed in Rufeisen, held that "the notification of the Jewish
'nationality' of the petitioners' children was given bona fide since the
petitioners believe with perfect faith that their children's nationality is
Jewish, and the contrary directives of the Minister of the Interior certainly
cannot bind them."3 04
Justice Manny simply concurred with both Sussman and Cohn.30 s
President of the Supreme Court Agranat, dissenting, concurred in large
part with Justice Landau. 306 The President rejected the subjective approach
to nationality championed by Cohn, suggesting that this was perhaps even
required by Rufeisen (although he did not address what roles Rufeisen's
conversion away from Judaism and the fact that it was to another religion,
and Christianity specifically, nor the difference between the terms
"nationality" in the Population Registry Law and "Jew" in the Law of
Return).307 Agranat discussed at length the reasons why, in his view, it was
not such a simple matter to disassociate religion from nationality, and why
Jewish religious law was still a relevant criterion in determining Jewish
nationality even for a secular law.30s He suggests that the contrary view
"had its source in the school of liberalism and individualism which teaches
that religious faith is a matter of conscience falling in the individual's
private domain." 30 After reviewing some of the arguments on both
sides,310 Agranat concluded that the issue presented depends so heavily on
ideological views that judicial resolution of the case would essentially
amount to rule by caprice. 31' Accordingly, Agranat would have let stand
the Minister's decision, owing to its lack of amenability to judicial review.
Deputy President of the Supreme Court Silberg explained at the outset
that "[t]he problem in all its magnitude and gravity is the substance of the
concept 'Jew': can a person belong to the Jewish people without being at
the very same time an adherent of the Jewish religion?" 312 Silberg
contended that the secular definition of "Jew" elucidated in Rufeisen was
inapplicable because in Rufeisen, the secular usage was what the Knesset
was assumed to have intended. Here, the issue was "nationality," and so
he suggested that if there was no definition of "Jew" in general usage
303. Id. at 44.
304. Id. at 47.
305. Id. at 148 (opinion of Manny, J.).
306. Id. (Agranat, President of the Supreme Court, dissenting).
307. Id. at 149.
308. Id. at 150-64.
309. Id. at 167.
310. Id. at 170-78.
311. Id. at 181.
312. Id. at 49 (Silberg, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, dissenting).
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other than that of halakha, then the halakhic definition would be applied
notwithstanding the similarly secular nature of the Population Registry
Law."' Silberg then proceeded to consider what test should be applied to
determine nationality. He concluded that there existed no Israeli nation,
only an Israeli state and a much larger Jewish nation. 314 Suggesting that
the abandonment of religious principles would spell the end of the Jewish
people, he reached the conclusion that the Jewish nation determined its
membership according to religious precepts.315
After reprising the basic facts,316 Justice Landau noted that Shalit made
two arguments: (1) that the registration must be made by the registration
officer upon the notification provided, and the registration officer is not
empowered to alter that notification; and (2) that even if the registration
officer had the power to amend the notification, Shalit's notification to the
registration officer that his children were of Jewish nationality was
accurate. 317 This case, therefore, squarely presented the question whether
in the State of Israel it was possible to be Jewish by nationality (in the
ethnic sense as opposed to citizenship), while not being a member of the
Jewish people as a religious matter.
Landau thought that Rufeisen could not answer the matter. In Rufeisen,
the Court had no trouble concluding that popular sentiment would exclude
a Jew by descent who had converted to Christianity from registering as a
Jew. But no similar consensus view of "the man on the street" existed with
respect to the status of children of mixed marriages where the mother was
not Jewish, yet the father was, and the children acculturated Israelis.319
Landau, like several of the other judges, concluded that there was little the
Court could do to resolve an ideological dispute that turns a "court of law
into a court of judges."320 Consonant with the views of Agranat on matters
ideological, Landau concluded that "the decision must rest with the
Knesset which represents the people and, so long as the Knesset has not
decided otherwise, with the Government which is entrusted with matters
of policy and depends upon the confidence of the Knesset." 32 1
Justice Kister delivered a lengthy opinion ranging from the meaning of
"nationality" in the context of political theory,322 to the treatment of mixed
marriages in Jewish law, 32 3 to psychological studies on maternal
313. Id at 50.
314. Id. at 53.
315. Id. at 53-62.
316. Id. at 78-79 (Landau, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 79.
318. Id.
319. Id at 80-81.
320. Id at 82-83.
321. Id at 94.
322. Id. at 108-13 (Kister, J., dissenting).




attachment of children.324 He canvassed the dilemma of European Jews
during the emancipation and the desire on the part of the Reform
movement to reduce Jewish life to religion (in order to make room for an
adopted nationality and full political rights).3 25 Kister concluded that the
views of the scholars consulted that led to the new directives were a
sufficient ground to defer to the government, and that in any event the idea
that nationality (as ethnicity) could be acquired simply by "feeling" was
incredulous.3 26
3. Amendment No. 2
Although Rufeisen and Shalit may appear somewhat contradictory, at
least insofar as they reach different results (Shalit winning and Rufeisen
losing their respective claims to Jewish status), on closer inspection, the
cases reveal a consistent adherence to what the Court considers a "secular"
definition of Israeli nationality.327 In effect, the Court determined that
religion and nationality were separable, and that based on prevailing
norms, (1) halakhic non-Jews may be considered Jews for purposes of
registration (as in Shalit), and (2) halakhic Jews may be considered non-
Jews for purposes of the Law of Return (as in Rufeisen). Leaving aside for
the moment the difference between registration, which carries no
substantive rights, and the Law of Return, which carries immediate and
automatic citizenship, the two decisions reflect, sometimes at pains, that
the religious view of who is a Jew matters very little apart from questions
reserved to the rabbinical courts. This did not sit well with everyone.
Despite the fact that "[o]f the five majority justices, only one, Justice
Berinson, stated clearly that the Shalit children were Jewish in the secular
sense evolved in the Brother Daniel case,"328 and "only three out of the
nine judges actually delivered any opinion on the controversial
question,"329 the Shalit decision was venomously attacked by the Chief
Rabbi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, and the Rabbinate's chief
executive.330
As a result of the public rancor, "[t]he inevitable governmental crisis in
the wake of the Shalit case was not long in coming, and in response to the
strong protests against the decision made by the religious parties, the Law
of Return was amended." 3 1 Indeed, "[e]ven before anyone had time to
324. Id. at 121.
325. Id. at 129-31.
326. Id. at 143-45.
327. Stroman, supra note 79, at 1547.
328. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89.
329. Id. at 90.
330. LESLIE, supra note 190, at 42; ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 303.
331. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 8. See also Sapir, supra note 273, at 1243 (noting that the Shalit
decision "triggered a public storm and a threat on the National Religious Party's part to bolt the
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read the lengthy judgment . .. the religious parties lashed out against the
majority with a ferocity unparalleled in Israel's history of respect for the
judiciary."33 2  "[U]nder threat by the Orthodox to bring down the
government, the Knesset passed legislation directly addressing the Court's
decision.""' Out of necessity, the process was rapid. "[T]he new Law was
hastily prepared by the Minister of Justice and approved by the Cabinet,
presented to the Knesset, discussed, adopted and promulgated: the entire
legislative process was completed within a few weeks."334 The Shalit
decision had been handed down on January 23, 1970. By March 16, 1970,
the Amendment had been adopted. 335
The Amendment rejected the Supreme Court's secular position on the
severability of religion and nationality. 336 "It amended the Law of Return
by defining as a Jew 'a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has
become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another
religion."' 337 The Amendment also extended the right of return to a Jew's
spouse, children, grandchildren, and the spouses of children and
grandchildren, regardless of whether they were Jewish (unless they had
previously been Jewish and converted to another religion). 338 Thus, the
Amendment, "[t]hough basically following the religious concept ...
constitutes a typical compromise between the two ideologies by granting
coalition, a move that would have precipitated the government's downfall."); Edelman, supra note 26,
at 218 ("The Shalit decision created a political maelstrom and propelled a most reluctant Knesset to
act."); Shava, supra note 14, at 146 ("The judgment in Shalit's case . . . created a public storm and the
threat of a governmental crisis due to the dissatisfaction of the National Religious Party."); Klein,
supra note 115, at 60 n.23 ("The amendments were spurred by the Supreme Court's Shalit decision");
Ginossar, supra note 115 at 264 ("[F]ar from settling the issue, [the Shalit decision] exacerbated it
further, even threatening the stability of the Coalition Government."); KRAINES, supra note 130, at 54
("The Shalit decision stirred the public for days."); Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89 (noting "a loud
and heated debate swept the whole country," "[tiwo religious [government] ministers spoke out
against the decision," and "[t]he Rabbinate issued a proclamation stating that any enforcement of the
Court's ruling would be contrary to Holy Writ and ordered the Minister of Interior not to obey the
Court's decision").
332. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89; see also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 303.
333. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 70. See also KRAINES, supra note 130, at 54 ("On January 25,
1970, the National Religious Party announced that it would resign from the Government Coalition
unless the Knesset passed legislation reversing the Court's decision."). In fact, the legislation
amending the Law of Return did not address the Court's decision at all. "The Law of Return was not
invoked as all the Shalits were Israeli citizens-Anne Shalit by naturalization, the father and children
by birth." Rubenstein, supra note 131 at 85. But see Shalit, supra note 283, at 103, 145 (Kister, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that Anne Shalit had not been naturalized).
334. Ginossar, supra note 115, at 264. See also KRAINES, supra note 130, at 54 ("Four days later
the Cabinet voted to recommend to the Knesset the legislation demanded by the National Religious
Party."); Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 90 ("A week later, the two Shapiros-the Minister of Justice
and Minister of Interior-came out with a proposed package deal.").
335. Ginossar, supra note 115, at 264 n.3.
336. Stroman, supra note 79, at 1547 n.15 (quoting JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 71).
337. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 70; Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970, 24 LSI 28
(1969-1970) (Isr.). The Population Registry Law was simultaneously amended to preclude registration
as a Jew of anyone failing the test laid down for the Law of Return. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 70;
see also Shava, supra note 14, at 146-47; Klein, supra note 115, at 58-59.
338. Ginossar, supra note 115, at 266 & n.10.
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equal rights under the Law of Return to persons who are formally not
Jews." 3
4. Beresford
The final act in the Supreme Court's drama concerns Gary and Shirley
Beresford, a Messianic Jewish couple who sought to emigrate to Israel
from their home in South Africa.340 Beresford is notable because unlike
Rufeisen, there was no formal act of affiliation (as with Rufeisen's baptism
and subsequent holy orders) and unlike Shalit, there was no absence of
some outward manifestation of affiliation (as with Anne Shalit's decision
not to convert). Instead, Beresford concerns solely individual beliefs and
the result that particular beliefs may have on religious status under civil
law. Where Brother Daniel was deemed no longer Jewish because he
"linked his destiny to other forces whose precepts he honours in both
thought and observance,"34 1 Beresford took this one step further by
making maintenance of Jewish status turn exclusively on thought. The
case is also notable insofar as two Justices, applying two very different
modes of analysis, come to the same result. At first, this may seem
innocuous. But, again, closer inspection reveals that both rely on some of
the same suppositions, and there is good reason to believe that
suppositions, which frame both analyses, have a significant influence on
the result the Court reaches.
Gary Lee Beresford and Shirley Beresford sought oleh's visas to
immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return, either as Jews themselves or,
under the newly enacted category, as children of Jews. 3 42 That both of
them were born Jews was not in dispute.343 With respect to practice, the
Beresfords observed the Sabbath and Jewish dietary laws, were Zionists,
and held strong emotional ties with the people, state, and land of Israel.3"
But the couple also belonged to the "Jews for Jesus" movement. Although
339. Englard, supra note 7, at 194-95. At the time, Israel was preparing for the possibility of
massive immigration from the Soviet Union due to the Jewish "national awakening" that country had
recently experienced. Weiss, supra note 115, at 94. Many in Israel understood that given the realities
of life in the U.S.S.R., they could expect a significant number of Jews with non-Jewish spouses, and
there was a call from some quarters to ease the process of immigration for these couples. Id. At the
same time as the National Religious Party had acquiesced to broadening the Law of Return to include
non-Jewish family members, there was significant pressure to define who was a Jew for Law of Return
and registration purposes along religious lines. Id
340. HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of the Interior 43(4) PD 793 [1987] (Isr.), translated in
JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE
OF ISRAEL 27-63 (Daniel B. Sinclair ed., 2000) [hereinafter Beresford].
341. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23 (opinion of Landau, J.) (emphasis added).
342. Id. at 28. For a more colorful, if unflaggingly sympathetic, background to the Beresfords'
case, see LINDA ALEXANDER, THE UNPROMISED LAND: THE STRUGGLE OF MESSIANIC JEWS GARY &
SHIRLEY BERESFORD (1994).
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not Christians-neither had ever been baptized-the Beresfords "came to
believe that there is no contradiction between the Jewish faith and the
belief in Jesus as the Messiah; this belief, according to their view, is an
inseparable part of a clearly Jewish religious movement, which
characterized a legitimate stream of Judaism in the Second Temple
period" and which they contended was "a legitimate stream of Judaism
today."3 45
The question before the Court was whether this belief alone, in the
absence of baptism and affiliation with any Christian church, rendered the
Beresfords "members of another religion" such that they had extinguished
their rights, as Jews, to make aliyah under the Law of Return. Justice Elon
stressed that formal admission to another religion under its own terms is
not required for purposes of the Law of Return (though it would be with
respect to matters of personal status adjudicated by the religious courts). 34 6
Instead, with respect to the Law of Return, "all that we need ask of the
other religion is whether such beliefs are amongst the principles which
express the substance and the character of that religion."34 7 Notably, Elon
held that what counts is not ceremonial admission, but "theological
criteria, i.e. what are the central doctrinal or theological principles through
which that other religion finds expression."3 48 Applying this test, Elon
concluded that "the most important thing-even more important than
baptism- . . . in Christianity-is the belief in the Divinity of Jesus." 349
Elon continued by refuting the Beresfords' claim that Jews for Jesus
should be counted among the various branches of Judaism because "[iun
the entire world of Jews and Judaism, in all its movements and divisions,
there is not a single community which believes in the divinity of a human
being in the incarnation of God, and in a Messiah that has already
arrived." 3"o Elon held that "Notwithstanding any historical claim that
Messianic Jews were once fully accepted as members of the Jewish
religion, the situation has changed irreversibly and no person believing in
Jesus can claim today to be a Jew under this objective definition."3 5 1
Breaking somewhat with past cases that went to lengths to distance the
Court from application of halakha, Elon also turned to several religious
345. Id. at 28-29.
346. Id at 29-30.
347. Id. at 30.
348. Id. at 30.
349. Id. at 30.
350. Id at 32. Of course, this reasoning is deeply flawed; it defines-out Messianic Jews. Any
denomination could be similarly excluded by essentializing a particular characteristic or lack of a
particular characteristic. For example, if one wanted to define Judaism in theological terms, one could
create a definition that "... there is not a single community that does not profess a belief in a
supernatural God." Such a definition would exclude Humanistic Judaism. Other examples could be
drawn up along similar lines, simply by identifying a particular characteristic and declaring it to be
either essential or disqualifying.




authorities to conclude that even under religious law, an apostate is
considered a Jew only for purposes of marriage and divorce. 352
Justice Barak agreed that the petition must be dismissed, but on rather
different grounds. He reasoned that the definition of Judaism for the Law
of Return is a dynamic, secular, liberal one, established on the basis of
public opinion at any given time.35 3 He noted that the question before the
Court was only the meaning of the phrase "and is not a member of another
religion."354 Barak rejected an earlier approach that assessed whether an
individual is a member of another religion by reference to the position of
the other religion, because it is "incompatible with the aim underlying the
definition of 'Jew' in the Law of Return" which was "intended to establish
the identities of those who are entitled to immigration to Israel" and
therefore Jewishness cannot be made contingent upon the particularities of
a non-Jewish community.355 Secondly, applying another religion's
membership criteria, although it serves the purpose of permitting relative
autonomy of religious groups to direct their own affairs in the matters that
have been delegated to them, does not serve any parallel purpose in the
context of the Law of Return.35" Barak rejects determining who is a
member of another religion according to any religious law, including
Jewish law, not least because the Amendment was generally thought
inconsistent with halakha.357 He concedes that the Law of Return is
animated by Jewish religious conceptions of Jewry as a body corporate,
but concludes that this cannot mean that the Jewish religious conception of
"another religion" is what the Knesset intended to adopt.35
Instead, Barak held that it must be understood in the context of secular
Israeli law.359 He explained that "[t]he expression 'is not a member of
another religion' is like any other expression in the Law of Return, which
must be accorded a secular interpretation." 360 Relying on the opinions of
Justices Silberg, Cohn, Landau, and Berinson in Rufeisen, he noted that
the interpretation that governs is the common understanding. 361 This
understanding, he continued, "undoubtedly contains religious elements,
for these elements currently constitute a component in the identity of the
Jewish people." 362 But ultimately, it is a criterion of "national-secular and
352. Beresford, supra note 340, at 32-35.
353. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 9.
354. Beresford, supra note 340, at 46.
355. Id. at 47.
356. Id. at 48-49.
357. Id. at 49-51.
358. Id. at 51-52.
359. Id at 53.
360. Id
361. Id
362. Id. at 55.
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not religious significance."363
Barak concluded that the national-secular definition of the Jewish
people excluded those who have a religion other than Judaism that is
"their effective religion" to which they "see themselves connected in their
every-day lives.""3M Notably, he explained, "it is essential that this
effective connection be incompatible with the secular conception of a
person being a Jew," and offered Brother Daniel as a prime example. 365 "A
person who was born of a Jewish mother but has become a Christian priest
is 'a member of another religion' since, according to our secular approach,
he has stopped being a Jew."
Applying this national-secular concept of "Jew" to the case at hand,
Barak noted that the Beresfords were not part of the Jewish community in
Johannesburg and that they believed in Jesus as the son of God, the
Messiah, and the King of the Jews. He also noted, however, that they do
not believe in the doctrine of the Trinity and have not been baptized, and
that they have a profound connection with the Jewish people. 36 7
Conceding that the followers of Jesus in the first century may have seen
no contradiction in that pursuit with membership in the Jewish
community, Barak concluded that the Jew "from the marketplace" today
would take the Beresfords as members of another religion because "it is
not possible to skip two thousand years of history as if nothing
happened."368 "According to the secular criterion, the other religion-the
one to which the Petitioners belong-is Christianity," even if Christians
would not view things that way according to Christian doctrine.369 The
controlling factor is the current secular conception of what it means to be a
member of another religion, not whether the petitioners are apostates
under Jewish law, or whether they have been formally accepted into
another religion according to the norms of the other religion.370 Justice
Halima concurred in the result without opinion. 37 1
B. The Court's Conclusions
Rufeisen, Shalit, and Beresford raise a number of intriguing points
concerning how the Supreme Court of Israel understands what it means as
a legal matter to be a Jew and, in turn, what constitutes a "religion" and a
363. Id.
364. Id. at 56.
365. Id
366. Id
367. Id at 59-60.
368. Id. at 60.
369. Id. at 61-62.
370. Id. at 62. Justice Barak noted briefly that the same reasoning applied with equal force to the
phrase "voluntarily changed his religion" in section 4A, and the Beresfords were therefore not entitled





"nationality." First, a strong majority of the Court in Rufeisen rejected the
notion that who is a Jew for purposes of the Law of Return should be
determined according to halakha.37 2 Instead, Rufeisen referred to the
popular understanding of religion to make that determination. Popular
understanding, in turn, "treated conversion as decisive."37 4 Rufeisen had
placed himself outside of the Jewish community "in both thought and
observance. "3  Shalit held that nationality is subjective (or at least mostly
subjective) but to reach that conclusion had to assume that religion and
nationality are separable categories. 7 And finally Beresford took
Rufeisen one step further, holding that religion is primarily a matter of
belief and closing the door on the possibility raised in Rufeisen that formal
affiliation is necessary. 377 In Rufeisen, Berinson suggested that had
Rufeisen become a Buddhist, rather than a Christian monk, he would not
have extinguished his right of return.7 After Beresford, that possibility
appears to be foreclosed.
In short, for the Supreme Court of Israel, religion is 1) something
separable from nationality and 2) primarily a matter of belief. These
conclusions, although not inevitable, were also not unprecedented in
Israeli history. For example, a minister of the Jewish Agency said that not
joining another religion is a requirement of Jewish status for aliyah.379
This conclusion may have been based on a statement Herzl made that a
Jew who converted to another religion was not a Jew and was not entitled
to membership in the Zionist Organization. 380
In reaching these conclusions, the Court understood itself to be applying
an "ordinary" or "secular" understanding of "religion" and
"nationality." Oswald Rufeisen himself admitted, "had my position
been accepted this would have created a revolution in conventional
concepts."382 But how did these concepts come to be considered
372. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5.
373. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15; LESLIE, supra note 190, at 39; JACOBSON, supra note 78, at
65 (noting that for the majority, "the secular meaning of the term 'Jew' in the Law of Return is to be
derived from the common understanding of the 'ordinary simple Jew."'); Green, supra note 200, at
191.
374. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
375. See Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23 (opinion of Landau, J.).
376. See supra notes 277, 287-88, 295, 300, and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 367-70 and accompanying text. See also Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23
(opinion of Landau, J.) (noting importance of both "thought" and "observance").
378. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 31 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
379. TEC, supra note 160, at 226.
380. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 109.
381. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 16-17 ("[T]he Court in the Brother Daniel case looked to the
ordinary meaning of the term 'Jews.' Justice Silberg made reference to the 'ordinary every meaning'
of the word as used by Jews; Justice Landau spoke of the 'instinct of the overwhelming majority of
Jews today' . . . and Justice Berenson, of the 'common meaning of the word' and of the 'popular
understanding."'); Galanter, supra note 157, at 11 (same).
382. TEC, supra note 160, at 231.
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"ordinary" and "conventional"-so ubiquitous and fundamental as to be
unworthy of critical inquiry, and so widely accepted as to be
presumptively neutral?
The answer appears to be two-fold. First, "religion" is generally
understood to mean something chiefly concerned with beliefs because
Christianity is chiefly concerned with beliefs. "Religion" historically
connoted those non-Western modes of behavior, rituals, institutions, etc.
that had at least rough parallels in Christianity. "Religion" is, at its core, a
Christian category. But as the centrality of religion generally and
Christianity specifically declined in the West, the idea of religion as an
isolable component of the human experience lost the connection to its
Christian origins. Eventually, the Christian idea of "religion" was adopted
by non-Christians. Religion was reified as a legal construct in
constitutions and laws guaranteeing "freedom of religion." And as religion
became a universal concept, there seemed little reason to question its
provenance or its neutrality as a category.
V. A CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION
The approach the Supreme Court of Israel has taken to defining who is a
Jew under civil law is not secular, but is instead derived from the history
of Christian hegemony in the West.383 It is not a neutral definition, but
rather a sacrifice-intentional or not-of a Jewish corporate self-
conception at the altar of Christian universalism.
A. A "Rather Odd Modern Concept "384
In colloquial speech, "religion" is "one of the simplest, most obvious
and minimal terminological statements" one can make.38 ' As understood
by the Court, the concept is essentially "transhistorical and
transcultural,"386 i.e., unhistoricized, essentialized, and tacitly presumed
immune to or inherently resistant to critical analysis."3 87 Even today, the
category "'world religions" belies a pervasive, unexamined, and "rather
monumental assumption . .. that religion is a universal, or at least
ubiquitous phenomenon to be found anywhere in the world at any time in
history."'
But despite its ubiquity, "[t]he modern concept of religion . . . is not a
383. See DIDI HERMAN, AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS, & ENGLISH LAW
16 (2011) ("[Slecularism becomes a term that facilitates judicial Christian thinking").
384. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 13, 190.
385. Dan, supra note 1, at xxv.
386. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 28 (1993).
387. TOMOKO MASUZAWA, THE INVENTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS 1-2 (2005).




neutral or timeless category but instead a modem, European creation, and
a Protestant one at that."389 Leora Batnitzky explains "this Protestant
notion simply as the view that religion denotes a sphere of life separate
and distinct from all others, and that this sphere is largely private and not
public, voluntary and not compulsory." 390 An understanding of religion
that gives primacy to propositional belief (which occupies the private,
voluntary sphere) has been called "a modern, privatized Christian one
because and to the extent that it emphasizes the priority of belief as a state
of mind rather than as constituting activity in the world." 391 In short, the
common understanding of "religion," as primarily a matter of voluntary,
internal, propositional belief is neither neutral nor secular.392 It assumes
and is built on a Christian normativity.
The extent to which "religion" is a product of post-Enlightenment
Protestantism or of the early Christian period is not well understood.393
But the idea of religion, as it "is generally recognized, derive[s] from
Western cultural traditions and experiences." 394 Ruth Langer and Joseph
Dan agree "that the very concepts of religion and theology as the academy
understands them today are Christian concepts, derived from
Christianity's early accommodations with Greco-Roman culture, resulting
389. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1, 13, 190; see also Linda Woodhead, Five Concepts of
Religion, 21 INT'L REV. Soc.-REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 121, 123 (2011) ("[T]he
conception of religion as a matter of belief is a distinctly modern one, with a bias toward modem
Christian, especially Protestant, forms of religion."); Hent de Vries, Introduction: Why Still
"Religion "?, in RELIGION: BEYOND A CONCEPT 1, 4 (Hent de Vries ed., 2008) (Religion points to
"many concepts, in any event, the ones we have come to associate with it too quickly, influenced by a
Western and especially Protestant idiom."); James Boyd White, Talking About Religion in the
Language of the Law, in JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND LEGAL EDUCATION 124, 131 (1999) ("Here is the image of religion (I think deeply Protestant in
nature) to which I have been repeatedly exposed. Religion at heart consists in something called
'belief; this belief is arrived at by an individual, in whatever way seems best to him or her; the object
of this belief is a set of propositions, usually about a Supreme Being, sometimes about a set of beings
superior to the human; this being (or beings) issues commands to human beings, who are threatened
with punishment, often eternal punishment, if they fail to comply; and the life of religion consists in
large part of obedience to these commands.").
390. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 13.
391. Charles Taylor, The Future of the Religious Past, in RELIGION: BEYOND A CONCEPT 178,
178-79 (Hent de Vries ed., 2008) ("One of the main vectors over the last six or seven centuries in this
civilization has been a steadily increasing emphasis on a religion of personal commitment and
devotion, over against forms centered on collective ritual."); ASAD, supra note 386, at 47.
392. See generally Petty, supra note 6, at 135-42 (discussing origin and development of the
concept of religion).
393. DANIEL BOYARIN, BORDER LINES: THE PARTITION OF JUDAEO-CHRISTIANITY 11 (2004).
394. Benson Saler, Religio and the Definition of Religion, 2 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 395,
395 (1987). See also Jan G. Platvoet, Contexts, Concepts and Contests: Toward a Pragmatics of
Defining Religion, in THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIGION: CONTEXTS, CONCEPTS AND
CONTESTS 463, 463-64 (Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk eds., 1999) ("[T]he modem terms
'religion' and 'religions' are diffuse and untidy prototypical concepts of recent Western origin.");
Russell T. McCutcheon, The Category "Religion" in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey, 42
NUMEN 284, 285-86 (1995) (citing Tim Murphy, Wesen under Erscheiung in the History of the Study
of Religion: A Post-Structuralist Perspective, 6 METHOD & THEORY IN THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS 119,
119-46 (1994) ("universalized categories as 'religion'-defined as essence or manifestation, are part
of the baggage of Occidental Humanism.")).
92
256 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 26:211
in a clear differentiation between the realms of church and state and
between theology and philosophy."395 In the Roman context, "religio"
denoted that aspect of human life which is dedicated to the worship of the
gods; a corner of the week's activities and a few days of festivals."3 96
The Protestant Reformation redefined religio to correspond to
individual beliefs.397 In contrast to their perception of Roman Catholic
practice wherein the individual's relationship with God was mediated by
priests performing sacraments and rites, Protestants sought a more direct
relationship between the individual and God.3 98 Thus, many of the
"position[s] and functions formerly controlled by the church came to be
transferred to the individual and his or her conscience." 39 9
During the Enlightenment the construct of "religion"-as a category
broader than Christianity alone-was "forged into a recognizably modem
form,"400 which "drew heavily upon prior Christian understandings."40'
Indeed, it was not until Enlightenment that the term "Christianity"
becomes standard and increasingly comes to refer to "a system of
beliefs." 402 And "[b]y the eighteenth century, religion did not refer mainly
395. Langer, supra note 141, at 257; see also Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi ("Christianity did
describe itself as a religion. It accepted this term from the Hellenistic world, especially from Roman
ways of worship.").
396. Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi; see also BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 6 ("The modem concept
of religion also indicates that religion is one particular dimension of life among other particular and
separate dimensions, such as politics, morality, science, or economics.").
397. See Robert A. Yelle, Moses' Veil: Secularization as a Christian Myth, in AFTER SECULAR
LAW 23, 34 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011) ("The triumph of an antinomian concept of
religion ... was ... largely a product of the Reformation."); Woodhead, supra note 389, at 123 ("The
'confessionalization' of religion in the post-Reformation period tended to define and distinguish
different forms of religion (particularly Christianity) in terms of distinctive 'confessions' of faith.");
Carolyn Evans, Introduction, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1, 8
(Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008) ("This is a particularly post-Reformation Western view of religion that
gives primacy to the internal, intellectual aspects of religion over other viewpoints"); Taylor, supra
note 391, at 179 ("The point of declaring that salvation comes through faith was radically to devalue
ritual and external practice in favor of inward adherence."); de Vries, supra note 389, at 5 (discussing
". . . the modem definition of the concept, which has so often, and all too hastily, identified 'religion'
with a 'set of beliefs."').
398. JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA
23-24 (1985).
399. Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1869, 1877 (2009); see also Molendijk, supra note 5, at 5 ("Does the notion [of 'religion'] not
preserve a one-sided-Schleiermachian-focus on the inner religious sentiment as well? The alleged
eurocentricity, especially, makes Western scholars feel uneasy.").
400. Saler, supra note 394, at 395. See also PETER HARRISON, 'RELIGION' AND THE RELIGIONS IN
THE ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT 1 (1990) ("The concepts 'religion' and 'the religions' ... emerged
quite late in Western thought, during the Enlightenment."); ASAD, supra note 386, at 45 (noting the
modem view of religion as that which consists of "a positive attitude toward the problem of disorder,
of affirming simply that in some sense or other the world as a whole is explicable, justifiable,
bearable ... is a product of the only legitimate space allowed to Christianity by post-Enlightenment
society, the right to individual belief').
401. Michael L. Satlow, Defining Judaism: Accounting for Religions in the Study ofReligion, 74
J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 837, 841 (2006).
402. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION 70-71 (1964).
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to ritual practice or performance, but instead to personal belief or faith."403
The equation of religion with faith, therefore, "involves the reproduction
of a Christian worldview." 404 Among scholars of religion, "[i]t has become
a truism that religion in its modem sense is an invention of Christians."405
As James Boyd White sardonically noted, "'religious belief means the
affirmation of certain propositions. What else could it be?"406 Certainly for
the Supreme Court of Israel, the affirmation of Christian articles of faith
has often been determinative.
B. Christianity is a Religion. Judaism "Refuses to be One. "407
The tension between Judaism and the common notion of religion is "one
of the most vexed problems of modernity."4 At least until very recent
times, Judaism did not fit with the internal, private, voluntary Protestant
conception of religion.409 "Adherence to religious law, which is at least
partially, if not largely, public in nature, does not seem to fit into the
category of faith or belief, which by definition is individual and
private." 410 In Judaism, actions matter most. As Moses Mendelssohn
explained, "Among all the prescriptions and ordinances of the Mosaic law,
there is not a single one which says: You shall believe or not believe. They
all say: You shall do or not do."4 11 As Mendelssohn elaborated, "Jewish
religion is not a matter of belief but rather of behavior. As he puts it,
'Judaism knows of no revealed religion in the sense in which Christians
understand the term. The Israelites possess divine legislation-laws,
commandments, ordinances, rules of life, instruction in the will of God as
to how they should conduct themselves in order to attain temporal and
eternal felicity."' 412 Indeed, plurality of belief and of observance have
been identifiable features of the Jewish experience since at least the
403. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1; see also GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, HISTORY, RELIGION, AND
ANTISEMITISM 70 (1990) (By the eighteenth century, after the Roman Catholic monopoly on European
Christianity failed, the term "religion" "came to be applied to the beliefs of the competing religious
societies into which Europe had been fragmented.").
404. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1.
405. Id. at 11. As early as the 1960s sociologists began to recognize that the conceptions of
religion holding sway in academic studies were heavily influenced by the investigators' own Christian
milieu. See Woodhead, supra note 389, at 121 ("Thomas Luckmann (1967) argued that sociological
studies of religion hugged the form of churches so closely that they rendered other manifestations of
religion 'invisible.').
406. White, supra note 389, at 133.
407. Id. at 8, 12.
408. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 13, 190. See also id. at I ("From the eighteenth century
onward, modem Jewish thinkers have been concerned with the question of whether or not Judaism can
fit into a modern, Protestant category of religion.").
409. Victoria S. Harrison, The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World, 59
INT'L J. PHIL. RELIGION 133, 134 (2006) ("[R]eligion cannot so easily be identified with the
affirmation of a given content of belief.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1.
411. Id. at 27.
412. Id. at 20.
Petty 257
94
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
destruction of the Second Temple.4 1 3
Conversely, "Judaism is not and has not been, since early in the
Christian era, a 'religion' in the sense of an orthodoxy whereby heterodox
views, even very strange opinions, would make one an outsider."414 Belief
matters little. Indeed, Amos Funkenstein suggests that "no written or oral
commandment forbids an orthodox Jew even now to believe in the
messianity of Christ." 4 15 And "[flor most Jews, religious observance is a
means of identifying with the Jewish community, rather than an
expression of religious faith."4 16 As a result, notions of Judaism "as a faith
that can be separated from ethnicity, nationality, language, and shared
history have felt false."417
Beyond the focus on actions rather than belief, Judaism did not
understand itself to be a "religion" in the Greco-Roman sense adopted by
Christianity: "a comer of the week's activities and a few days of
festivals."418 Instead, Judaism saw itself "expressing the totality of the
meaning and purpose of every single aspect of human activities." 419 As
Hirsch explained, "Judaism is not a religion . . . . Judaism is not a mere
adjunct to life: it comprises all of life."420
"'Religion' and its cognate terms seem self-evidently meaningful
because they are so deeply embedded and widely used in everyday
language. But their meaning is loose and largely influenced by
traditional-and conflicting-religious preconceptions."4 2' For this
reason, "[i]f historians categorize Judaism and Christianity as instances of
413. Hayim Lapin, The Origins and Development ofthe Rabbinic Movement in the Land ofIsrael,
in THE LATE ROMAN-RABBINIC PERIOD 214 (Steven T. Katz ed., 2006).
414. BOYARIN, supra note 393, at 13.
415. AMos FUNKENSTEIN, PERCEPTIONS OF JEWISH HISTORY 170 (1993).
416. Zvi Gitelman, The Decline of the Diaspora Jewish Nation: Boundaries, Content, and Jewish
Identity, 2 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 112, 119 (1998) (internal quotation omitted); see also Andrew Buckser,
Secularization, Religiosity, and the Anthropology of Jewry, 10 J. MODERN JEWISH STUD. 205, 208
(2011) ("[G]roup identity and membership are intimately linked to religious practice.").
417. BOYARIN, supra note 393, at 8; see also Buckser, supra note 416, at 208 ("In Judaism ...
ritual has a religious value of its own, one substantially independent of the particular theological
meanings attached to it.").
418. Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi; see also BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 6 ("The modem concept
of religion also indicates that religion is one particular dimension of life among other particular and
separate dimensions, such as politics, morality, science, or economics.").
419. Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi. On the other hand, "in the last two centuries a large segment of
the Jewish people moved from one understanding of the meaning of 'religion' to another." Id. at
xxviii. And today, virtually "[a]ll contemporary Jewish religious denominations .. . [have] adopted the
Christian concept of religion as an individual spiritual realm which constitutes a part of human life,
besides which other profane aspects of life and culture can co-exist." Id. In fact, Orthodox Judaism
may have adopted the Protestant model the most fully. See BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 43 ("[T]he
historical irony is that Hirsch's orthodoxy is not only modem, but rather in a certain sense the most
modem of modem Judaisms in molding itself as a religion on the German Protestant model."). See
also Woodhead, supra note 389, at 124 (noting that "a 'beliefification' of religion is also evident in
other [non-Christian] world religions in modem times").
420. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 41.




the same kind of basic human activity, as 'religion,' despite the obvious
differences in the beliefs and actions of Jews and Christians, they should
recognize that they themselves are deciding what they mean by
religion." 422 Daniel Boyarin, for example, suggests that the categorization
of Judaism as a religion is wholly artificial when he says "it is not the case
that Christianity and Judaism are two separate and different religions, but
that they are two different kinds of things altogether. "423
C. A Supreme Irony?
At first blush it seems that the Supreme Court of Israel's apparently
unwitting importation of Christian norms into Israeli jurisprudence is
enormously ironic (particularly given some of the venomous language in
Rufeisen and Beresford about how awful Christians have been to Jews
over the years). The more the Court attempted to distance itself from
halakhic rules in favor of what it understood to be "secular" concepts, the
more it stumbled into Christian norms concerning religion and even
Judaism. But the Court's apparent lack of interest in critically examining
the concepts applied is perhaps not entirely unjustified. In other words, the
adoption of Christian norms may have served some useful purpose
notwithstanding the Court's lack of critical analysis of the category itself.
1. Forging an Identity
"The new Jewish culture which developed in Eretz Israel in the first half
of the twentieth century was modern, Western and secular."424 The young
state, including the Supreme Court, had a mandate to reflect that culture.
Thus, in Rufeisen, all of the Justices expressed a view that halakhic rulings
would not control the outcome.425 The Court went to pains to show that
Israel was not a theocratic state, and that the civil courts would not defer
to rabbinic rulings on matters of civil law (even where civil law imported
what might be religious concepts or terminology). Israel wanted to show it
was modern and enlightened, more European than Levantine, and that
meant a civil legal system separate from and superior to religious
tribunals.
Beyond this urgency to cabin any potential criticism that Israel would
422. Id. at 46. Even so, this is still how religion is generally understood, even in the academy. See
Evans, supra note 397, at 8 (noting that "[f]or most of the authors [in an edited volume], religion is
primarily a set of beliefs-beliefs that are capable of being adopted, rejected, modified or refined at
the will of the believer"); Woodhead, supra note 389, at 123 ("One of the most popular conceptions of
religion today-if one takes as evidence not only academic work but the discourse of politicians, legal
professionals, journalists, and everyday talk-is of religion as belief. On this account, being religious
has to do with believing certain things, where that amounts to subscribing to certain propositions and
accepting certain doctrines.").
423. BOYARIN, supra note 393, at 13.
424. MAUTNER, supra note 20, at 29.
425. See JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 64.
Petty 259
96
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
become a Jewish theocracy, there was at the same time a struggle to forge
a national identity. During the 1950s,
significant efforts were invested in the creation of national symbols
and a national identity: "The creation of Israel and the tripling of
its population in three years led state leaders to feel that the
country must be completely integrated; that the value-belief
systems separating the various camps must be abolished and
replaced by a unified symbol system uniting the entire Jewish
population in support of the state and its institutions."42 6
"This ideology . .. in many respects . .. acquired the role of a civil
religion for Israel."427 Even apart from matters of security, the Court
clearly had more pressing concerns than the historical nuances of widely
shared concepts.
2. The Relationship Between Nation-State and Religion
Moreover, at the same time that Israel was trying to define itself as a
state, it also had the task of defining the state's relationship with religion.
This posed a unique challenge. European nations defined religion in
Christian terms (and their former colonies had it so defined for them). This
meant that in Europe, religion was not just internal, individual, private,
voluntary, and separable from other categories of existence (as
Christianity is) but also that Christians, as a community, did not constitute
a political entity. Indeed, the idea of religion as it is understood in modern
states assumes a lack of political control. In the modern state, "citizenship
meant the subordination of any communal identity to the state and the
relegation of religion to the sphere of private sentiment." 428 This
distribution of power-with the nation-state governing external actions
and serving as a locus for communal identity, while religion governs
internal beliefs and is primarily concerned with the individual-fits
comfortably when the religion in question was Christianity.
For Jews living in Europe, the separation of religion from temporal
authority posed a problem because the pre-emancipation Jewish
communities were to a significant extent self-governing. They did hold
political power over their members, and they claimed primary importance
in constituting their members' identities.429 "The whole concept of Jewish
426. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 36 (quoting CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHHIYA,
CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL: TRADITIONAL JUDAISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE JEWISH STATE 82
(1983)).
427. Id. The Israeli national identity is thus "inspired by religious history but detached from
religion as such." Id. at 37. And today, there is "a growing detachment among the Israeli secular public
from traditions that had previously also been respected by non-religious Jews, together with a
declining willingness to view religious elements of the culture as having national significance." Id. at
3.
428. Id. at 33.




identity, in its traditional sense, is founded upon the Covenant (Brit)
between God and the Jewish people. . . . It is this Covenant which . . .
because of its continuity, defines a Jew independently of his own personal
belief."43 0
"[B]efore Jews received the rights of citizenship, Judaism was not a
religion, and Jewishness was not a matter of culture or nationality. Rather,
Judaism and Jewishness were all of these at once: religion, culture and
nationality."431 Graetz explained that
Judaism is not a religion of the individual but of the community.
That actually means that Judaism, in the strict sense of the word, is
not even a religion-if one understands thereby the relationship of
a man to his creator and his hopes for earthly existence-but rather
a constitution for a body politic.432
In order to secure the place of Jews in the modem nation-state, Judaism
surrendered much of its political authority.433 "Jewish modernity most
simply defined represents the dissolution of the political agency of the
corporate Jewish community and the concurrent shift of political agency to
the individual Jew who also became a citizen of the modem nation-
state."434 The emancipation of individuals came at the cost of collective
political autonomy. "It "meant that Jews were free as individuals, but that
Jewishness and even a full embrace of Judaism could not be freely
expressed within German culture. The notions of being German and
citizenship in the modem state excluded the possibility of other types of
state allowed for the Jewish enclave to be in the state but not of the state. The disciplined Jewish
community lived largely by its own law, which the rabbis, through their interpretations, applied to
concrete situations in changing circumstances."); Salo Baron, Ghetto and Emancipation: Shall We
Revise the Traditional View?, XIV THE MENORAH J. 515, 519 (1928) ("Like other corporations, the
Jewish community enjoyed full internal autonomy.... Thus the Jewish community of pre-
revolutionary days had more competence over its members than the modem Federal, State, and
Municipal governments combined.").
430. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 85.
431. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 186. See also Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 85 ("Judaism
does not conform to the ordinary rules of nations and religions"); BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1-2
("To appreciate the novelty of the idea of Jewish religion, we need to understand a bit about the nature
and structure of medieval and early modem Jewish communities. Prior to modernity [emancipation]
Judaism was not a religion, and Jewishness was not a matter of culture or nationality. Rather, Judaism
and Jewishness were all these at once: religion, culture, and nationality.").
432. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 45. See also id. at 46 ("Granting Judaism a political dimension
means, as Graetz indicates, that Judaism does not quite fit the category of religion."); Dan, supra note
1, at xxviii ("The use of the term 'religion' in a Jewish context is, therefore, an external imposition
rather than an authentic expression of the intrinsic nature of Judaism."). But see BATNITSKY, supra
note 22, at 43 (discussing Hirsch's creation of Jewish orthodoxy in the German Protestant model).
433. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 98-99 ("The French Revolution and the Emancipation brought
about the disintegration of Jewish autonomous life in Europe."); Baron, supra note 429, at 524
("When the modem State came into being and set out to destroy the medieval corporations and estates
to build a new citizenship, it could no longer suffer the existence of an autonomous Jewish
corporation.").
434. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 4; see also id at 92 ("Mendelssohn ... invented the idea that
Judaism is a religion in order to make room for the emergence of the modern nation-state.").
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collective belonging." 4 3 5 Thus, the French politician Comte de Clermont-
Tonnerre claimed that "[o]ne must refuse everything to the Jews as a
nation, but one must give them everything as individuals; they must
become citizens."436
The nascent Israeli state had the arduous task of reconciling a dominant
non-Christian religion with its existence as a nation state. Being a modem
nation-state required "religion" to occupy a private, internal space
subordinate to the state and with little, if any, temporal political power.
Anything less would risk charges of theocracy. A move toward an
understanding of Judaism as a religion in the sense that religion is
understood in Christian states avoided that difficulty.
3. Zionism as Normalization
Finally, the influence of Zionism must be considered. If the raison
d'tre of Zionism is to normalize the situation of the Jews,437 then perhaps
it makes sense that Israel should understand religion in Christian terms
independently of the state's desire to minimize religious authorities'
influence over the affairs of state. Normalization means to be a nation
among the other nations of the world,438 and if the international
community generally views religion in one (Protestant) way, then why not
assume that viewpoint if it furthers that goal of Zionism? On the other
hand, if the point of Zionism is to allow Jews full political participation
with full Jewish experience, it is difficult to see how a full Jewish
experience is possible where religion is not understood by the nominally
Jewish state on Jewish terms.
VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING SECULARIZATION
So far, I have suggested that the understanding of "religion" employed
by the Supreme Court of Israel is one premised primarily, if not
exclusively, on belief, and that this understanding is moored in Christian
theology. I have also explained why this might be so, and tentatively
explored the extent to which the highest court in the "Jewish state" might
have adopted, even if unwittingly, Christian normativity in its conception
435. Id. at 49; see also id. at 111 ("[1]f Judaism is a religion, it is something different in kind from
the supreme political authority of the sovereign state."); Baron, supra note 429, at 524 ("Political
equality also meant the dissolution of the autonomous communal organization: the Jews were no
longer to be a nation within a nation; they were to be thought of and to think of themselves as
individuals connected only by ties of creed-Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen of the Jewish
'Confession."').
436. Id. at 33.
437. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 85 ("Zionism sought to solve the Jewish problem by
'normalising' the Jews.").
438. Id. ("In a sense, political Zionism attempted to do on a national basis what Jews sought in




of "religion." In this final part, I will attempt to place these findings in the
larger context of the debate over secularization.
A. The Secularization Debate
Like "religion," the notion of "'[t]he secular' was, in fact, originally a
religious concept, a product of traditional religious epistemological
frameworks." 4 39 The word "finds its original meaning in a Christian
context. Saeculum, the ordinary Latin word for century, or age, took on a
special meaning as applied to profane time, the time of ordinary historical
succession which the human race lives through between the Fall and the
Parousia."4
The noun "secularization" is likewise a Christian and specifically
Protestant construction." This usage originated in France where it
signified, in the second half of the sixteenth century (during the
Reformation), "the transfer of goods from the possession of the Church
into that of the world."442 It was brought into German no later than 1646,
and gained wide acceptance quickly in connection with the closure of
monasteries and liquidation of goods of the Roman Catholic Church."
"The notion of secularization has a long history in the social sciences,
tracing back at least to Auguste Comte's argument that a rational modem
society would render religion obsolete."" "Weber and Durkheim both
forecast the marginalization of religion in modem societies, and their
successors built the decline of religion into their models of social
439. Nomi Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, in LAW AND THE SACRED 29, 30 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 2007).
440. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 31-32 (Rhajeev
Bhargava ed., 1998). The Parousia is "the Second Coming of Christ that would precede the Last
Judgment." Jakob de Roover, Secular Law and the Realm of False Religion, in AFTER SECULAR LAW
43, 46 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011).
441. See generally Yelle, supra note 397; see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on
Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1057 (2010) ("[T]he idea of a realm of the secular, split off
from a spiritual realm, was originally a religious idea, derived from the premises of religious-in
particular, Christian-theology."); Taylor, supra note 440, at 31 ("'Secular' itself is a Christian term . .
. ."); Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept ofReligion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 813 (1997) ("Even within
Christianity, the dualistic connotation of 'religion' as standing in opposition to the 'secular' (that is,
nonreligious) is rooted in a very Protestant understanding of a world divided into Luther's Two
Kingdoms.").
442. Jan N. Bremmer, Secularization: Notes Toward a Genealogy, in RELIGION: BEYOND A
CONCEPT 432, 433 (Hent de Vries ed., 2008) (internal quotation omitted); Kevin M. Schultz,
Secularization: A Bibliographic Essay, THE HEDGEHOG REVIEW, Spring & Summer 2006, at 170, 172.
443. Bremmer, supra note 442, at 433-34. But apparently saecularisatio was not the term used in
canon law prior to this date, instead using profanatio or alienatiolalienare to mean transfer to lay
persons, and saecularisatio to refer to transfer from religious orders to secular clergy. Veit Bader,
Religion and the Myths of Secularization and Separation, RELIGARE WORKING PAPER NO. 8, 2011,
at 8.
444. Buckser, supra note 416, at 206. See also Philip S. Gorski & Ate§ Altmordu, After
Secularization?, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 55, 56 (2008); Jeffrey K. Hadden, Toward Desacralizing
Secularization Theory, 65 Soc. FORCES 587, 587, 590-91 (1987).
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moderization."445 But not until "about 1963, when two Central
Europeans, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, started publishing
studies regarding secularization, did the term receive more or less its
modern meaning."" 6
"The secularization thesis, advocated by seminal social thinkers in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, asserted that religion would gradually
fade in importance and even cease to be significant with the advent of
modem society."" The traditional formulation of secularization, the
phenomenon, holds that "'the political ends of citizens, organizations, and
societies themselves are no longer as explicitly religious as they once were
or are no longer explicitly religious at all.'" 8
Today, "there seems to be a nearly universal consensus that the so-
called 'secularization thesis' has failed."" 9 The theory, which previously
had been closer to a mathematical postulate, 4 50 began to deteriorate in
response to events such as the Iranian revolution and the rise of the
Christian right in the United States.45 1 In short, "[c]ontinued religiousity
became a nagging problem."452 And ". . . by the 1990s, [when] it became
evident that religion just wasn't going away; critiques of secularization
445. Buckser, supra note 416, at 206-07.
446. Id. But see William H. Swatos, Jr. & Kevin J. Christiano, Secularization Theory: The Course
ofa Concept, 60 Soc. RELIGION 209, 209-10 (1999) (suggesting the term was coined by Max Weber).
447. PAUL CLITEUR, THE SECULAR OUTLOOK: IN DEFENSE OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
SECULARISM 1-2 (2010); STEVE BRUCE, SECULARIZATION 1 (2011) ("The secularization paradigm
aims to explain one of the greatest changes in social structure and culture: the displacement of religion
from the centre of human life."); Swatos & Christiano, supra note 446, at 214 ("The principle thrust in
secularization theory has [been] ... that, in the face of scientific rationality, religion's influence on all
aspects of life-from personal habits to social institutions-is in dramatic decline."). The
secularization debate, as a (postulated) sociological phenomenon is distinct from secularism as a
normative value in ethics, politics, morals, etc. See CLITEUR, supra, at 3.
448. CLITEUR, supra note 447, at 3 (quoting Daniel Philpott, The Challenge of September I Ito
Secularism in International Relations, 55 WORLD POL. 66, 69 (2002)); Gorski & Altmordu, supra note
444, at 56 ("[M]ost would have agreed with the general thrust of the argument: that modernity was
somehow undermining the social significance of religion.") (internal citation omitted); Evans, supra
note 397, at I ("It was not so long ago that confident predictions were being made about the eventual
demise of religion. Religious people complained that liberal states had privitised religion; excluding it
from the public square until such time as developments in science, education and philosophy rendered
religion entirely obsolete.").
449. CLITEUR, supra note 447, at 1.
450. See generally Hadden, supra note 444.
451. Buckser, supra note 416, at 207; Gorski & Altnordu, supra note 444, at 56 (Influential
events include "[t]he rise of the Moral Majority, the Iranian Revolution, the collapse of communism
qua secular religion, the rapid spread of Pentecostalism in the global South, communal violence in
South Asia. These and other developments challenged the confident pronouncements of religious
decline that humanists, rationalists, and social scientists had been repeating since the days of Hume,
Voltaire, and Comte, to name only the best known.") (internal citations omitted).
452. Schultz, supra note 442, at 170. See also Mark Chaves, Intraorganizational Power and
Internal Secularization in Protestant Denominations, 99 AM. J. Soc. 1, 2 (1993) ("[N]ew religious
movements continue to arise; older movements like Pentecostalism and Mormonism are expanding;
and, at least in the United States, huge segments of the population continue to say that they believe in




"The central claim of the critique is that, if secularization is defined as
the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modem societies, the
theory of secularization is bunk."454 "Not only has religion persisted (and
the evidence is incontrovertible) but the theory also implies that the past
was more religious than today, which, it turns out, is not so easy to
prove."455
Some scholars have attempted "to salvage the idea behind the theory but
to soften its predictive capacity, or to shift the definition of secularization
by emphasizing different aspects of what secularization means."4 56 Mark
Chaves, for example, has suggested that secularization most appropriately
refers to a decline in religious authority, apart from individual belief.457
Charles Taylor sees a change in the conditions of belief; that is,
secularization concerns a change in what it means to believe and to be a
believer.45 8 Alexandra Walsham discards the term entirely in favor of
"desacralization" when discussing the decline in belief in divine
immanence.459
The process of secularization, therefore, has a multiplicity of
understandings, including at a minimum the pre-modern transfer of
property; the classical understanding of decline in religiosity, belief, or
observance; the decline of religious authority, per Chaves; the change in
the significance of religious observance, per Taylor; and the
desacralization or disenchantment, per Walsham. These are certainly not
the only ways secularization could be understood.460
453. Schultz, supra note 442, at 174.
454. Id.
455. Id.; Mark Chaves, Secularization as Declining Religious Authority, 72 Soc. FORCES 749,
753 (1994) ("[1]t is no longer possible to truthfully assert that 'modernity' is incompatible with
religious belief."); Chaves, supra note 452, at 2 ("'[C]lassical' secularization theory ... is no longer
tenable."); Buckser, supra note 416, at 208 (Some of the problems of applying secularization theory to
the Jewish experience stem from "the largely Christian orientation of secularization theory, which has
generally followed the Protestant tradition of privileging belief over other modes of religious
engagement.").
456. Schultz, supra note 442, at 175; Buckser, supra note 416, at 207 ("Critiques of secularization
began to emerge, and in response a number of sociologists developed more precise and sophisticated
models of the process."). For a thorough discussion of the current sociological approaches to
secularization, see Gorski & Altmordu, supra note 444, at 58-62.
457. Chaves, supra note 455, at 754-56; Chaves, supra note 452, at 7-8.
458. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
459. Alexandra Walsham, The Reformation and 'The Disenchantment of the World' Reassessed,
51 HIST. J. 497, 504 (2008). Walsham contrasts "desacralization" as concerned "with the decline of
belief in divine immanence" with "secularization," which she describes as "the rejection or
marginalization of religion per se." Id.
460. See generally Olivier Tschannen, The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization, 30 J. SCt.
STUD. RELIGION 395 (1991) (discussing theoretical diversity of approaches to studying secularization
from the sociological perspective).
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B. Disassociation as Secularization
Here I suggest that one form of secularization may be seen where
(originally) religious concepts are stripped of their religious character. The
concept becomes disassociated with religion and assumes a cloak of
neutrality, possibly even approaching objective detachment. A general
example of this phenomenon can be seen in what N.J. Demerath III has
called the "paradoxical decline of liberal Protestantism."
Demerath notes that "the decline of liberal Protestantism seems
paradoxical. It can be construed as evidence both for and against the once-
reigning model of long-term 'secularization. '461 "Insofar as any churches
are waning, this would seem ipso facto evidence of secularization."4 62
"However, because some liberal churches have suffered more than many
conservative groups, it is conceivable that just the opposite trend is at
work." 463
Demerath suggests that "[t]he decline of liberal Protestantism may
actually stem from its success", 46 and that "liberal Protestants have lost
structurally at the micro level precisely because they have won culturally
at the macro level."465 In other words, the decline of liberal Protestantism
"may be the painful structural consequence of Protestantism's wider
cultural triumph." 466 A church that promotes individualism, freedom,
pluralism, and tolerance does so at its own organizational peril because
holding these values may "reduce any organization's compelling claims
by making its virtues relative." 4 67 Similarly, promoting democracy
"attenuates power" and promoting intellectual inquiry may be "corrosive
for keeping the faith," particularly propositional faith.468 In its drive to
emancipate the world, mainline liberal Protestantism may have
"emancipated its own membership." 4 69 Liberal Protestantism's cultural
victory put itself out of business. In fact, De Roover sees this
secularization-as-universalization as typical of Christianity more
generally. 470
The same sort of phenomenon may be at work in how religion has come
461. N.J. Demerath III, Cultural Victory and Organizational Defeat in the Paradoxical Decline of
Liberal Protestantism, 34 J. Scl STUDY RELIGION 458, 458 (1995).
462. Id.
463. Id. at 458-59.
464. Id. at 459-60.
465. Id. at 463.
466. Id at 460.
467. Id at 461.
468. Id
469. Id. at 462.
470. See de Roover, supra note 440, at 51 ("Christian religion ... expands ... through a moment
of secularization, whereby it achieves universalization in fact by progressively losing its specific





to be seen as an a-religious category. As nonreligious bodies adopted
Liberal Protestant values, the religious roots of concepts like "human
rights" faded from memory.471 Here, the success of Christianity and the
domination of European states universalized the understanding of religion
as belief to such an extent that its religious origins have been largely
forgotten. Secularization as "de-religifying," rather than merely
desacralization, may be a useful line of further inquiry because, as I have
suggested in this Article and elsewhere,472 misunderstanding and
inequalities persist precisely because of ignorance of the religious roots of
common concepts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Margaret Davies has explained that
[a]t a subtle and therefore insidious level . . . , the situatedness of
law within a cultural context and history means that certain
principles based on religion rather than reason or practicality are
embedded in law: these can be difficult to remove or challenge,
even when there is very good reason to do so.473
Here, I have tried to show that one principle based on religion (here,
Christianity) is the very notion of religion itself. I have also tried to lay out
some of the reasons why even a non-Christian state such as Israel might
encounter significant difficulties in defining religion, itself a Christian
concept, on anything other than Christian terms, and suggest how such an
understanding might come to be assumed by courts to be neutral,
objective, and secular.
"The concept of religion has never been uncontentious."474 In the trio of
cases addressing who is a Jew, many Justices have explicitly assumed that
Judaism (or, at least, the status of being a Jew) is a "religion" in the same
sense that Christianity is a religion; that is, by defining membership
largely, if not exclusively, on the content of beliefs, 475 and assuming that
religion and nationality are separable. 47 6 Daphne Barak-Erez suggests that
there was "an expectation that Israel's character as the state of the Jewish
people would be reflected in its legal system and its public sphere."4 77
471. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS
SEEN 4-20 (1998).
472. See generally Petty, supra note 6.
473. Davies, supra note t, at 79. See also Marc Galanter, Secularism East and West, in
SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 234, 254 (Rhajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) ("[T]here may be 'predominant
religious aspects' in situations in which the actors are mainly unaware of them.").
474. Woodhead, supra note 389, at 121.
475. See Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 20-22 (opinion of Landau, J.); id. At 24, 31-32 (opinion of
Berinson, J.); Beresford, supra note 340, at 56 (opinion of Barak, J.).
476. See supra notes 277, 287-88, 295, 300, and accompanying text (discussing Shalit).
477. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 34.
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With respect to how the state understands religion, the Supreme Court of
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[T]here is reason to be concerned that bias might operate 




 “Religion is a highly complex concept.”1  It is both a member 
of the everyday English lexicon and a constitutional term of art. 
Recently, several commentators have suggested that “religion,” as 
the term is understood and applied by courts, primarily refers to 
beliefs or systems of beliefs.2  This conventional understanding 
privileges some religions at the expense of others.3  Specifically, the 
notion that religion is chiefly a matter of adherence to a set of 
propositions reflects a Christian and largely Protestant worldview; 
this understanding measures whether something is a religion or not 
by the extent to which it resembles Protestant Christianity.4  How 
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School, 2007; M.St., University of Cambridge, 2012; Ph.D. candidate, University 
of Leiden.  
† FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 116 
(1995). 
1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: VOLUME 1: FREE 
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 139 (2006); see also Jonathan Z. Smith, God Save This 
Honorable Court: Religion and Civic Discourse, in JONATHAN Z. SMITH, 
RELATING RELIGION 375-90, 375 (2004) (“the study of religion is the only 
humanistic field in the American academy whose subject matter is explicitly 
governed by the United States Constitution.”). 
2 See Lourdes Peroni, Deconstructing ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg, 3 OX. 
J.L. & REL. 235 (2014) (addressing European law); Aaron R. Petty, The Concept 
of “Religion” in the Supreme Court of Israel, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 211 (2014) 
(addressing Israeli law) (hereinafter The Concept of “Religion”); Aaron R. Petty, 
“Faith, However Defined”: Reassessing JFS and the Judicial Conception of 
Religion, 6 ELON L. REV. 117 (2014) (symposium article) (addressing British law) 
(hereinafter “Faith, However Defined”).  See also BENSON SALER, 
CONCEPTUALIZING RELIGION: IMMANENT ANTHROPOLOGISTS, TRANSCENDENT 
NATIVES, AND UNBOUNDED CATEGORIES 22 (1993) (“Public agencies in the 
United States have tended to make theistic ‘belief’ central to their conceptions of 
religion.  Doing so is in keeping with hoary Western traditions that dispose them 
to convert religious imaginings and sensitivities into systems of propositions.”). 
3 Indeed, “the danger of bias in Religion Clause jurisprudence is a very real 
one given that “[n]o Jewish, Muslim or Native American plaintiff has ever 
prevailed on a Free Exercise claim before the Supreme Court.”  GEDICKS, supra 
note † at 116.   
4 Petty, The Concept of “Religion,” supra note 2; Petty, “Faith, However 
Defined,” supra note 2, Linda Woodhead, Five Concepts of Religion, 21 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY-REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE 
SOCIOLOGIE, 121, 123-24 (2011) (“[T]he conception of religion as a matter of 
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should the law account for this imbalance, where the very 
constitutional foundation of religious liberty—the idea of religion 
itself—is not a level playing field?  As Lori Beaman put it, “[i]f the 
very notion of religion is imbued with a Christian definitional bias, 
how can law interpret religious claims outside that framework?”5  
The subject of how (or whether) “religion” ought to be defined 
for legal purposes, or even how it should simply be understood as a 
general matter, is well-trodden.6  At this point, there is little to be 
belief is a distinctly modern one with a bias toward modern Christian, especially 
Protestant, forms of religion.”). 
5 Lori G. Beaman, Defining Religion: The Promise and the Peril of Legal 
Interpretation, in LAW AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADA 192-216, 196 
(Richard Moon, ed., 2008). 
6 See, e.g., Lael Daniel Weinberger, Religion Undefined: Competing 
Frameworks for Understanding “Religion” in the Establishment Clause, 86 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 735 (2009); Beaman, supra note 5; Barbra Barnett, 
Twentieth Century Approaches to Defining Religion: Clifford Geertz and the First 
Amendment, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 93 (2007); Jeffrey 
Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First 
Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study 
Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. 
L. REV. 123 (2007); GREENAWALT, supra note 1; W. Cole Durham, Jr. & 
Elizabeth A. Sewell, Definition of Religion, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 3-83, 10 (James 
A. Serritella, et al., eds. 2006) (“In addressing the question of the definition of 
religion, scholars in the field appear to agree only on their disagreement.”); L. 
Scott Smith, Constitutional Meanings of “Religion” Past and Present: 
Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89 
(2004); Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 
DUQ. L. REV. 181 (2002); Jeffrey L. Oldham, Constitutional “Religion”: A Survey 
of First Amendment Definitions of “Religion”, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117 
(2001); Eduardo Peñalver, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997); 
James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition 
of “Religion,” 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23 (1995); Dmitry N. Feofanov, 
Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (1994); 
Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 
CUMBERLAND L. REV. 1 (1991/1992); Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the 
First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532 (1989); 
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion 
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided 
Search for the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); 
Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 579 (1982); Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welch: Redefining Religion 
Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 973 (1982); Timothy L. Hall, The Sacred 
and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139 
(1982); Sharon L. Worthing, “Religion” and “Religious Institutions” Under the 
First Amendment, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 2 (1980); Gail Merel, The Protection of 
Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First 
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 (1978); Note, Toward a Constitutional 
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978); Anita Bowser, Delimiting 
Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 
(1977); Note, Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution, and the D.A.R., 32 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 533 (1965). 
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gained by suggesting yet another definition or by proposing a novel 
comparative approach.7  Several commentators have convincingly 
argued that true religious freedom in the United States is 
“impossible”; that the religion clauses are hopelessly in tension with 
each other; that free exercise cannot be protected in the absence of 
cultural (and hence theological) understandings about the nature of 
religion; that legal pronouncements on religious freedom necessarily 
entail choosing between competing background assumptions about 
what religion is; and that definitions of religion inherently limit 
religious freedom by saying what is and what is not really religion.8   
7 See Brian C. Wilson, From the Lexical to the Polythetic: A Brief History of 
the Definition of Religion, in WHAT IS RELIGION?: ORIGINS, DEFINITIONS, AND 
EXPLANATIONS 141-62, 141 (Thomas A. Idinopulos & Brian C. Wilson, eds., 
1998) (“During the last hundred years or so, dozens, if not hundreds of proposals 
have been made, each claiming to solve the definitional problem in a new and 
unique way.”); W. Richard Comstock, Toward Open Definitions of Religion, 52 J. 
AM. ACAD. OF RELIGION 499, 499 (1984) (“There is no want of proposals as to 
how religion might be defined.”); WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING 
AND END OF RELIGION 21 (1962) (“there has been in recent decades a bewildering 
variety of definitions; and no one of them has commanded wide acceptance.”).  
See also Val D. Ricks, To God God’s, to Caesar Caesar’s, and to Both the 
Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053, 1053 n.1 (1993) (noting that 
“[s]o much has been written on the subject that authors apparently have begun to 
standardize certain parts of the discussion.”). 
8 See Ino Augsburg, Taking Religion Seriously: On the Legal Relevance of 
Religious Self-Concepts, 1 J. OF LAW, RELIGION & STATE 291, 292 (2012) (“[I]n 
order to prevent state authorities . . . from interfering in religious affairs, the law 
must determine and at the same time must not  determine what religion or 
religiously motivated forms of behavior are.”); Arif A. Jamal & Farid Panjwani, 
Having Faith in Our Schools: Struggling with Definitions of Religion, in LAW, 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND EDUCATION IN EUROPE, 69-86, 69 (Myriam Hunter-
Henin, ed., 2011) (“when courts are asked to consider religious definitions . . . 
there emerges a fundamental, and perhaps irreconcilable, tension between 
freedom of religion or religious expression, on one hand, and the need for 
adjudication about religion or religious expression on the other.”); Winnifred 
Fallers Sullivan, et al., Introduction, in AFTER SECULAR LAW 1-19, 6 (Winnifred 
Fallers Sullivan, et al., eds. 2011) (“Indeed, the bare question of ‘what constitutes 
religion’ in the secular state necessarily involves the law in a process of 
theologizing, demonstrating the ‘impossibility of religious freedom’ and of a 
complete separation between law and religion.”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
807, 807 (2009) (“[I]n order to protect religious liberty we have to define what 
religion is, and once we are in the business of saying that some beliefs, 
commitments, and projects are entitled to special treatment as ‘religious’ while 
others are not, we are creating a sphere of orthodoxy of exactly the sort that any 
plausible understanding of religious liberty should deplore.”); GREENAWALT, 
supra note 1 at 125 (“Any judicial test of what counts as ‘religious’ is worrisome; 
it is intrinsically difficult to apply and creates a danger that judges will favor the 
familiar over the unorthodox.”); WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE 
IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005); STEVEN D. SMITH, 
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 68 (1995) (“In adopting a theory of religious freedom that is 
consistent with some background principles, but not with others, therefore, 
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But for better or worse, the religion clauses are a part of the 
American jurisprudential legacy.9  We must be able to address the 
religion clauses in some measure if for no other reason than 
“[b]ecause the constitution says so.”10  And to address the religion 
clauses, we must at least engage with the term “religion.”  In this 
Article, I hope to illuminate some of the problems in defining 
religion for legal purposes by taking a step back and examining the 
problems with definitions of religion more generally and, indeed, 
definitions generally.  I aim to begin a discussion of how the word 
“religion” in the First Amendment is best understood, given the 
understanding, still relatively new to the legal world, that “religion” 
is not a neutral category.11   
At the very least, a critical review of our constitutional terms of 
art seems overdue.  “The anxious obsessiveness of scholars of 
religion over the appropriate referent of the word ‘religion’ can be of 
service to a group—American lawyers and judges—which has spent 
a lot of words on the subject but which, in general, has not had the 
inclination or training to analyze carefully the discourse about 
religion that they employ.”12  Drawing on definitions attempted in 
government (or the judge or the legal scholar) must adopt, or privilege, one of the 
competing secular or religious positions.”); Worthing, supra note 7 at 345-46 (“If 
a government can define what is a ‘church,’ it can also define what is not a 
church, and can do so in a manner that excludes religions that are not favored by 
government officials.”); Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: 
“Religion” in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964); Francis J. Conklin, S.J., 
Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 
GEO. L.J. 252, 277 (1963) (“Since any attempt by a court to define or interpret the 
word ‘religion’ in the first amendment must, of necessity, imply the exclusion of 
some opinions which a small minority may choose to call religion, the plain 
implication in this opinion is that any such attempt is automatically 
unconstitutional.”). 
9 Benson Saler, Cultural Anthropology and the Definition of Religion, in THE 
NOTION OF «RELIGION» IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH: SELECTED PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE XVI IAHR CONGRESS 831-36, 831 (Ugo Bianchi, ed. 1994) (“For the time-
being, however, religion remains with us as a term and as a category.”). 
10 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 313, 314 (1996). See also Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 5 (“the power 
to define is the power to confer differential dignity and legitimacy.”); 
GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 125 (“sometimes defining religion or religious is 
unavoidable”); SULLIVAN, supra note 8 at 148 (“When law claims authority over 
religion, even for the purpose of ensuring its freedom, lines must be drawn.”); 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE 124 (1999) (“It is not 
possible for the law simply to avoid the use of the word, for it appears in the First 
Amendment, which is the ruling text in the field, and also, in one form or another 
in important statutes.”). 
11 I am not the first to ask these antecedent questions, but there are few such 
studies in the legal field.  See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6 at 1520 (“Surprisingly, 
no court or commentator has yet addressed the logically prior question: Can 
‘religion’ be defined?”). 
12 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Competing Theories of Religion and Law in the 
Supreme Court of the United States: An Hasidic Case, 43 Numen 184, 185 (1996).  
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the field of religious studies and other disciplines, I ask whether 
religion should be defined for legal purposes?  If so, how?  And if 
not, what alternatives are available?13   
In Part II, I briefly review the concept of religion with particular 
reference to the common understanding of religion as belief.  I note 
that using belief as a criterion for identifying religion has several 
shortcomings, both internally and externally. Part III discusses 
various types of definitions and evaluates their utility in defining 
religion.  Part III.A covers “essentialist” definitions, including 
several prominent examples while Part III.B introduces 
“multifactor” strategies including polythetic classification/ 
numerical phenetics, family-resemblance theory, prototype theory, 
and other open-ended approaches. Part IV turns to application of 
definitions of religion in legal contexts.  Part IV.A traces the 
development of the Supreme Court’s struggle with the definition of 
religion in modern cases.  Part IV.B addresses some of the leading 
academic thought on how to deal with the definitional quandary.  In 
light of the many drawbacks and difficulties faced by all of the 
various approaches, Part V suggests potential avenues for avoiding 
the issue, at least in part, when possible.  Part V.A discusses the 
largely abandoned theory of understanding “religion” differently in 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Part V.B 
applies decisional sequencing to suggest that in Free Exercise cases, 
where the religious status of the claimant is in doubt, judges address 
whether the Free Speech Clause might resolve the issue without 
reaching the question of “religion” when it is possible to do so.  Part 
VI offers a brief conclusion. 
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION: BEYOND BELIEF 
 
“‘Religion’ is a heavily, perhaps even over, theorized term.”14  
But it is commonly assumed “to be a ubiquitous human 
See also id. at 185-86 (“By and large, legal debates about the First Amendment 
fail to deal serious with how to talk critically about the church that is being kept 
separate or the religion that is being accommodated.  There is a tendency in legal 
discourse to have ‘religion’ be a place holder in the sentence.  No content is 
ascribed to the word.  It is simply filled . . . without examination.”); ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 43 (2013) (“the 
vagueness of the legal understanding of ‘religion’ is troubling.  It is surprisingly 
uncertain what is the object of all this protection.”). 
13 STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE vii (1995) (“Contemporary 
legal scholarship . . . is pervasively normative; its analysis is typically oriented 
toward, and culminates in, some sort of prescription for the proper resolution.”).  
See also id. at 5 (“It may be that the source of our present frustrations in the area 
of religious freedom is not that judges and scholars have given careless answers, 
but rather that that they have asked the wrong questions.”). 
14 Michael L. Satlow, Defining Judaism: Accounting for “Religions” in the 
Study of Religion, 74 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF RELIGION 837, 837 (2006). 
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phenomenon.”15  We are told that “[i]t is customary nowadays to 
hold that there is in human life and society something distinctive 
called ‘religion’: and that this phenomenon is found on earth at 
present in a variety of minor forms, chiefly among outlying or 
eccentric peoples, and in a half-dozen or so major forms.”16  Further, 
some have suggested that scholars of religion have largely been 
derelict in directing critical attention to these assumptions.17 
 One important example is “[t]he widely shared assumption . . . 
that the larger category into which religion is, or is not, to be 
subsumed, is that of belief.”18  “On this account, being religious has 
to do with believing certain things, where that amounts to 
subscribing to certain propositions and accepting certain 
doctrines.”19 And although it is “undeniable . . . that propositional 
beliefs typically play a significant role” in many religions,20 this 
assumption has influenced how scholars have approached 
fundamental questions about what religion is and how it works.  
Even “many anthropologists tend to think of religion largely in 
terms of certain sorts of ‘beliefs.’”21  And individuals outside of the 
social sciences, “[t]o the extent that they may voice a definition at 
all . . . are likely to emphasize belief—‘belief in,’ traditionally, a 
‘Supreme Being’ or a ‘God’ or ‘Gods.’”22  Many legal professionals 
are among them: 
 
15 BRENT NONGBRI, BEFORE RELIGION: A HISTORY OF A MODERN CONCEPT 1-
2 (2013); Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS 
FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 269-84, 269 (Mark C. Taylor, ed. 1998). 
16 SMITH, supra note 7 at 19.  See also id. at 1 (noting familiarity with “world 
religions” belies a “rather monumental assumption that is pervasive as it is 
unexamined, namely, that religion is a universal, or at least ubiquitous 
phenomenon to be found anywhere in the world at any time in history, albeit in a 
wide variety of forms and with different degrees of prevalence and importance.”).   
17 TOMOKO MASUZAWA, THE INVENTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS 6-7 & n.9 
(2005) (noting several exceptions that “highlight the overwhelming obtuseness of 
the subject matter all the more”). 
18 Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1041, 1046 (2010). 
19 Woodhead, supra note 4 at 123.  See also Stolzenberg, supra note 18 1041 
n.2 & 1045 (on the ubiquity of the assumption that religion is primarily belief); 
Weiss, supra note 8 at 604 (as an example, noting “religion is traditionally an area 
of faith and assent”). 
20 Victoria S. Harrison, The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-
Cultural World, 59 INT’L J. FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 133, 134 (2006). 
21 Benson Saler, Religio and the Definition of Religion, 2 CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 395, 395 (1987).  See also MANUEL A. VASQUEZ, MORE THAN 
BELIEF: A MATERIALIST THEORY OF RELIGION 1 (2011) (“Up until very recently, 
our discipline has taken for granted the view that religion is primarily ‘private and 
interior, not shamelessly public; mystical, not ritualistic; intellectually consistent 
and reasonable; not ambivalent and contradictory.’”). 
22 SALER, supra note 2 at 21-22. 
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Legal accounts of religion often take a similarly belief-
based view of religion, as in the common tendency in the 
USA to define religion (broadly) in terms of “sincerely held 
religious, moral, or ethical beliefs,” and (narrowly) as 
beliefs asserted in an “authoritative sacred text’ and ‘classic 
formulations of doctrine and practice.”23 
 
James Boyd White notes “the view of religion as propositional 
is not eccentric.”24  He explains that: 
 
It is supported by at least two tendencies in our culture.  
One is the Christian tradition, which has focused so much 
attention on the Creed. . . . The other is the contemporary 
secular assumption . . . that real thought takes the form of 
propositions, the utterance of assertions about the way the 
world is.25 
 
But “[a]n emphasis on isolating various beliefs and making 
them central to an analytically distinct department of culture termed 
religion is not a markedly ancient tradition.”26  Rather, “the 
conception of religion as a matter of belief is a distinctly modern 
one with a bias toward modern Christian, especially Protestant, 
forms of religion.”27  “The most obvious feature of the cognitive 
23 Woodhead, supra note 4 at 123.  See also Peroni, supra note 2 at 236 
(“[B]ackground assumptions about religion as primarily a matter of conscience or 
belief appear throughout the [European Court of Human Rights’] freedom of 
religion case law.”); T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the 
Definition of “Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189 & 
203-04 (2003) (noting “‘belief in a supreme being remains a necessary 
characteristic of religion for the purposes of English charity law’” and “religious 
belief is perhaps the most readily understandable facet of religion” for Western 
asylum adjudicators); SALER, supra note 2 at 22 (“Public agencies in the United 
States have tended to make theistic ‘belief’ central to their conceptions of 
religion”); But see Frederick Farré, The Definition of Religion, 38 J. AM. ACAD. 
Religion 3, 9 (1970) (“[T]he public and the Congress (more so fortunately, than 
the higher judicial branches of government) tend still to define religion in terms of 
some form of belief.”). 
24 WHITE, supra note 10 at 132. 
25 Id. 
26 Saler, supra note 21 at 395 (italics in original). 
27 Woodhead, supra note 4 at 123 (“The ‘confessionalization’ of religion in the 
post-Reformation period tended to define and distinguish different forms of 
religion (particularly Christianity) in terms of distinctive ‘confessions’ of faith.”).  
See also Christian Smith, et al., Roundtable on the Sociology of Religion: Twenty-
three Theses on the Status of Religion in American Sociology—A Mellon Working-
Group Reflection, 81 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 903, 922 (2013) (“In American 
sociology, we can easily recognize the legacy of certain kinds of Protestant 
theology, whose heavily creedal and voluntaristic natures, along with their 
relatively narrow, privatized accounts of divine involvement in history and life, 
have defined the way most Americans understand religion.”); Nelson Tebbe, 
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conception of religion is its inward nature, the fact that it resides 
within the recesses of the individual human mind.”28  This feature, 
when applied as a defining characteristic, is also immensely 
problematic.   
 To “focus on individual beliefs is not the only way to 
understand religion, faith, or religious freedom.”29  Perhaps the most 
common objection is that “defining religion in terms of belief that 
has a particular kind of object, such as God, entails that certain 
belief systems which are routinely characterized as religious—
Theravada Buddhism, for example—would have to be classed as 
non-religious.”30  In more general terms, “the cognitive model of 
religion as conscience” excludes or distorts non-creedal, non-
cognitivist views.31  For example, “in many religious traditions, the 
needs and identity of the community would take precedence and 
religious practice would play a bigger role.  Religious communities 
with tightly formed authority and creeds may place a lower valence 
on individual conscience and belief.”32  But even with respect to 
creedal religions, belief is a difficult criterion to employ.   
 
A. Belief as an Internally Problematic Criterion 
 
Belief is a troublesome yardstick to measure what is a religion 
because belief itself is an amorphous concept.  “The nature and 
Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1133 (2011) (noting an “implicit orientation 
toward Protestant culture” marked by “individual belief or private inwardness.”); 
Harrison, supra note 20 at 134 (“such definitions would seem to be particularly 
suited to Protestant forms of Christianity, which do tend to portray religion as 
essentially  the affirmation of a set of beliefs.”). 
28 Stolzenberg, supra note 18 at 1046. 
29 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 449 
(1998).  See also Saler, supra note 9 at 142 (citing PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A 
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 102 (1958)) (“Ritual 
statements . . . must be understood within their contexts of expression.  There is 
no general norm for intelligibility and rationality of religious statements against 
some universal standard of judgment but only against the standards contained in 
the ‘form of life’ in which they are expressed.”). 
30 Harrison, supra note 20 134.  See also Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 6-
7 (collecting authority); WHITE, supra note 10 at 138 (“[T]he assumption that 
religion invokes belief in a Supreme Being who issues commands, enforced by 
sanctions, perhaps eternal ones, corresponds with only some kinds of religious 
experience.  There are religious people who have no belief in a Supreme Being at 
all—Buddhists and some Quakers, for example, not to mention individual 
members of churches that have an official belief the person does not share.”). 
31 Stolzenberg, supra note 18 at 1045.  See also Woodhead, supra note 4 at 
124 (“Above all, it seems to be bound up with a scientism and empiricism which 
assumes that all knowledge is primarily a matter of (testable) propositional belief, 
and with a shift of attention from the oral and practiced to the literate and 
encoded.”). 
32 Sullivan, supra note 29 at 449. 
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boundaries of belief are hard to trace,”33 and “philosophers continue 
to argue about how to conceptualize belief,” whether it is “a mental 
state, act, or event, or a disposition to act of feel in certain ways 
under certain conditions, or perhaps something else.”34  Benson 
Saler suggests that the “debate over the status of belief ought to 
prove troubling for the easy acceptance of . . . any . . . definition of 
religion that makes belief essential to religion and does not provide a 
cogent account of the significance of ‘belief.’”35   
Moreover, belief alone is rarely the sum total of religious 
identity and other aspects of one’s religiousness may be antagonistic 
to professed beliefs.  Mark Chaves notes that “attitudes and behavior 
correlate only weakly, and collections of apparently related ideas 
and practices rarely cohere into logically unified, mutually 
reinforcing, seamless webs.”36  Instead, “people’s religious ideas 
and practices generally are fragmented, compartmentalized, loosely 
connected, unexamined, and context dependent.”37  So the 
assumption that belief can function as a proxy for all indicia of 
religious affiliation or adherence does not hold.  What one believes 
and what one does do not necessarily align. 
From the perspective of the faithful, treating religion as 
essentially propositional faith is incomplete, if not outright false, 
because it treats religion as though it was composed of a collection 
of facts, subject to verification.38  This places “religion on the same 
plane of human knowledge”39 as any other facts.  It reifies religion, 
rather than treating it as lived experience.40 
33 WHITE, supra note 10 at 135. 
34 SALER, supra note 2 at 91. 
35 Id. at 92. 
36 Mark Chaves, Rain Dances in the Dry Season: Overcoming the Religious 
Congruence Fallacy, 49 J. FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 1, 2 (2010).  
See also WHITE, supra note 10 at 135-36 (suggesting that religion as practiced is 
far more nuanced and fluid than when limited to a belief/nonbelief dichotomy).  
37 Id. 
38 WHITE, supra note 10 at 132.  See also Will Durant, Freedom of Worship, 
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, Feb. 27, 1943, at 12 (“religion, like music, lives 
in a world beyond words, or thoughts, or things”). 
39 Stolzenberg, supra note 18 at 1044. 
40 WHITE, supra note 10 at 127.  See also Petty, “Faith, However, Defined,” 
supra, note 2 at 139 (“John Calvin, for example, propounded doctrines, practices, 
and interpretations of biblical passages that he hoped would induce a personal 
relationship with God.”) (emphasis in original); Woodhead, supra note 4 at 121 
(“Christian theologians have long objected that ‘religion’ is a modern concept 
which carries a baggage of secular presuppositions, and which narrows, distorts, 
and sucks the living truth out of that which it attempts to dissect.”). This distortion 
may be particularly acute for those whom “religious beliefs are instilled by a 
higher authority and are not products of individual choice.”  William P. Marshall, 
Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 386 
(1996). 
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Finally, belief may not be as important to people’s religious 
commitments as it appears from official statements of doctrine.  
People engage in religious activities for a variety of reasons, not all 
having to do with what they believe.  “Many and perhaps most 
people engage in religious practice out of habit; adherence to 
custom; a need to cope with misfortune, injustice, temptation, and 
guilt; curiosity about religious truth; a desire to feel connected to 
God; or happy religious enthusiasm.”41  What religion means to 
particular individuals may be quite different from the creeds they 
profess.42  In short, belief is neither coterminous with nor 
necessarily representative of “religion” more generally. 
 
B.  Belief as an Externally Biased Category 
 
Even assuming belief could be used as shorthand for religion, it 
would face insuperable problems as applied to many “religions.”  As 
I have previously observed,43 “we cannot study an ancient category 
called religion”44 because “[i]t is only western modernity that knows 
this category of religion.”45  Indeed, “[i]n the academic field of 
religious studies, the claim that religion is a modern invention is not 
really news.”46  “[O]ur construct religion is of relatively recent 
provenance,”47 and “lacked a taxonomical counterpart in 
antiquity.”48  Thus, “Josephus cannot talk about Apion as a member 
of another religion because the category did not yet exist.”49   
The current understanding of religion “was stimulated in 
significant measure by the Reformation, with its sectarian doctrinal 
controversies over justification, the resistibility or irresistibility of 
grace, and the like.”50  “Protestants sought to cut out (or at least 
41 Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for 
Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961, 964 (2010).  
42 See Beaman, supra note 5 at 194 (“Like law, religion as it is written and 
religion as it is lived are two rather different pheonomena.”). 
43 Petty, The Concept of “Religion,” supra note 2; Petty, “Faith, However 
Defined,” supra note 2. 
44 Steve Mason, Jews, Judeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of 
Categorization in Ancient History, 38 J. FOR THE STUDY OF JUDAISM 457, 482 
(2007). 
45 Id. at 488.  See also James Boyd White, Introduction, in HOW SHOULD WE 
TALK ABOUT RELIGION?: PERSPECTIVES, CONTEXTS, PARTICULARITIES (James 
Boyd White, ed. 2006) 1-10, 3 (“Why should Westerners assume that the Japanese 
or Indonesians, say, have cultural formation that parallels what we call 
‘religion?’”). 
46 BRENT NONGBRI, BEFORE RELIGION: A HISTORY OF A MODERN CONCEPT 3 
(2013). 
47 Saler, supra note 21 at 395. 
48 Mason, supra note 44 at 480. 
49 Id. 
50 Saler, supra note 21 at 395.  See also Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the 
Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1876-77 
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downsize) the middle man, so to speak, and to encourage a more 
direct relation between the individual and God.”51  “In the 
‘priesthood of all believers’ anyone could read the Bible for himself 
or herself and could commune with God directly without the 
intercession of priests, saints, or sacraments.”52   
“[T]he development of that construct was carried further, and 
forged into a recognizably modern form, by the Enlightenment.”53  
As Thomas Paine said, “my own mind is my own church.”54  
Jefferson and Madison advocated for religious freedom on openly 
theological grounds stressing the sanctity of conscience.55  The term 
religion, as it is employed today, was not particularly useful until the 
eighteenth century when it acquired a sense of “objective reality, 
concrete facticity, and utter self-evidence.”56 
Thus, “religion” is “an intellectual construction, a device 
through which the rationalist passion for classifying and 
pigeonholing expresses itself.”57  And it is indisputably the product 
of the West.58  “‘In most societies, religion is not a separate category 
(2008) (“Although the sanctity of conscience was recognized in medieval Catholic 
teaching and canon law, the Protestant Reformation altered the significance of 
conscience in a way that profoundly affected, and to some extent redirected, 
historical commitments to the separation of church and state.”). 
51 Id. at 1877. 
52 Id. 
53 Saler, supra note 21 at 395. 
54 Smith, supra note 50 at 1878. 
55 Id. at 1880. 
56 MASUZAWA, supra note 17 at 2. 
57 Russell T. McCutcheon, The Category “Religion” in Recent Publications: A 
Critical Survey, 42 NUMEN 284, 286 (1995) (internal citation omitted).  See also 
SALER, supra note 2 at ix (“Religion is a Western folk category that contemporary 
Western scholars have appropriated.”).  Cf. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING 
RELIGION: FROM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN xi (1982) (“Religion is solely the 
creation of the scholar’s study. It is created for the scholar’s analytic purposes by 
his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no existence 
apart from the academy.”).  But see Steve Bruce, Defining Religion: A Practical 
Response, 21 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY-REVUE INTERNATIONALE 
DE SOCIOLOGIE 107, 107 (2011) (criticizing “various post-modern approaches 
which argue that there is actually no such thing as religion because ‘religion’ is a 
modern social construct.”). 
58 See Petty, The Concept of “Religion,” supra note 2; Petty, “Faith, However 
Defined,” supra note 2; Woodhead, supra note 4 at 121-22 (“the concept of 
religion has ethnocentric imperialist biases, and fails to do justice to non-Western 
cultures by forcing them into a Western straightjacket.”); Koppelman, supra note 
41 at 975 (“the term religion denotes an anthropological category, arising out of a 
particular Western practice of encountering and accounting for foreign belief 
systems associated with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to 
deal.”); Bryan Rennie, Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: 
Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology, 87 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION 315, 315 (2007) 
(noting “‘only an incredible ethnocentric illusion would authorize us to recognize 
it as still have true scientific vocation today’” and “Religion is in fact the West’s 
most characteristic and most valued concept, without equivalent in other cultures.  
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of experience and action.  There is, rather, a religious dimension to 
every part of social life.’”59 
Given that the idea of religion as a universal category is a 
Western construct, both legal and non-legal scholars have observed 
the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of satisfactorily defining it.60  
It is the legitimate daughter of Christianity, and questions relative to it are 
exclusively Western.”) (quoting DANIEL DUBUISSON, THE WESTERN 
CONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION: MYTH, KNOWLEDGE, AND IDEOLOGY 5 (2003)); 
Smith, supra note 15 at 269 (Religion “is a category imposed from the outside on 
some aspect of native culture.”); Sullivan, supra note 29 at 443 (“Indiscriminate 
use of the word ‘religion’ as well as other reifying categories describing religious 
cultural phenomena—including Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism—have 
been widely and thoroughly criticized in religious studies because their use makes 
indefensible claims about the existence of referents for those labels.”); Stewart 
Elliott Guthrie, Religion: What Is it?, 35 J. SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 412, 418 
(1996) (Religion “is a concept stemming from a particular culture at a particular 
time.”); McCutcheon, supra note 57 at 285-86 (“How useful is this category, 
given its clearly European and largely Christian-influenced heritage?”) (citing 
Tim Murphy, Wesen und Erscheiung in the History of the Study of Religion: A 
Post-Structuralist Perspective, 6 METHOD AND THEORY IN THE STUDY OF 
RELIGIONS 119 (1994)) (suggesting “universalized categories as ‘religion’—
defined as essence or manifestation—are part of the baggage of Occidental 
Humanism.”)); Saler, supra note 21 at 395 (“Common contemporary acceptations 
of the word religion, it is generally recognized, derive from Western cultural 
traditions and experiences.”) (italics in original); SMITH, supra note 7 at 43 
(“Religion as a systematic entity, as it emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, is a concept of polemics and apologetics.”). 
59 SALER, supra note 2 at 28 (quoting PHILIP K. BOCK, MODERN CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 380 (1969)).  And this “accords with the 
views of numbers of anthropologists.”  Id. 
60 Smith, supra note 27 at 923 (“we need more clarity on what ‘religion’ even 
is.”); Bruce, supra note 57 at 110 (“Much of our difficulty in defining religion 
comes from arguments about which of a largely agreed set of characteristics 
should be constitutive.”); Woodhead, supra note 4 at 121 (“Controversy over the 
definition of religion is a constant . . . . The concept of religion has never been 
uncontentious and its critics have never been quiet . . . . It has proved impossible 
to fox on a definition which all—or even a majority—can agree.”); Stolzenberg, 
supra note 18 at 1041 (noting the “notorious difficulty” of defining religion); 
Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 880 (2009) (“Religion is a category that is hard to 
delimit.”); Smith, supra note 50 at 1883 n.72 (“The challenges of saying what 
‘religion’ even is has vexed judges and scholars.”); Harrison, supra note 20 at 133 
(“Given that most of us have no trouble recognizing such traditions as religious, it 
is perhaps surprising that there is little agreement about what religion is or, 
indeed, if ‘it’ is anything distinctive at all . . . . Elementary though this may seem, 
it has proven difficult to formulate a definition of religion that can command wide 
assent.”); Satlow, supra note 14 at 838 (“defining a ‘religion’ is no easy matter.”); 
WHITE, supra note 10 at 125 (“By what criteria, then can ‘religion’ possibly be 
defined, and the line between it and ‘nonreligion’ be drawn?”); Smith, supra note 
15 at 281 (“It was once a tactic of students of religion to cite the appendix of 
James H. Leuba’s Psychological Study of Religion (1912), which lists more than 
fifty definitions of religion, to demonstrate that the effort to define religion in 
short compass is a hopeless task.”) (internal quotation omitted); Sullivan, supra 
note 29 at 453 (“The difficulties of tightly defining the borders of religion and 
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How religion is, or is not, defined can be critical because “many 
arguments or seeming disagreements about theoretical issues pivot 
on, or sometimes reduce to, variant definitional commitments.”61   
 
III. THE DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION 
 
Many commentators have called for a judicial definition of 
religion and many have lamented the purported inability of courts to 
satisfactorily apply the religion clauses in the absence of one.62  
religious practice are familiar to religion scholars.”); Guthrie, supra note 58 at 412 
(“Scholars agree broadly that no convincing general theory of religion exists” and 
that “writers in every discipline concerned with religion admit that even the 
definition of the term still eludes consensus”); GAVIN LANGMUIR, HISTORY 
RELIGION, AND ANTISEMITISM 69 (1990) (“Few words are so deeply freighted as 
‘religion’; and few raise so many questions”); John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and 
the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1985) (“We have 
only recently abandoned the assumption, which may never have been true, that 
Americans share a common understanding of language about God and 
transcendent values.  That understanding made it unnecessary to define for 
nonspeakers a meaning that even believers have trouble putting into words.”); 
Comstock, supra note 7 at 499 (“Augustine’s famous observation about time 
applies with equal force to religion; if not asked, we know what it is; if asked, we 
do not know.”); Choper, supra note 6 at 579 (“Giving the concept of ‘religion’ a 
precise meaning is a formidably complicated task.”); Martin Southwold, 
Buddhism and the Definition of Religion, 13 MAN, NEW SERIES 362, 362 (1978) 
(“Religion is not . . . an institution with sharp boundaries.”); SMITH, supra note 7 
at 21 (noting religion “is notoriously difficult to define.”). 
61 Saler, supra note 21 at 395.  As Winnifred Fallers Sullivan has noted, 
“[p]roblems of definition arise when decisions are made by prisoners as to the 
regulation of inmate religious observance; by zoning commissions when decisions 
are made as to the placement of places of worship, by taxing authorities when 
decisions are made as to exemptions from taxation, by schools when children 
claim a right to be excused from requirements on grounds of religious conscience, 
by cities when they celebrate ethno-religious holidays, by legislatures that are 
asked to regulate religious butchering, by military authorities administering a 
chaplaincy program, by judges who are asked to substitute religious ex-offender 
programs for other kinds of rehabilitation efforts.”) SULLIVAN, supra note 8 at 
148-49. 
62 Oldham, supra note 6 at 123 (“The lack of a definition seems to make 
policing the First Amendment all but impossible in marginal cases.”); WHITE, 
supra note 10 at 124 (“The most obvious problem here is that of understanding 
and defining the central term, religion.”); Feofanov, supra note 6 at 313 (“Simply 
put, we need a definition of religion because it determines what is protected and 
what is not.”); Clements, supra note 6 at 553 (“[T]he plain language of the 
religion clauses suggests the need for a definition. . .”); Garvey, supra note 60 at 
781 (“It is impossible to apply the religion clauses without first defining the term 
‘religion.’”); Collier, supra note 6 at 975 (“A clear definition of religion is 
essential to any case based solely on the religion clauses.”); Hall, supra note 6 at 
160 (“[G]iving effect to the protections of the free exercise clause requires at least 
some definition of religion.”).  But see Bruce, supra note 57 at 107 (maintaining, 
with respect to non-legal definitions, that “if we are looking for an academic 
pursuit that merits the insult [‘academic’] then the obsession of some students of 
religion with the definition of their subject matter would be a strong candidate.”). 
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These authors suggest that “[w]hile a ‘definition of cannot take the 
place of inquiry . . . in the absence of definitions there can be no 
inquiry.’”63  Others have retorted that “[a]ny definition of religion 
reflects a particular theory about what religion is or . . . what 
religions are,”64 or that “[d]efinitions of religion are not tools for 
inquiry, but the results of inquiry, prejudicing (not aiding) thinking, 
and begging (rather than clarifying) our questions.”65  Complicating 
matters are competing imperatives that legal definitions of religion 
should align with either contemporary understanding,66 or 
consideration of what the Framers’ understanding might have 
been.67  
Attempts at definitions have been grouped into two broad 
categories.  The first, termed “essentialist,” aims to identify those 
characteristics that are shared by all “religions.”  Under an 
essentialist definition, potential religion that lacks an essential 
element would not qualify as a religion.  Essentialist definitions can 
be further subdivided into substantive definitions and functional 
definitions, which identify as essential characteristics what a religion 
is and what it does, respectively.   
Other attempts at defining religion may not deem any one 
characteristic a necessary condition.  These “multifactor” 
approaches to the definitional problem consider the issue from a 
more holistic perspective and apply a variety of methods to 
determine whether a given candidate should properly be considered 
a member of the group.  “Contemporary multi-factorial approaches 
are inspired largely by Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘family 
63 SALER, supra note 2 at 76 (quoting Melford E. Spiro, Religion: Problems of 
Definition and Explanation, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY 
OF RELIGION 90 (Michael Banton, ed. 1966)). 
64 Farré, supra note 23 at 4.  See also Benjamin L. Berger, Key Theoretical 
Issues in the Interaction of Law and Religion: A Guide for the Perplexed, 19 
CONST. F. 41, 47 (2011) (“[T]he adjudication of religious freedom inevitably 
involves the imposition of some juridical conception of what religion is, or what 
about religion really matters, and, in so doing, imposes a legal filter on what 
‘counts’ as protected religion.”).   
65 Farré, supra note 23 at 4. 
66 SALER, supra note 2 at 77 (“It ought not to contradict major established 
meanings.”); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as as Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 
CAL. L. REV. 753, 757 (1984) (“we should be surprised to learn that what is 
religious for the law is widely at variance with what otherwise counts as 
religious”). 
67 WHITE, supra note 10 at 124-25 (“[T]o decide what meaning it should be 
given is deeply problematic, particularly with respect to the First Amendment, 
where it must have a very different meaning for us now from any that was current 
in the population to which that text was originally addressed. . . . Then it would 
have referred mainly to different branches of Christianity, indeed to different 
branches of Protestantism.”).  But see SMITH, supra note 8 at 17, 21 (suggesting 
the religion clauses were understood by the Founders to be entirely a grant of 
jurisdiction over religious matters to the states). 
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resemblances’ or by so-called ‘polythetic classification’ in the 
biological sciences.”68  Both essentialist and multifactor approaches 
have significant limitations as applied to religion. 
 
A. Essentialist Definitions 
 
A “contrivance for bounding religion”69 
 
“Ideally [essentialist definitions] ought to specify what is 
distinctive of the phenomena defined, what separates them from all 
other phenomena.”70  “But what, if anything, makes religion 
distinctive among other ideologies, cultural formations, and social 
organizations that warrants particular attention?”71  “Attempts to 
ascertain the essence of ‘religion’ are based on the assumption that 
‘religion’ must indicate a distinctive set of data determined by some 
feature that all members of the set supposedly possess in 
common.”72 
 “Essentialist definitions constitute the great majority of 
definitions explicitly proffered”73 and they “typically take 
monothetic form:74 they attempt, that is, to state a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for recognizing phenomenal instances of 
the category and maintaining category boundaries.”75  In other 
words, essentialist definitions “stipulate[] a single feature or set of 
conjunctive features that specifies what a category  term basically 
means” and “specif[y] a set of necessary and sufficient features or 
conditions for identifying instances of the group of objects 
comprehended by the category.”76  “If any one stipulated feature or 
condition is missing with respect to some candidate for inclusion in 
the group, that candidate cannot be properly admitted.”77   
Essentialist definitions can be further divided into substantive 
definitions and functional definitions.78  Substantive definitions 
68 Saler, supra note 9 at 832. 
69 SALER, supra note 2 at 226. 
70 Id. at 87. 
71 Smith, supra note 27 at 924. 
72 Comstock, supra note 7 512. 
73 SALER, supra note 2 at 24.  See also id. at 81 (“monothetic (essentialist) 
definitions are legion.”).  For a recent example of an attempt at an essentialist 
definition of religion in the legal context, see Peter W. Edge, Determining 
Religion in English Courts, 1 OX. J.L. & RELIGION 402, 403 (2012) (defining 
religion by relation to “metaphysical reality”). 
74 With respect to definitions of religion, “all monothetic definitions are 
essentialist definitions.”  SALER, supra note 2 at 80. 
75 Saler, supra note 9 at 831. 
76 SALER, supra note 2 at 79. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 24 (“They typically gravitate toward one of two poles, the substantive 
(‘religion is such and such’) or the functional (‘religion is that which does this and 
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“bring together analytically similar phenomena, aspects of which we 
believe we can explain the same terms.”79  A substantive definition 
of religion tells us what religion fundamentally is, what it is 
composed of (for example, beliefs of a certain sort or beliefs of a 
certain sort plus certain kinds of behaviors).”80  For example, 
Frederick Farré defines religion substantively as “one’s way of 
valuing most intensively and comprehensively.”81  Steve Bruce 
takes a different substantive approach:  
 
I will define religion substantively, as beliefs, actions, and 
institutions based on the existence of supernatural entitites 
with powers of agency (that is, Gods) or impersonal 
processes possessed of moral purpose (the Hindu and 
Buddhist notion of karma, for example) that set the 
conditions of, or intervene in, human affairs.82 
 
Most anthropological definitions of religion “are essentialist: 
they purport to capture the presumptively abiding and universal 
characteristic(s) of religion.”83  Hideo Kishimoto is typical of a 
substantive anthropological definition: “Religion is an aspect of 
culture centered upon activities which are taken by those who 
participate in them to elucidate the ultimate meaning of life and to 
be related to the ultimate solution of all its problems.”84 
Functional definitions, in contrast, define their object by 
reference to its consequence or function.85  “A functional definition 
states what religion does, what consequences it has . . . (for example, 
it expresses and facilitates coping with existential concerns, or it 
promotes social solidarity).”86  One of the most influential 
that’).”) (italics in original).  See also Saler, supra note 9 at 831 (“Essentialist 
definitions span a spectrum from ‘substantive’ to ‘functional.’”); Beaman, supra 
note 5 at 193 (“For the most part, definitions can be divided into substantive and 
functional accounts of religion, succinctly described as what religion is and what 
religion does.”). 
79 Bruce, supra note 57 at 111-12. 
80 SALER, supra note 2 at 79-80.  See also Steve Bruce, The Pervasive World-
view: Religion in Pre-modern Britain, 48 BRIT. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 667, 667-68 
(1997) (“Substantive definitions identify religion in terms of what it is: for 
example, beliefs and actions which assume the existence of supernatural beings or 
powers.”). 
81 Farré, supra note 23 at 11 (original in italics). 
82 STEVE BRUCE, SECULARIZATION 1 (2011). 
83 Saler, supra note 9 at 831. 
84 Hideo Kishimoto, An Operational Definition of Religion, 8 NUMEN 236, 240 
(1961). 
85 Bruce, supra note 57 at 111-12. 
86 SALER, supra note 2 at 80.  See also Bruce, supra note 80 at 667 
(“Functional definitions identify religion in terms of what it does: for example, 
providing solutions to ‘ultimate problems,’ or answering fundamental questions of 
the human condition.”). 
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functional definitions of religion of the twentieth century was that of 
Emile Durkheim, who proposed that religion is a “division of the 
world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the 
other all that is profane.”87  Durkheim was interested “in what 
religion did”—not just its substantive characteristics, but also “its 
characteristic social function.88 
Initially, “monothetic definitions may seem attractive.”89  After 
all, “[p]henomena are often complex” and we must “select which of 
a range of characteristics we shall regard as definitive.”  
Additionally, “[m]onothetic definitions have a certain utility.”90  
They may be pedagogically useful in marking a field of study; 
heuristically useful in “stimulating research”; and they have some 
“orientational value” as starting points for inquiry.91  
But monothetic or essentialist definitions have a variety of 
difficulties as well.  Perhaps most obviously, they are both over and 
under inclusive.92  They take no account of prominent features that 
are not part of the definition because crafting an exhaustive list is 
impossible; on the other side, they often do take account of 
characteristics that are not truly universal.93  These limitations are 
present in both functional and substantive essentialist definitions. 
“A church is a complex and dynamic organization, often 
including believers with a variety of view on important questions of 
faith, morals, and spirituality.”94  Functional definitions, therefore, 
“may count as religious things which do not on the face of it look 
terribly religious and which their adherents regard as secular.”95  
“They tend to be so elastic—universalism is typically purchased by 
decreasing the specifics of content—that it is sometimes difficult to 
be certain what they actually exclude.”96  And “to define religion in 
87 Wilson, supra note 7 at 150-51 (internal quotation omitted). 
88 Id. 
89 SALER, supra note 2 at 87. 
90 Id. at 156. 
91 Id. 
92 GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 763 (“No specification of essential conditions 
will capture all and only the beliefs, practices, and organizations regarded as 
religious in modern culture.”); Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 11 (noting that 
Tillich’s ‘ultimate concerns’ is likely over-inclusive because it could include 
sports, work, or whatever is subjectively the ‘ultimate concern’ of an individual, 
while simultaneously being under-inclusive because it might exclude some forms 
of Buddhism that do not attempt to address ‘ultimate concerns.’).  I address this 
common misreading of Tillich below. 
93 Harrison, supra note 20 at 134. 
94 Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1981). 
95 Bruce, supra note 80 at 668. 
96 Saler, supra note 9 at 832.  See also Harrison, supra note 20 at 138-39 
(noting Durkheim, Weber, and Geertz all fail to differentiate religious from non-
religious phenomena). 
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terms of social or psychological functions is to beg the question of 
just what functions this or that religion performs in this or that 
setting.”97  Functional definitions may also primarily account for 
observable side effects, rather than the origins, of phenomena.98 
Substantive definitions are problematic for other reasons.  They 
“tend to narrow religion to one or two explicit variables.”99  And 
those variables tend be those that are seen in the dominant religious 
culture.  Lori Beaman observes that “[o]ne of the most serious 
problems with substantive definitions of religion is their tendency to 
reify dominant conceptualizations of religion”100 and those concepts 
“may not be cognitively salient among some peoples.”101  For 
example, “when we seek to unpack the notion of ‘superhuman’ or 
‘supernatural,’ we find difficulties with some non-western or 
traditional cultures.”102  “Applying the concept across cultures thus 
requires adjustments such as abandoning boundaries and, perhaps, 
replacing them with family resemblances.”103   
Overall, essentialist definitions focus attention away from 
complexities and subtleties.104  “[O]verly rigid boundaries between 
religion and non-religion”105 “facilitate . . . the dubious conflation of 
those categories and terms with presumptive ‘things out there in the 
world.’”106  And this reification “gives rise to interminable 
arguments about so-called ‘borderline’ cases.”107  In the legal 
context, this is enormously problematic.  The marginal cases are the 
most important because they mark the reach of the law. 
 
B. Multifactor Approaches 
 
Seeking to pin a label on the nonexistent . . . is cosmic futility108 
 
“Some students of religion have come to suspect or suppose that 
no single distinguishing feature, or no specific conjunction of 
distinguishing features, can universally be found in what, on various 
97 Bruce, supra note 80 at 668 
98 Wilson, supra note 7 at 155. 
99 Saler, supra note 9 at 831-32. 
100 Beaman, supra note 5 at 195. 
101 Saler, supra note 9 at 831-32. 
102 Bruce, supra note 80 at 668.  See also SALER, supra note 2 at 156-57 
(noting monothetic definitions may depend on non-native categories); Farré, supra 
note 23 at 7 (“Especially in the theistic West there is a tendency to import, at least 
implicitly, theistic or supernaturalistic characteristics into the list of defining 
characteristics that determine the essence of religion.”). 
103 Guthrie, supra note 58 at 418. 
104 SALER, supra note 2 at 156-57. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 157. 
107 Id. at 156-57. 
108 Farré, supra note 23 at 4. 
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grounds, we may wish to identify as ‘religious.’”109  Saler goes so 
far as to claim that “the task of identifying the essence or universal 
core of religion has largely been a failure.”110  He suggests that 
“[t]he phenomena commonly comprehended by applications of the 
word ‘religion’ are too complex and variable, and often too 
enmeshed with other phenomena in a larger universe, to be confined 
analytically within sharp, impermeable boundaries.”111   
“In the early 1960s, Wilfred Cantwell Smith argued that the 
attempt [to define religion] was misguided, and could not succeed, 
because the term ‘religion’ does not pick out phenomena that are 
naturally grouped together.”112  Talal Asad suggested that W.C. 
Smith’s “attempt to address the old question of the nature of religion 
by denying that it has any essence was truly original.”113   It “was 
the first to argue against essentialist definitions of religion.”114  His 
recommendation against using “religion” as a reified concept has 
gained acceptance.115 His work is “widely cited by historians of 
comparative religion”116 and “until recently . . . constituted one of 
the more notable critiques of the concept of ‘religion’ as it is used by 
scholars.”117  The problem with essentialist definitions, in a nutshell, 
is that “nobody’s definition works very well.”118  “[T]here is just too 
much variety.”119  Less charitably, “religious traditions cannot be 
essentialized without being misrepresented.”120  As Paul Valéry put 
it, “everything simple is false.”121   
109 Id. at 158.  See also KOPPELMAN, supra note 12 at 45 (“Arising thus out of 
a specific historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter, 
‘religion’ would be surprising if it had any essential denotation.”); Koppelman, 
supra note 41 at 975 (same). 
110 SALER, supra note 2 at x. 
111 Id. at 197. 
112 Harrison, supra note 20 at 140. 
113 Talal Asad, Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith’s The Meaning and 
End of Religion, 40 HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 205, 206 (2001).  It was not.  Benson 
Saler notes that as early as 1902, “William James, for example, remarks that ‘As 
there . . . seems to be no elementary religious emotion, but only a common store-
house of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might 
conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of religious act.’”  
SALER, supra note 2 at 158 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 27 (1929) [1902]).  Saler continues, quoting James: “we 
are very likely to find . . . ‘no one essence, but many characters which may 
alternately be equally important to religion.’”  Id.  See also Saler, supra note 9 at 
832 (quoting James). 
114 Asad, supra note 112 at 205. 
115 McCutcheon, supra note 57 at 286. 
116 Asad, supra note 112 at 205. 
117 McCutcheon, supra note 57 at 285. 
118 Koppelman, supra note 41 at 973. 
119 Bruce, supra note 57 at 113. 
120 Jamal & Panjwani, supra note 8 at 70. 
121 PAUL VALERY, NOTRE DESTIN ET LES LETTRES (1937).  A similar sentiment 
is found in PAUL VALERY, ŒUVRES II 864 (1942) (« Ce qui est simple est toujours 
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The alternative is not to make any one characteristic or set of 
characteristics determinative.  The three most prominent examples 
of this “polythetic classification” are numerical phenetics (grouping 
by outward similarity); family resemblance (which looks to the 
number and strength of shared characteristics); and prototype theory 
(in which membership in a category is judged by relative similarity 
to a prototype of the category).  Other non-essentialist definitional 
strategies include having no definition, and permitting groups to 
define themselves.  As with essentialist definitions, however, each 
of these approaches to determining what is a “religion” have 
difficulties of their own. 
 
1. Polythetic Classification/Numerical Phenetics 
 
“In biology the idea of polythesis is an organizing concept in an 
approach to classification by ‘overall similarity.’”122  “[N]o single 
feature is essential for membership in a polythetically defined taxon 
nor is any feature sufficient for such membership.”123  Frequently, 
not a single character is present in every member of the category.124  
“[W]ith every polythetic class there is associated a bundle of 
attributes,” and some attributes are possessed by every member of 
the category.125  Saler explains: 
 
For analytical purposes we may conceptualize [religion] in 
terms of a pool of elements that more or less tend to occur 
together in the best exemplars of the category.  While all of 
the elements that we deem to pertain to the category 
religion are predictable of that category, not all of them are 
predictable of all the phenomena that various scholars 
regard as instantiations of religion.126 
 
faux. Ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilisable. »).  See also Jeremy Webber, The 
Irreducibly Religious Content of Freedom of Religion, in DIVERSITY AND 
EQUALITY: THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM IN CANADA 192 (Avigail 
Eisenberg, ed., 2006) (“The more detailed they are the less complete they seem.”). 
122 Saler, supra note 9 at 834. 
123 Rodney Needham, Polythetic Classification: Convergence and 
Consequences, 10 MAN, NEW SERIES 349, 357 (1975) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
124 Id. 
125 Southwold, supra note 60 at 370.  See also SALER, supra note 2 at 158 
(“‘This must allow for the possibility that in any one case not every element in the 
configuration will be present, and that every element present will not necessarily 
be there to the same degree.’”) (quoting Raymond Firth, Problem and Assumption 
in an Anthropological Study of Religion 89 J. ROYAL ANTHRO. INST. 129, 131 
(1959)). 
126 SALER, supra note 2 at 225. 
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“This ‘polythetic’ model accounts for a wide diversity of actual 
religious manifestations while at the same time requiring the 
development of the basic map of characteristics that underlie a 
single ‘religion.’”127  But, like essentialist definitions, it also has 
significant limitations, both generally and as applied to social 
phenomena such as religion.   
“Polythetic taxa in the biological sciences are especially 
(though not exclusively) associated with an approach to 
classification once known as numerical taxonomy and now more 
generally called numerical phenetics.”128  Numerical phenetics is 
essentially classification by overall outward similarity.  This 
approach is fundamentally limited, both as applied to religion and 
more generally.  With respect to religion, the first problems appears 
when attempting to transfer the method from the hard sciences to the 
social sciences.  “The student of religion . . . generally operates with 
a smaller number of characters and character states than does the 
numerical pheneticist in biology.”129  With fewer characters, the 
decision how to group them becomes more difficult and more 
arbitrary.  Additionally, students of religion “are less likely than 
biologists to agree empirically” on what the relevant character states 
even are.130  This may be because the elements themselves are 
polythetic, rather than elemental as the case is more frequently in the 
hard sciences.131   
Even assuming the applicability of numerical phenetics to 
religion, the theory itself remaains problematic.   To begin, it 
requires one to establish an artificial horizon for comparison.  “The 
researcher . . . must first somehow establish a population of units 
that are to be subjected to empirical comparison for classificatory 
purposes.  After that is done, the members of that population can be 
sorted into polythetically described groups.”132  Arbitrary selection 
of a limit on what is being classified may result in less than optimal 
classification. Better grouping might be possible if the selection is 
expanded, and particularly salient objects lying just outside the limit 
could seriously distort groupings.  Finally, observed outward 
similarities may reflect common descent, but also may be nothing 
more than “similarities produced in other ways, like ‘convergent 
functional adaptations.’”133  For example, bees and birds both have 
wings, but few biologists would identify them as closely related 
because of it.  For these reasons, within biology, numerical 
127 Satlow, supra note 14 at 845. 
128 SALER, supra note 2 at 167. 
129 Id. at 219. 
130 Id. 
131 Saler, supra note 9 at 835. 
132 SALER, supra note 2 at 193. 
133 Id. at 175. 
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phenetics is “dead.”134  With respect to polythetic taxa as a means of 
defining religion, Saler complains: 
 
I see little prospect of making a responsible and productive 
use of numerical phenetics, and we would do well to search 
for other options.  Not only have weighty criticisms been 
entered against numerical phenetics in the biological 
sciences, and not only has that approach been supplanted 
by others, but strong reservations respecting its 
applicability to cultural phenomena are persuasive.135 
 
2.  Family Resemblance 
 
One alternative to numerical phenetics is family resemblance 
theory.  J.Z. Smith has suggested that family resemblance and 
polythetic classification “‘are built around quite different 
philosophical presuppositions’” and Richard Paul Chaney claims 
that one author’s “‘converging of them veils phenomenal 
differences.’”136  “Family resemblances have to do with how we use 
our words and concepts whereas polythetic classifications . . . refer 
‘to our data charts.’”137  Both approaches, however, hold “that no 
single feature is either necessary or sufficient for assigning 
candidates to the group comprehended by a category.  Rather, 
candidates are assigned membership on the basis of differentially 
sharing some, but not necessarily all, of a set of phenomenal values 
or ‘characteristics.’”138 
“‘Family resemblance,’ as an established philosophical 
construct, is preeminently associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
concept of philosophy as ‘a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language.’”139  Wittgenstein illustrates his 
theory of language by means of the word ‘game,’ claiming it is 
134 Id. at 176. 
135 Id. at 196. 
136 Id. at 159 (quoting JONATHAN Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FROM 
BABYLON TO JONESTOWN 136 (1982) and Richard Paul Chaney, Polythematic 
Expansion: Remarks on Needham’s Polythetic Classification, 19 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 139, 139 (1978)). 
137 SALER, supra note 2 at 170 (quoting Chaney, supra note 136 at 139-40)). 
138 Saler, supra note 9 at 833.  See also Harrison, supra note 20 at 142 
(“Perhaps, instead, ‘religion’ is a complex concept used to refer to things sharing a 
number of features—and thereby exhibiting a number of ‘family resemblances’—
not all of which need be present.”); SALER, supra note 2 at 164-65 (“While all the 
members of [a family] need have no feature or quality in common, some pairs of 
members typically do have features or qualities in common, and their particular 
commonalities are predictable of them.”).  See generally JOHN HICK, AN 
INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION: HUMAN RESPONSES TO THE TRANSCENDENT 
(1989); NINIAN SMART, THE PHENOMENON OF RELIGION (1975). 
139 SALER, supra note 2 at 159. 
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fruitless to search for a single feature that all games have in 
common.”140 
Generally speaking, family resemblance is attractive because it 
seeks to avoid the need to essentialize “religion” into one or a few 
determinative characteristics.  But it too suffers from several serious 
drawbacks.  First, to a certain extent, there is a problem of 
circularity.  “What one is prepared to regard as religiously-relevant 
family resemblance will depend upon what one means by 
‘religion.’”141  Similarly, broadening the definition to include 
marginal cases does not completely correct the assumptions that 
underlie essentialist definitions, and runs the risk of overinclusion.  
“Definitions of religion necessarily involve assumptions about its 
underlying nature.  Each and every definition of religion implies at 
least some theoretical conclusions.”142  Finally, “[i]f we regard as a 
member of the ‘religious family’ everything that has some feature in 
common with standard examples of religion, the concept of 
‘religion’ will have such a wide scope that it may well be 
analytically useless.”143  To borrow again from Valéry, “Everything 
complex is unusable.”144 
 
3. Prototype Theory 
 
Prototype theory presents a nuanced alternative to family 
resemblance.  Prototypes are understood to be “‘the clearest cases of 
category membership defined operationally by people’s judgments 
of goodness of membership in the category.’”145  In other words, 
they “provid[e] an image of a commonplace example that then 
serves as an ideal or typical exemplar of a category with decisions as 
to whether another object is a member of the same category being 
based on matching it against features of the prototype (for example, 
employing a robin as the prototype for ‘bird.’).”146  Prototypicality 
of a religion is determined by “cogent analytical arguments about 
elements that we deem analogous to those that we associate with our 
reference religions.”147  “The referents adjudged most prototypical 
are usually those that are deemed (1) to ‘bear the greatest 
140 Harrison, supra note 20 at 141. 
141 Harrison, supra note 20 at 143. 
142 Gunn, supra note 23 at 193 (internal quotation omitted). 
143 Harrison, supra note 20 at 143.  See also FITZGERALD, supra note 141 at 72 
(“[A] family resemblance theory of religion overextends the notion so badly that it 
becomes impossible to determine what can and what cannot be included.”). 
144 VALERY, supra note 120; Webber, supra note 120 at 192 (“the more 
abstract they become, the more empty.”). 
145 Saler, supra note 9 at 835 and SALER, supra note 2 at 206-07 (both quoting 
Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND 
CATEGORIZATION 27, 36 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd, eds. 1978)). 
146 Smith, supra note 1 at 377. 
147 SALER, supra note 2 at 225. 
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resemblance to other members of their own categories’ and (2) to 
‘have the least overlap with other categories.’”148 
Prototype theory has the advantage of minimizing the need for 
definitive category boundaries.149  “We may explicitly conceive of 
categories with reference to clear cases that best fit them rather than 
conceptualizing categories monothetically, which implicates 
stipulated limits.”150  But this requires first identifying clear cases, 
and “what we regard as our clearest examples of religion are neither 
timeless nor monolithic.”151  As is usually the case, Western 
monotheisms are understood to be the most prototypical 
instantiations of religion.152  Indeed, Martin Southwold “refers to 
Christianity as ‘the religion prototypical for our conceptions of 
religion,’” and J.Z. Smith notes “the features of other religions are 
routinely being matched against some Christian prototype.”153 The 
analogical prototype approach, thus, may “harm minority religions 
and new religious movements.”154  It also leaves open the question 
of to what extent a candidate must share characteristics with the 
prototype in order to be classified as a religion.155 
 




Thus far, the definitional strategies discussed have focused on 
objective criteria.  But “[w]hat is the role of the claimant’s own 
characterization?”156  Self-definition may prevent a government 
from denying legal protections to religious groups or practices by 
denying their religious character, but at the same time “is highly 
problematic because . . . [it] presents a clear danger of misuse.”157 
148 Id. at 211 (quoting Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn B. Mervis, Family 
Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories, 7 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY 573, 599 (1975)). 
149 Saler, supra note 9 at 835. 
150 SALER, supra note 2 at 206. 
151 Saler, supra note 9 at 836. 
152 SALER, supra note 2 at 225. 
153 Id. at 208 (quoting Southwold, supra note 60 at 367); Smith, supra note 1 
at 377. 
154 RUSSELL SANDBERG, LAW AND RELIGION 39 (2011) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
155 Wilson, supra note 7 at 160. 
156 Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 
1966 WISC. L. REV. 217, 255. 
157 Augsburg, supra note 8 at 294.  See also Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, 
Questioning Sincerity: The Role of Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 59, 59 (2014) (“If unable to evaluate sincerity, courts would indeed be 
powerless to identify fraudulent claims.”); Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 30 
(noting “a definition with infinitely malleable borders and no protection against 
strategic behavior would cease over time to have any meaningful substance.”).   
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In 1968 an ordained minister sought to dismiss a criminal 
indictment against him on the ground that his facially unlawful use 
of LSD and marijuana were protected religious rites in a new church 
whose official songs were “Puff, the Magic Dragon” and “Row, 
Row, Row Your Boat.”158  A decade later, certain federal inmates 
demanded steak and wine as religious sacraments in their 
purportedly religious celebration of the coming destruction of prison 
authority.159  Neither claim succeeded, but they do highlight both the 
potential for abuse and the important (if understated) role of 
sincerity in making claims based on religious grounds.160   
The word “sincerity” is not found in the religion clauses,161 but 
it has been called “‘the threshold question’” in cases implicating 
them.162  One commentator has even suggested that “[o]ne can 
hardly imagine a serious argument against a sincerity requirement.  
That a belief is sincerely held obviously must be established before 
an inquiry into the beliefs nature may proceed.”163  But even here 
difficulties remain. 
First, sincerity is a measure of whether beliefs are honestly held, 
rather than fraudulently expressed for the purpose of obtaining a 
benefit.  And since sincerity concerns beliefs, it brings with it and is 
limited by the problems associated with using beliefs as a proxy for 
religion, discussed above.  Sincerity also raises several new issues.  
The most challenging issue is whether sincerity of beliefs can be 
evaluated without also evaluating the content of the underlying 
beliefs themselves.  “In considering the sincerity of belief, courts 
cannot help but delve into the content of the beliefs in the process of 
158 Merel, supra note 6 at 805 (citing United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 
444 (D.D.C. 1968)). 
159 Id. (citing Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Tex. 1975)).  
More recent purportedly religious prisoner claims include challenges to 
restrictions on diet, grooming, housing, conjugal visits, and distribution of 
literature.  Adams & Barmore, supra note 157 at 61-62 nn.21-25 and 
accompanying text.  See also Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect 
Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
357, 358 (1996) (“[w]e engage in this task with an appropriately skeptical eye 
when claimants stand to achieve earthly and material gain from the recognition.”). 
160 See Webber, supra note 120 at 194 (“One suspects that sincerity looms so 
large not merely for its own sake, but because it is self-limiting, posing the issues 
in a way that involves both judgment and abstention.”) 
161 Bowser, supra note 6 at 181 (“The word ‘sincerity’ is not mentioned . . . in 
the Constitution.”). 
162 Id. at 181-82 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)). 
163 Feofanov, supra note 6 at 390.   But see ADAM B. SELIGMAN, ET AL., 
RITUAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: AN ESSAY ON THE LIMITS OF SINCERITY 103-04 
(2008) (“Sincerity often grows out of a reaction against ritual. . . . Though the 
tension between the two usually remains under control, it can also lead to shifts in 
the balance between ritual and sincerity, as nearly any of the world’s religious 
traditions shows: the Buddhist critique of Hinduism, Christian critique of Judaism 
. . . and so forth.”). 
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determining the sincerity with which they are held.”164  The more 
familiar or reasonable the underlying belief, the easier it is 
psychologically for a judge to find the claimant’s belief sincere.165  
This risks an indirect establishment of orthodoxy or, at the very 
least, makes the sincerity of new, eccentric, or unfamiliar beliefs 
more difficult to establish.  This is particularly problematic in the 
context of religious experience166 because “‘[r]eligious experiences 
which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to 
others.’”167   
But even where claimants are sincere in their beliefs, individual 
subjective accounts of whether that sincerity is religious presents 
problems of massive over-inclusiveness.168  Allowing individuals to 
determine their own constitutional protection according to their own 
views of the religiousity of their actions would “obliter[ate] . . . any 
meaningful distinction between religious and nonreligious.”169  
“Self-definition is even more obviously ill-suited for establishment 
cases for which the perspectives of outsiders are very important.”170  
Self-definition is therefore not a viable means to determine the 
extent of constitutional protections. 
 
 b. No Definition 
  
Several authors have suggested that the Constitution itself, 
either because of establishment concerns, or an overriding neutrality 
principle, precludes courts from defining religion at all.171  But not 
defining religion leads to just as many problems as defining it does.  
“[H]ow could anyone expect to go about developing a theory of 
religious freedom without invoking assumptions about, for example 
. . . the nature of religion . . . ?”172  The problem here is that “‘when 
164 Beaman, supra note 5 at 201. 
165 Adams & Barmore, supra note 157 at 64 (noting the “dangerous temptation 
to confuse sincerity with the underlying truth of a claim.  Particularly for 
unorthodox beliefs, the challenge is that “[p]eople find it hard to conclude that a 
particularly fanciful or incredible belief can be sincerely held.”) (quoting Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 
1982)); Ingber, supra note 6 at 248 (“Jurors are more willing to accept that a given 
belief is sincerely held if they also perceive it to be reasonably believable.”). 
166 Bowser, supra note 6 at 187. 
167 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (quoting United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)). 
168 Ingber, supra note 6 at 248. 
169 Ingber, supra note 6 at 248-49; Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 812.  See also 
Adams & Barmore, supra note 157 at 64 (quoting United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 
1549, 1559 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Neither the government nor the court has to accept 
the defendants’ mere say-so.”). 
170 GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 136. 
171 Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1961); Weiss, supra note 8 at 604; Worthing, supra note 6 at 314-15. 
172 SMITH, supra note 8 at 68. 
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the term “religion” is given no explicit ostensive definition, the 
observer, perforce, employs an implicit one.’”173  And the implicit 
definition may have many of the same problems associated with 
essentialist definitions described above.  “All of us who use the 
word religion have a theory—explicit or implicit—about what 
religions basically are.”174  Explicitly declining to enter the fray, 
although ostensibly transparent, would likely conceal more 
reasoning than it would disclose. 
In sum, neither essentialist nor polythetic definitions offer a 
panacea.  Both types of definitions have substantial difficulties 
defining religion for legal purposes.  Essentialist definitions, even 
where they account for the inadequacy of framing religion as largely 
a matter of belief, oversimplify the question.  Religion cannot be 
essentialized without being misrepresented.  Polythetic definitions, 
on the other hand, cannot adequately capture only and all 
“religions,” and lack the determinacy that characterize effective 
legal rules.  How, then, should courts handle religious claims when 







173 SALER, supra note 2 at 76 (quoting Melford E. Spiro, Religion: Problems of 
Definition and Explanation, in ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY 
OF RELIGION 90 (Michael Banton, ed. 1966)); see also Durham & Sewell, supra 
note 6 at 28 (“a non-definition still leaves the question to the courts of dividing a 
religious sphere, where courts should not intrude, from a nonreligious sphere.”). 
174 Farré, supra note 23 at 6.  See also White, supra note 45 at 2. 
 
Our experience, supported we think by that of others, is that it is in 
fact quite difficult to talk about religion in a satisfactory way, whether 
we are trying to do so within a discipline such as law or psychology or 
anthropology, or while speaking in more informal ways with our 
friends and colleagues.  There are many reasons for this: it is in the 
nature of religious experience to be ineffable or mysterious, at least for 
some people and some religions; different religions imagine the world 
and its human inhabitants, and their histories, in ways that are 
enormously different and plainly unbridgeable; and there is no super-
language into which all religions can be easily translated, for purposes 
either of comparison or mutual intelligibility.  What is more, it seems to 
be nearly always the case that one’s religion’s deepest truths and 
commitments, its fundamental narratives, appear simply irrational, even 
weird, to those who belong to another tradition, or are themselves 
simply without religion.  This means that in any attempt to study and 
talk about a religion other than one’s own there is a necessary element 
of patronization, at least whenever we are studying beliefs we could not 
imagine ourselves sharing. 
 
132
IV. FAIRLY APPLYING A BIASED CONCEPT 
 
How can we talk about religion from a legal point of view?175 
 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, the Supreme Court held that both the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Establishment Clause mandated that generally applicable 
employment laws could not govern the terms of employment of 
clergy.176  Institutions relying on this ruling may soon confront 
arguments that Hossana-Tabor does not apply because the employer 
is not religious.177  The autonomy of religious institutions in the 
selection and terms of employment of their pastoral staff is but one 
instance of the First Amendment according “special solicitude” to 
religion where a definition may prove necessary.178  Special legal 
status calls out for line-drawing.  Given the lack of neutrality 
inherent in the concept of religion and the difficulties inherent in 
framing definitions generally, how should religion be defined for 
constitutional purposes?     
Despite the significant investment of the non-legal academy in 
attempting to define religion, lawyers and judges in the United 
States have not taken advantage of these efforts.  Thus far, “[t]he 
legal approach to definition in the United States has been 
independent of the anthropological or even social scientific 
approaches.”179  And legal scholars, like all the rest, “have written 
volumes on the subject without reaching anything approaching 
agreement.”180   
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
175 Augsburg, supra note 8 at 291. 
176 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
177 For a more thorough treatment of the problem of identifying religious 
institutions, see Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 181 (2014). 
178 Andrew Koppelman has suggested that the Supreme Court’s decisions 
concerning conscientious objector exemptions from the draft “placed pressure on 
the definition of religion that was becoming fairly unendurable by the time the 
Vietnam War ended.”  See KOPPELMAN, supra note 12 at 190 n.135. 
179 Donovan, supra note 6 at 70.  Although legal scholars and judges have 
made little use of insights from social sciences, the definitions they have proposed 
can be grouped the same way.  See Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 13 
(“Definitions of religion in the legal scholarly literature and United States court 
cases largely follow the types of definitions advanced by social scientists.”) & 17 
(“Legal definitions of religion have largely followed social science trends.”). 
180 Choper, supra note 6 at 579.  See also Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 753 
(“Academic commentators have come to startlingly diverse proposals.”).  But see 
Gunn, supra note 23 at 190-91 (“It is fairly common for legal analyses of freedom 
of religion or belief to avoid a serious discussion of the definitional problem, even 
among the most important works.”). 
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religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”181  The 
Establishment Clause “mandates government neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion . . . 
[while] the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special 
protection to the exercise of religion.”182  “It is widely believed that 
the First Amendment puts courts and legislatures of the United 
States in a double bind when it comes to religion: requiring them to 
remain neutral with respect to religious concerns, while 
simultaneously protecting these same concerns.”183  Obviously “[i]t 
is not logically possible for the government both to be neutral 
between religion and nonreligion and to give religion special 
protection.”184  Thus, “[t]he accommodation of religion gives rise to 
a puzzle in First Amendment theory: how to reconcile free exercise 
with establishment principles.”185   
Some have called “the profound tension, indeed paradox, 
between its religion clauses” the First Amendment’s “great 
achievement.”186   The contradiction “reflects a struggle between 
two values, both of them crucial, neither of which can be 
accommodated perfectly.”187  The problem is that “[t]here is no 
neutral course out of a contradiction.”188 
Perhaps in partial recognition of the paradox, “[t]he Supreme 
Court has never seriously discussed how religion should be defined 
for constitutional purposes.”189 And as a result of the Court’s 
demurrer, its jurisprudence has been deemed “incoherent.”190  
181 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
182 Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 571, 573 (internal quotations omitted). 
183 Id. at 571. 
184 Koppelman, supra note 60 at 869-70.  See also id. (“Some Justices and 
many commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as in tension 
with itself.”). 
185 Id. at 869. 
186 WHITE, supra note 10 at 149.  See also id. (“[T]he First Amendment has the 
great merit of insisting simultaneously upon the importance of religion and its 
danger.”). 
187 Id. at 149.  See also Hall, supra note 6 at 387 (“The challenge of the 
religion clauses then is to create a doctrine that can work simultaneously as a 
protection for religion and as a protection against religion.”). 
188 Koppelman, supra note 183 at 573. 
189 Choper, supra note 6 at 579.  See also GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 125 
(“[T]he Supreme Court understandably has remained relatively silent.”); Laycock, 
supra note 94 at 1373 (noting “the Supreme Court’s failure to develop any 
coherent general theory of the religion clauses.”); Freeman, supra note 6 at 1524 
(“Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has had surprisingly little to say 
about the meaning of religion.”); Weinberger, supra note 6 at 736. 
190 Smith, supra note 50 at 1871; Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to 
Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Religion in U.S. 
Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 49 (1999) (“The Supreme Court and 
commentators have been struggling for over a century to find an adequate 
definition or characterization of the term ‘religion’ in the First Amendment.”). 
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Steven D. Smith laments, “[v]irtually no one is happy with the 
Supreme Court’s doctrines and decisions in this area or with its 
explanations of those doctrines and decisions.”191  And “John 
Mansfield’s view was probably representative: the Court’s religion 
clause decisions reflected ‘the incantation of verbal formulae devoid 
of explanatory value.’”192  For his part, “Douglas Laycock has 
described the Court’s establishment clause formula as ‘so elastic in 
its application that it means everything and nothing.’”193  Less 
charitably, the Supreme Court’s religion clause jurisprudence “looks 
like a sort of schizophrenic, constitutional love-hate complex 
extending to religion both special immunities and special 
disabilities.”194  Much as it is in the social sciences, “[d]elimiting the 
term ‘religion’ in the first amendment . . . is not easily within reach 
of a practical solution.”195 
 
A. Legal Background 
 
The Supreme Court’s first modern discussion of the boundaries 
of legal religion came in 1879 in United States v. Reynolds.196   
There, a Mormon sought an exemption from a law prohibiting 
bigamy because it was specifically permitted by his religion.197  The 
Court turned to how the Framers of the First Amendment had 
defined the term and, relying on writings by Jefferson and Madison, 
191 SMITH, supra note 8 at v. 
192 Id. at 3-4 (quoting John Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 846, 848 
(1984)).  See also SULLIVAN, supra note 8 at 155 (“[T]he legal limits to religious 
freedom are often expressed by rhetorically set boundaries that are strangely 
unhelpful when it comes to actual cases.”). 
193 SMITH, supra note 8 at 3 (quoting Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious 
Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 450 (1986)). 
194 Smith, supra note 50 at 1886. 
195 Bowser, supra note 6 at 163.  See also SMITH, supra note 8 at 36 
(“Extensive analysis has been dedicated to resolving, or at least reducing, this 
perceived conflict between the clauses.”). 
196 98 U.S. 145 (1879).  Prior to this (and even after, for a time), the Court’s 
statements concerning religion expressly “used traditional Western Christianity as 
a benchmark of religion.”  Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 17.  In 1844, the 
Court declared Christianity part of the common law in the “qualified sense” that 
“it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the 
annoyance of believers or the injury of the public.”  Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 
43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844).  Even more than a decade after Reynolds, the 
Court suggested that “we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truth . . . 
that this is a Christian nation.”  Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 465 (1891).  And as late as 1931, a majority of the Court was willing to 
declare that “[w]e are a Christian people . . . acknowledging with reverence the 
duty of obedience to the will of God.”  United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 
625 (1931). 
197 Id. at 161. 
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concluded that although the Mormon practice of bigamy was 
religious, the claimant was not entitled to practice it.   
A decade later, the Court considered a similar case in Davis v. 
Beason.198  The Territory of Idaho had enacted law disenfranchising 
any person who belonged to an organization that supported 
polygamy.199  Echoing James Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Establishments,200 the Court 
declared that “[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of 
his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of 
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his 
will.”201  The Court, however, conflated the question of what 
constitutes religion with whether a religious practice can be legally 
prohibited.202 
In 1931 at least four Justices remained committed to a belief-
based theistic view of religion, when Chief Justice Hughes, joined 
by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone wrote “the essence of 
religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to 
those arising from any human relation.”203 
It was not until 1944 that the Court began to retreat from an 
overtly theistic and specifically Christian formulation of what 
constitutes religion.204  Throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the Court had based its decision “on the reality of God and 
the truth of individuals’ religious claims.”205 In United States v. 
Ballard, Justice Douglas, faced with “massive immigration,” “a 
society increasingly influenced by the technological revolution” and 
“the changing faces of a pluralistic society,”206 discarded the Court’s 
increasingly uncomfortable role of arbitrating religious claims, when 
he wrote that “[m]en may believe what they cannot prove.  They 
198 Choper, supra note 6 at 587 (citing 133 U.S. 333 (1890)). 
199 Id.  
200 Id. (citing J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Establishments, reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON 302 (S. Padover, ed. 
1953)). 
201 Id. (citing 133 U.S. at 341-42). 
202 133 U.S. at 341-42 (“Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all 
civilized and Christian countries. . . . To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is 
to offend the common sense of mankind.”). 
203 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., 
dissenting). 
204 See Anand Agneshwar, Rediscovering God in the Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 295, 299 & nn.18-22 (1992) (citing MacIntosh, 283 U.S. at 625; Church 
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1891); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); Vidal v. 
Girard’s Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844)); James McBride, Paul 
Tillich and the Supreme Court: Tillich’s “Ultimate Concern” as a Standard in 
Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 245, 251 (1988). 
205 Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 299 n.21. 
206 Id. at 299-300. 
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may not be put to proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.”207   
And just a few years later, he abandoned specific references to 
Christianity in favor of recognition that “[w]e are a religious people 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”208 
The content of beliefs, rather than belief itself, continued to be a 
major issue as the Court refined its understanding of religion 
through the twentieth century.  Torcaso v. Watkins, decided in 1961, 
invalidated a Maryland law that required a declaration of a belief in 
God as a test for holding public office.209  “In what has become a 
famous footnote, the Court noted that ‘among religions in this 
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a 
belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical 
Culture, Secular Humanism and others.’”210 
The Court followed Torcaso with its seminal decision in United 
States v. Seeger.211 Seeger concerned interpretation of the 
conscientious objector provisions of the Universal Military Training 
and Service Act, rather than the constitutional definition of religion 
for the First Amendment, but it is generally understood that 
Congress intended the Act to provide all of the protection 
constitutionally available, and it has been interpreted as essentially a 
constitutional decision.212  This is not necessarily the case with all 
congressional enactments concerning religion.  Congress has much 
greater leeway to define religion more narrowly in the statutory than 
the constitutional context.213   
At the time, the Universal Military Training and Service Act 
provided an exemption from military service for those who: 
 
by reason of religious training or belief, is conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war in any form.  Religious 
training and belief in this connection means an individual’s 
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties 
superior to those arising from any human relation, but does 
207 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). 
208 Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
209 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
210 Ingber, supra note 6 at 257 (quoting Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11). 
211 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
212 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) 
(“Although Seeger . . . turned on statutory interpretation . . . [it] remain[s] 
constitutionally significant.”); Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 302 n.41; Ingber, 
supra note 6 at 260-61; McBride, supra note 205 at 250; Note, Toward a 
Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 6 at 589. 
213 The distinction is sometimes lost, especially on non-lawyers.  E.g., Smith, 
supra note 1 at 376 (suggesting that the Internal Revenue Service is “America’s 
primary definer” of religion). 
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not include essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical views on a merely personal moral code.214 
 
Seeger claimed that his opposition to war was based upon his “belief 
in devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a 
religious faith in a purely ethical creed.”215  Relying on the writings 
of several modern theologians, “especially those of theologian Paul 
Tillich,”216 the Court concluded that sincere religious belief that 
“occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by 
the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the 
exemption” also qualifies.217  The Court explained that a belief was 
parallel to the “orthodox belief in God” if it was “based upon a 
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or 
upon which all else is ultimately dependent.”218  Thus, the Supreme 
Court adopted an essentialist functional definition of religion by 
looking to what role it plays in an individual’s life.219 
The Court’s reliance on Tillich, a theologian, is noteworthy.  
Tillich argued that “‘Religion’ is the state of being grasped by an 
ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies as all other concerns as 
preliminary, and which itself contains the answer to the question of 
the meaning of our life.”220  “Ultimate concern,” in turn, he 
described as “the integrating center of the personal life”221 to which 
“all other concerns are subordinated or sacrificed” and which is 
“experienced as promising ‘total fulfillment.’”222  Tillich also 
defined ultimate concern as “concern about what is experienced as 
ultimate,”223 and he also formulated his definition, in earlier 
manuscripts, as “concern for the ultimate.”224   
214 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).  This provision, enacted in response to 
conflicting decisions by lower courts on how broadly religion was to be 
understood for conscientious objector status, see Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 
759-60 & n.27 (citing Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of 
Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 37-38), superseded an 
earlier provision which granted conscientious objector status only to those who 
were “members of a well-organized sect or organization.”  Act of 18 May 1917, 
ch. 15, para. 4, 40 Stat. 78 (1919).  The 1917 law was intended to deny 
exemptions to those who had private reservations about the war.  McBride, supra 
note 205 at 252. 
215 380 U.S. at 166. 
216 Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 760.  See also Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 
302; Ingber, supra note 6 at 259 n.148. 
217 380 U.S. at 176. 
218 Id. at 166 & 176. 
219 Ingber, supra note 6 at 259 n. 149; Choper, supra note 6 at 589. 
220 SALER, supra note 2 at 106. 
221 Id. at 106. 
222 Id. at 108. 
223 Id. at 107-08. 
224 Smith, supra note 15 at 280. 
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But as James McBride explains, “Tillich’s ‘ultimate concern’ 
cannot be reduced to an affective attitude alone.”225 Instead, “there 
exist two poles in ‘ultimate concern’: objective as well as 
subjective.”226  “Tillich believed that in true religious faith, ‘the 
ultimate concern is a concern about the truly ultimate; while in 
idolatrous faith, preliminary, finite realities are elevated to the rank 
of ultimacy.’”227  For Tillich, “[t]he best religion, in short, is one in 
which the central symbols nullify their own candidacies for ultimacy 
and take their significance only as manifesting and expressing Being 
Itself, which alone is properly deemed ultimate.”228  For Tillich, this 
is Christianity.229  In applying Tillich’s formulation of “ultimate 
concern,” but avoiding the objective component of Tillich’s theory, 
the Court distorted Tillich’s theologicial views.230  
Beyond this oversimplification and distortion, the use of 
Tillich’s writings to establish a legal test is questionable. “Tillich’s 
writings occupy volumes and are directed at theologians and lay 
believers, not lawyers.  To extract from them the phrase, ‘ultimate 
concerns,’ and instruct judges to apply it as a legal formula seriously 
underestimates the subtlety of Tillich’s thought and overestimates 
the theological sophistication of the participants in the legal 
process.”231  Nonetheless, Seeger’s holding, including reliance on 
the modified form of Tillich’s theology remains the law.   
A  plurality of the Supreme Court took Seeger one step further 
in Welsh v. United States, by negating the need for an applicant to 
subjectively believe his views were “religious” to receive 
conscientious-objector status.232  Welsh expressly disclaimed that 
his basis for seeking conscientious-objector status was based on 
religion, and struck the words “religious training and” from his 
application, leaving only his “belief.”233  Rather than religious 
training, Welsh’s views were based on his study of history and 
sociology, his understanding of world politics, and his view that 
military enterprises were wasteful.234  Four Justices concluded that 
although Welsh did not subjectively view his reasons for seeking an 
exemption as religious, they were tantamount to religious beliefs for 
purposes of the statute because they “‘play the role of a religion and 
225 McBride, supra note 205 at 269 
226 Id.; see also Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 308 (“Tillich’s conception of 
religion as an objective as well as a subjective component.”). 
227 Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 308 (quoting PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF 
FAITH 12 (1957)). 
228 SALER, supra note 2 at 111. 
229 Id. at 109. 
230 Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 309. 
231 Choper, supra note 6 at 595. 
232 Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 760 (citing 398 U.S. 333 (1970)). 
233 Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 303 (citing 398 U.S. at 337)). 
234 Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 760. 
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function as a religion in his life.’”235  In the thirty-five years since 
Welsh, the Supreme Court has addressed the definition of religion 
only twice, both times in dicta, and has not sought to modify its 
holding in Seeger.236  In view of the Court’s hands-off approach, 
several commentators have sought to fill the void.  The two most 
notable approaches are those of Jesse Choper and Kent Greenawalt. 
 
B. Academic Approaches 
 
1. Jesse Choper’s “Extratemporal Consequences” 
 
Jesse Choper has suggested that the religion clauses protect 
actions that have “unique significance for believers” that makes it 
“particularly cruel” for the government to insist on conformation to 
generally applicable laws.237  Choper contends that focusing on 
“extratemporal consequences,”238—essentially the threat of 
damnation—is more in line with the “conventional, average-person 
concept of religion” than Tillich’s “ultimate concern.”239  Choper 
recognizes the danger of “parochialism and intolerance” in how 
judges might apply his framework,240 but counters that it is superior 
to content-based approaches; it provides for the minimum content 
called for by the religion clauses in singling out religion; it has a 
substantial pedigree; and it fits with at least some doctrines of most 
major religions.241 
Several commentators have been sharply critical of Choper’s 
approach.  Stanley Ingber has responded that “Choper’s definition of 
religion, even by conservative standards, is grossly 
underinclusive.”242  Douglas Laycock notes that “many activities 
that obviously are exercises of religion are not required by 
conscience or doctrine.”243  Similarly, John Garvey explains that 
Choper’s definition “might not apply to many matters of worship 
235 Id. (quoting 398 U.S. at 339)). 
236 Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 304-05.  See also Peñalver, supra note 6 at 
799 (“Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not dealt directly with the issue 
of defining religion.”). 
237 JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 74 (1995); Choper, supra note 6 at 
597. 
238 CHOPER, supra note 237 at 77; Choper, supra note 6 at 599. 
239 Choper, supra note 6 at 599; see also CHOPER, supra note 237 at 77. 
240 CHOPER, supra note 237 at 77; Choper, supra note 6 at 599. 
241 CHOPER, supra note 237 at 78-80; Choper, supra note 6 at 599-601. 
242 Ingber, supra note 6 at 276.   
243 Laycock, supra note 94 at 1390.  See also Garvey, supra note 60 at 793-94 
(“The problem with Choper’s suggestion . . . is that it threatens to remove 
coverage from a fairly broad range of cases that most of us think should get first 
amendment protection.”). 
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whose abandonment, although undesirable, would not be visited 
with ‘damnation or some like consequence.’”244   
Ingber also observes that by limiting the inquiry to extra-
temporal consequences, Choper ipso facto focuses on Western 
religions, excludes those (both Western and non-Western) that 
believe in the possibility of forgiveness in the afterlife (whether 
universal or specific),245 and call on courts to immerse themselves in 
theological questions about whether and to what extent a particular 
action or inaction is compelled by fear of divine retribution.246 Even 
taking the simplest example, “[m]any Christians are deeply unsure 
about the precise relation of sins in this life to the nature of existence 
in a possible afterlife.”247   
Choper’s definition is not a functional one simply because it 
avoids the subjective inquiry into whether a particular belief is 
deeply and sincerely held.  Rather, Choper presents us with a 
substantive definition in which he has defined out the substance of 
many (perhaps most) religions and religious actions. 
 
2. Kent Greenawalt’s Prototype Approach 
 
In contrast to Choper’s essentialist proposal, Kent Greenawalt 
and George Freeman have separately suggested analogical 
approaches to defining religion.248  Greenawalt proposes a prototype 
analysis, suggesting that “courts should decide whether something is 
religious by comparison with the indisputably religious in light of 
the particular legal problem involved.”249  As with any polythetic 
definition, “[n]o single characteristic should be regarded as essential 
to religiousness,”250 because “[n]o specification of essential 
conditions will capture all and only the beliefs, practices, and 
organizations that are regarded as religious in modern culture and 
should be treated as such under the Constitution.”251  Andrew 
244 Garvey, supra note 60 at 794. 
245 The doctrine of universal reconciliation (also called universal salvation or 
apokatastasis) continues to be an influence with the Universalist Unitarian 
movement, see Richard Bauckham, Universalism: A Historical Survey, 4 
THEMELIOS 47 (1978), and among Trinitarian Christians has supporters including 
the noted Anglican bishop and scholar John A.T. Robinson, see JOHN A.T. 
ROBINSON, IN THE END GOD (1969); John A.T. Robinson, Universalism—Is It 
Heretical?, 2 SCOT. J. THEOL. 139 (1949). 
246 Ingber, supra note 6 at 276-77. 
247 Garvey, supra note 60 at 794. 
248 GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 139; Greenawalt, supra note 66; Freeman, 
supra note 6.  Greenawalt explains that he became aware of Freeman’s article 
only after a final draft of his had been completed, and that they differ at several 
points in their methods and conclusions.  Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 753 n.2. 
249 Greenawalt, supra note 66 at 753. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 763. 
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Koppelman has called these types approaches “[t]he best modern 
treatments of the definition problem.”252 
Eduardo Peñalver, on the other hand, has criticized 
Greenawalt’s approach, claiming that the degree of commonality 
between the entity to be classified and religion depends a great deal 
on what is chosen as the paradigm.253  Greenawalt acknowledges the 
criticism and responds by suggesting that beginning the analysis 
with “major world religions” rather than those most familiar in the 
United States may “at least moderate the tendency” of bias “toward 
features of Western religions.”254  Both Peñalver and Ingber also 
worry that the open-endedness of Greenawalt’s approach is not 
sufficient to guide judges in making these determinations.  Ingber 
claims that “without the ability to identify necessary and sufficient 
characteristics, courts would have no articulable basis for 
distinguishing between religious and nonreligious beliefs.”255  
Ingber concludes that “[e]ach court thus is left to determine sui 
generis which beliefs qualify as ‘religious’ on the basis of whether 
or not they ‘feel’ religious.”256  He dismisses Greenawalt’s approach 
as “not legal in nature.”257  Peñalver and Anand Agneshwar level a 
similar complaint, that Greenawalt’s definition does “nothing to 
constrain the decisionmaking processes of individual judges.  They 
would leave each judge completely free to determine whether or not 
a belief system is a religion according to the presence or absence of 
any single characteristic (or combination of characteristics) the 
judge chooses.”258 
Ingber, Peñalver, and Agneshwar go too far.  A prototype 
analysis does not devolve automatically into completely unbridled 
discretion.  As noted above, even where no single characteristic is 
252 KOPPELMAN, supra note 12 at 44; see also Koppelman, supra note 60 at 
880. 
253 Peñalver, supra note 6 at 815. 
254 GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 140 & n.57.  See also Lupu, supra note 159 
at 358 (“This methodology creates risks of discrimination against new faiths.”). 
255 Ingber, supra note 6 at 274. 
256 Id. 
257 Id.  This criticism is unfair.  A test need not be essentialist to be “legal.”  
First-year law students learn that “[p]roperty law has long recognized that 
property is a ‘bundle of rights.’”  Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: 
Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 
637, 660 n.79 (2013).  See also United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) 
(noting that “property” may be composed of a collection of individual rights 
which may be found in various combinations); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 
710, 746 (1917) (“‘Property’ . . . consists of a complex aggregate of rights (or 
claims), privileges, powers, and immunities.”). 
258 Peñalver, supra note 6 at 816.  See also Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 316-
17 (“The judge, in essence, is free to impose his or her own view of what should 
count as religion.  This standard will lead courts to take practices of familiar 
religions as the ‘norm.’”). 
142
essential, judges will still employ implicit understandings of what 
religion generally entails to arrive at a conclusion in a particular 
case.259  Moreover, Greenawalt’s prototype analysis may be more 
sensitive to religion as an element of culture or as lived experience, 
apart from its capacity to be linguistically compartmentalized.  As 
Charles Taylor has noted, sometimes “the ‘rule’ lies essentially in 
the practice.  The rule is what is animating the practice at any given 
time, and not some formulation behind it.”260 
That said, fair criticisms have been leveled at both Choper and 
Greenawalt’s approaches.  On the whole, each is subject to the same 
general limitations and problems to which the type of definition 
each proposes is generally subject.  Choper’s essentialist definition 
is too narrow, oversimplifies its object, and views religion from a 
Western, Christian, belief-based perspective.  Greenawalt’s 
approach is vague, permits judges a great deal of discretion, allows 
for the possibility of inconsistent results, and merely moves the 
question of Western bias from the definition itself to the selection of 
the prototype and the determination of salient characteristics.  In 
light of the difficulties in defining religion generally, and especially 
as a legal term of art, perhaps the better solution is to avoid relying 
on the religion clauses in the first place where it is possible to do 
so.261 
 
V. Avoidance Strategies 
 
A. Dual Definitions 
 
One attempt to avoid the difficulty, suggested initially by 
Lawrence Tribe and, later, a student writer in the Harvard Law 
Review, was to define religion differently in the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause.  Tribe, writing in 1978, 
suggested that a more expansive understanding of religion in the 
free exercise context was necessary to accommodate the growing 
number of “recognizably legitimate” forms of religion, while a 
narrower understanding of religion under the establishment clause 
was necessary to preserve “humane” government programs from 
259 See Farré, supra note 23 at 6; SALER, supra note 2 at 76; Durham & Sewell, 
supra note 6 at 26-27. 
260 KOPPELMAN, supra note 12 at 44 (quoting Charles Taylor, To Follow a 
Rule, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS (1995)). 
261 I do not mean to suggest that we should continue to rely on the religion 
clauses without defining religion, as discussed supra at Part III.B.4.b.  I am 
suggesting that we avoid the need to rely on the clauses where they can be 
avoided by seeking resolution of claims under other provisions of law without 
reaching the need to address that claim under the religion clauses. 
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being constitutionally impermissible.262  Tribe’s proposal was to 
treat anything “arguably religious” as religious under the Free 
Exercise Clause, and anything “arguably non-religious” as not 
religious for purposes of the Establishment Clause.263  The Harvard 
Note suggested that a bifurcated definition would “respond more 
sensitively to the values underlying the religion clauses,” would 
“perform[] the heuristic function of distinguishing and highlighting 
the purposes of each clause” and would “reduce the analytic tension 
between those clauses” thereby minimizing any judicial concern 
with spillover from one clause to another.264  
Overtly defining religion differently for the two clauses, 
however, has always been controversial, most obviously because the 
word “religion” appears in the First Amendment only once.265  As 
Justice Rutledge observed, “The word governs two prohibitions and 
governs them alike.  It does not have two meanings, one narrow to 
forbid ‘an establishment’ and another, much broader, for securing 
‘the free exercise thereof.’  ‘Thereof’ brings down ‘religion’ with its 
entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the 
second guaranty.”266   
Additionally, defining religion differently in the two clauses 
would create a three-tiered system of ideas:  
 
those that are unquestionably religious and thus both free 
from government interference and barred from receiving 
government support; those that are unquestionably non-
religious and thus subject to government regulation and 
eligible receive government support; and those that are only 
religious [for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause] and 
thus free from governmental regulation but open to receipt 
of government support.267 
 
Thus, borderline religious beliefs and new religious movements 
would be in a more advantageous position than old, well-established 
religions.268  In other words, the dual definition approach “clearly 
discriminates against traditional religion” because what may be 
262 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 826 (1st 
ed. 1978). 
263 Id. at 828. 
264 Note, supra note 6 at 1085-86. 
265 Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 14.  See also U.S. Const. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit 
the free exercise thereof.”). 
266 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
267 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring). 
268 Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 14; Feofanov, supra note 6 at 338-39; 
Ingber, supra note 6 at 288-91; Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in 
First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 834-35 (1984). 
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conventionally viewed as secular beliefs may win free exercise 
protection without corresponding establishment limitations.269  This 
would be “free from governmental regulation but open to receipt of 
government support.”270   
Finally, several authors have suggested that two definitions may 
be unnecessary because the legal tests for each clause differ, and the 
Establishment Clause focuses more on the conduct of the 
government than the nature of a group claiming a privilege or 
exemption.271  Indeed, the Supreme Court may already understand 
“religion” more narrowly in the establishment context.272  In the 
face of this criticism, Tribe “withdrew his suggestion from the 
subsequent edition of his hornbook.”273   
 
B. Free Exercise as Free Speech 
 
A more promising avenue, at least for free exercise cases,274 is 
to avoid the need to define religion by instead evaluating the case 
under the Free Speech Clause.  “Since at least 1890, the free 
exercise clause has been construed to protect forms of public 
expression, as well as the mere possession of religious belief.”275  
“The freedom of expression and association guarantees of the first 
amendment impose some significant, albeit as yet sketchily defined, 
limitations on the government’s ability to support, or require citizens 
to support, particular beliefs or groups.”276 
Many, perhaps all, religious activities are a form of expression, 
and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause.277  Choper has 
observed that “almost all decisions of the Supreme Court that have 
269 Agneshwar, supra note 205 at 312.   
270 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (Adams, J., concurring). 
271 Durham & Sewell, supra note 6 at 15 (collecting authority). 
272 Galanter, supra note 156 at 265. 
273 Ricks, supra note 7 at 1059 n.22. 
274 Some Establishment Clause claims may also raise Free Speech issues, such 
as blasphemy legislation, but there is a more substantial overlap between Free 
Exercise and Free Speech protections.  See GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 152. 
275 Merel, supra note 6 at 819. 
276 Choper, supra note 6 at 610. 
277 GREENAWALT, supra note 1 at 29 (“The right to engage in religious 
expression involves both free speech and free exercise”) & 230 (citing Marshall, 
supra note 40 at 392-401).  See also SULLIVAN, supra note 8 at 149 (noting that 
many religious activities are protected by the Free Speech clause); Alan 
Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech 
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 121 (2002) (“[m]any 
religious activities have an expressive dimension.”); Choper, supra note 6 at 581 
(“Under well developed constitutional principles, however, most free exercise 
cases either could have been, or were in fact, resolved under constitutional 
provisions other than either of the religion clause.”); Merel, supra note 6 at 820 
(“The coextensiveness of the free speech and free exercise provisions is strongly 
suggested in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wooley v. Maynard.”). 
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vindicated individual rights by invoking the Free Exercise Clause 
would just as easily have been resolved under other provisions of the 
Constitution and thus require no definition of religion at all.”278  
And in fact, “[s]ometimes the Court has bracketed the two freedoms 
[religion and speech] together to make them functionally equivalent. 
. . [this] is so common that it has led one commentator to conclude 
that free exercise has no independent content—that all religious 
liberty claims can be solved as free speech claims in disguise.”279  
William Marshall has gone so far as to suggest that the only 
consistency in the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence is its 
“extraordinary reluctance to vindicate free exercise claims outside 
those protected under the speech clause.”280 Alan Brownstein 
similarly observes that “when we scrutinize case law during [the 
1990s], most of the protection provided religious activity occurred 
under the auspices of the Free Speech Clause, not the Free Exercise 
Clause.”281 
Marshall has also suggested that freedom of religion issues 
might benefit from being subject to a Speech Clause analysis, and 
notes several cases in which the overlap was substantial.282 
Analyzing ostensibly religious claims under a Free Exercise rubric is 
not new.  As early as 1943, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
compulsory flag-salute requirement that conflicted with the religious 
tenets of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The Court framed the issue as a 
matter of speech, regardless of the underlying religious basis for the 
objection,283 and concluded that the First Amendment as a whole 
was intended to “reserve from all official control” “the sphere of 
intellect and spirit.”284 
 Unlike Brownstein, however, Marshall advocates for 
construing free exercise as a subset of speech.285  Public prayer and 
proselytization are literally speech; other religious practices 
278 CHOPER, supra note 237 at 64. 
279 Garvey, supra note 60 at 782 (citing William P. Marshall, Solving the Free 
Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983)). 
280 William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled 
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE WESTERN U.L. REV. 357, 366 (1989).  See 
also Marshall, supra note 279 at 545-56 (“Indeed, the relationship between 
religious exercise and expression is so extensive that in nearly all cases in which 
the Court has sustained a litigant’s religious objections to a religiously neutral law 
or regulation, it has done so with reference to freedom of expression.”). 
281 Brownstein, supra note 277 at 143. 
282 Marshall, supra note 40 at 392-93 (citing Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 115 
S. Ct. 2510 (1995); Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd v. Pinette, 115 U.S. 
2440 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940)). 
283 Marshall, supra note 280 at 364 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1943)).   
284 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
285 Marshall, supra note 279 at 546. 
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including observing dietary norms, standards of grooming and dress, 
and participation in rituals contain a communicative element.286  If 
nothing else, it communicates to co-religionists the commitment of 
the individual, and may identify the individual to outsiders.287  Thus, 
Marshall contends, construing free exercise as a subset of speech 
would avoid the need to draw lines between religious belief and 
nonreligious ideologies or communities because such government 
compulsion is prohibited “whether or not their teachings or tenets 
are generally considered to be ‘religious.’”288 
“[T]he subsuming of religion under the rubric of speech[] has 
been accepted largely uncritically,”289 and Brownstein contends that 
“[e]valuating burdens on religious practices as the regulation of 
speech has some virtues, but the problems with this approach may 
outweigh its benefits.”290  He contends that “[f]ree speech doctrine 
undercuts Establishment Clause holdings in two key respects.  First 
speech doctrine is grounded on a non-discrimination principle that 
precludes, or at least requires a compelling justification for, treating 
one message differently from another because of its communicative 
impact. . . . Second, free speech doctrine is conventionally 
understood and accepting a more limited understanding of state 
action than Establishment Clause cases recognize.”291  
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that 
(with two narrow exceptions) “the exercise of religion received no 
constitutional protection against neutral laws of general 
applicability.”292  Brownstein views Smith as insufficiently 
protective of religious freedom and suggests that post-Smith, the 
general application of rational-basis review has shifted the 
protection of religious liberty to Congress and state legislatures.  In 
this context, where protection of religious freedom by the political 
branches has become more important than it previously was, 
“conceptualizing religion as speech . . . creates a particularly 
difficult issue for legislative accommodations and exemptions of 
religious practice.”293  In other words, after Smith, if free exercise is 
speech, then statutory religious exemptions become difficult to 
justify and uphold. “[A]n expansive vision of the religion as speech 
286 Choper, supra note 6 at 582 (“[T]here is no doubt that most rituals, rites, or 
ceremonies of religious worship—such as fasting, confessing, or performing a 
mass—that may be denominated as constituting ‘action’ rather than ‘belief’ or 
‘expression,’ fall squarely within the protection the Court has afforded to 
nonverbal ‘symbolic speech.’”).   
287 Brownstein, supra note 277 at 121. 
288 Choper, supra note 6 at 610. 
289 Brownstein, supra note 277 at 120. 
290 Id. at 120. 
291 Id. at 145. 
292 Brownstein, supra note 277 at 138 (citing Employment Div., Dep’t of 
Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)). 
293 Brownstein, supra note 277 at 164. 
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that is subsumed under and protected by the Free Speech Clause 
precludes the adoption of many religion-only exemptions and 
accommodations and requires more even-handed treatment between 
religious and secular beliefs and viewpoints.”294   
Brownstein concedes, however, that “there is enough of a 
speech dimension to many religious activities, and religions play an 
important enough role in the marketplace of ideas” to suggest that 
religion should be characterized as speech and protected under the 
Free Speech clause “sometimes” and “with caution.”295  In short, 
“most violations of the free exercise protection may be vindicated 
without reference to the free exercise clause and thus require no 
constitutional definition of ‘religion’ at all.”296 
“Any judge faces two sets of choices in a case.  First she must 
decide how to resolve each of the issues before her.  Second, she 
must also decide the order in which she will resolve these issues.”297  
This “decisional sequence is critical in several respects.”298  A busy 
judge may discuss the simplest theory, issue a judgment, and decide 
not to reach the alternatives.  A more thorough judge may wish to 
discuss each alternative, investing more time initially, but hedging 
against the possibility that an appellate court might disagree with her 
view of a single basis for disposition.  “Presently, no doctrine 
constrains the judge’s discretion to choose” when deciding whether 
to discuss one outcome-dispositive legal theory among several, or 
multiple independently dispositive legal theories.299 
James Boyd White has suggested that “‘the wisest position for 
the law is a frank recognition that it cannot understand or represent 
religious experience with anything like fullness or accuracy.’”300  At 
294 Id. at 169.  The passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-
4), which intended to re-establish the pre-Smith standard of review, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb(b)(1), only partially alleviates Brownstein’s concerns.  The Supreme 
Court held the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states, City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997), but continues to enforce it against the federal 
government, Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficiente União do Vegetal, 548 
U.S. 418, 423-24 (2006).  See generally, Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby 
Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 161-62 (2014). 
295 Id. at 182. 
296 Choper, supra note 6 at 581. 
297 Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). 
298 Id. at 3. 
299 Id. at 21. 
300 Augsburg, supra note 8 at 293 (quoting WHITE, supra note 10 at 130).  See 
also Jamal & Panjwani, supra note 8 at 76: 
 
When courts cannot avoid dealing with religious definitions, however, they 
must encounter the fact that they are very ill-equipped to make such 
determinations for two reasons: (1) legally, because rights to freedom of 
religion are subjectively defined and based, ultimately, on individual 
perception and conviction, without there being any sort of objective metric 
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least in some cases, the Free Speech Clause may provide a way for a 
court to adjudicate religiously-based claims without having to 
attempt to understand or define religion or religious experience.  
And given that judges generally have discretion to tackle issues in 
the order that seems best, when there is a nonfrivolous claim or 
defense in a Free Exercise case that places a party’s status as a 
religion in question, judges should first analyze the claim under the 




“The First Amendment . . . is more than an exercise in social 
engineering.  It is an imported cultural symbol in the society that 
helps define who we are as a nation.”301  But its neutral application 
requires us to recall that “law is embedded in and indissociable from 
its cultural context . . . far from being neutral it is ideologically 
grounded in politically weighty presuppositions.”302  Therefore, 
“any account of religious freedom will necessarily depend on—and 
hence will stand or fall along with—more basic background beliefs 
concerning matters of religion and theology.”303  Critical and 
informed reflection on the idea of religion itself is necessary to fairly 
apply a legal category of “religion.”304  Any attempt to define 
religion fairly must account for the tendency of judges and courts to 
view “religion” through a Protestant lens focused on belief, as well 
as the origin of the idea of religion itself in Christian apologetics. 
But attempts to define “religion” for legal purposes suffer from 
the same limitations as attempts to define religion for other 
purposes, along with many of the same disabilities faced by 
definitions generally.  While some attempts may be better suited to 
particular contexts, or more sensitive to particular concerns, 
definitions of religion as a whole are uniformly inadequate.305  
that the courts could use to assess religious definition; and (2) 
sociologically, because there is no way to interrogate a religious tradition as 
to its terms, meanings, or definitions since religious traditions can speak 
only through individual adherents. 
301 Marshall, supra note 40 at 402. 
302 Margaret Davies, Pluralism in Law and Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN 
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 72-99, 72 (Peter Cane et al., eds. 2008). 
303 SMITH, supra note 8 at 63. 
304 Berger, supra note 64 at 42 (“Meaningful study of the relationship between 
law and religion also resists disciplinary boundaries, inviting and perhaps 
demanding the insights of history, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology.”). 
305 Jamal & Panjwani, supra note 8 at 76: 
 
When courts cannot avoid dealing with religious definitions, however, they 
must encounter the fact that they are very ill-equipped to make such 
determinations for two reasons: (1) legally, because rights to freedom of 
religion are subjectively defined and based, ultimately, on individual 
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Although it is far from a complete solution, shifting the inquiry, 
where possible, to the Free Speech Clause alleviates some of the 
pressure on the religion clauses to define religion.  At the same time, 
“religious studies can help lawyers and judges to acknowledge the 
religiousness of Americans without establishing it—by recognizing 
the instability of religion as a category for American law.”306 
perception and conviction, without there being any sort of objective metric 
that the courts could use to assess religious definition; and (2) 
sociologically, because there is no way to interrogate a religious tradition 
as to its terms, meanings, or definitions since religious traditions can speak 
only through individual adherents. 
 
306 Sullivan, supra note 29 at 442. 
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RELIGION, CONSCIENCE, AND BELIEF IN THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Aaron R. Petty* 
 
Religions are not treated equally by the law; religion is not 
absent from the substance of the law.† 
 
Europe is suffused with Christianity, or at least memories 




Historically, Europeans have not always been especially kind to 
each other, especially when there are religious differences between 
them.  Religion has been the cause of controversy and war in Europe 
for centuries.1  The last hundred years alone has seen attempts at 
exterminating substantial parts of populations identified by their 
religious difference: Armenian Christians, Ashkenazi Jews, and 
Bosnian Muslims have all faced systemic state-sponsored violence.  
Indeed, some European states exist as the result of “violent conflicts 
that once had their origins in religious enmity.”2  But the history of 
religion in Europe is not wholly dark.  Partly in response to this 
history of bloodshed, the modern notion of human rights developed 
in Europe as well.  “[T]he charter myth of modern law . . . describes 
a progressive growth of freedom, above all freedom of and from 
religion, following the European wars of religion that took place in 
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School, 2007; M.St., University of Cambridge, 2012; Ph.D. candidate, University 
of Leiden.  
† Anthony Bradney, Faced by Faith, in FAITH IN LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
THEORY 89-105, 89 (Peter Oliver, et al. eds., 2000). 
‡ Andrew Higgins, A More Secular Europe, Divided by the Cross, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2013, at A1. 
1 Gordon A. Christenson, “Liberty of the Exercise of Religion” in the Peace of 
Westphalia, 21 TRANS. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 721, 722 (2013) (“Violence and 
the wars of religion before and after the Protestant Reformation and Catholic 
Counter-Reformation, in particular, exhausted Europe. . . . [and afterward] 
sectarian violence actually increased inside states from 1550 to 1750.”).  See also 
Mark Weston Janis, The Shadow of Westphalia: Majoritarian Religions and 
Strasbourg Law, 4 OX. J.L. REL. 75, 75 (2015) (“From the Roman Empire to our 
times, the Continent has witnessed one after another fierce religious struggle.”); 
BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE 
PRACTICE OF TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 2-7 (2007). 
2 Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis, Introduction: Freedom of Religion and Belief—
The Contemporary Context, in RELIGION, RIGHTS AND SECULAR SOCIETY: 




the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”3  But while religion was 
the cause of conflict, the idea of human rights as a means to control 
and prevent conflict drew heavily upon religious ideas as well. 
Today, Europe’s relationship with religion remains “a 
complicated matter.”4  Within many states, “religion itself has been 
a formative element in the creation of the national identities.”5  At 
the same time, however, “Europe has long been religiously and 
culturally diverse,”6 and this diversity prompts continuing debate 
over the proper role of religion in European integration.7  
“Especially since the terrorist outrages of 9/11—and in Europe 
itself, 11 March 2004 in Madrid and 7 July 2005 in London—there 
has been something of a moral panic not just about jihadist Islam but 
more generally about the role of religion in public life.”8  
The Maastricht Treaty calls for European nations to “‘contribute 
to the flowering of the cultures of the member states . . . and at the 
same time bring[] the common cultural heritage to the fore.’”9  Is 
that common heritage “rooted in religion as claimed by some?”10   
 
3 Robert Yelle, Moses’ Veil: Secularization as Christian Myth, in AFTER 
SECULAR LAW, 23-42, 23 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, et al. eds., 2011). 
4 Cumper & Lewis, supra note 2 at 1 (internal quotation omitted). 
5 Id. at 6. See also id. (“there seems little doubt that Christianity has had a 
considerable impact on European public life, as illustrated by the fact that 
Europe’s working week and public holidays tend to be reflective of the Christian 
calendar.”). 
6 Lourdes Peroni, On Religious and Cultural Equality in European Human 
Rights Convention Law, 32 NETH. Q. HUMAN RTS. 231, 231 (2014); see also 
Silvio Ferrari, Law and Religion in Europe, in RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
CHALLENGES AND TRANSFORMATIONS 149-59, 149 (Lisbet Christoffersen, et al. 
eds., 2010) (“Religious plurality is a well-known fact in Europe.”). 
7 Cumper & Lewis, supra note 2 at 6 (“there exists a kaleidoscope of diversity 
on the status of religion in European societies”); Lucian N. Leustean & John T.S. 
Madeley, Introduction, in RELIGION, POLITICS AND LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1-16, 1 (Lucian N. Leustean & John T.S. Madeley, eds., 2010) (“[A] number of 
the most controversial issues associated with the ongoing project of European 
integration have indeed involved deep disagreement about the role of religion in 
politics and public life.”). 
8 Leustean & Madeley, supra note 7 at 6.  Jihadist Islam, however, remains at 
the forefront of the public discussion.  See Paul Cliteur, et al., The New 
Censorship: A Case Study of Extrajudicial Restraints on Free Speech, in 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER ATTACK 291-315 (Afshin Ellian & Gelijn Molier, 
eds. 2015).  And given the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015 and the 
attempted train shooting in August 2015, this appears unlikely to change in the 
near-term.  See also Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 744 (2011) (“Since 
2001, the Article 9 jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has 
raised anew the question of the relationship between religion and the public 
order.”). 
9 Lucia Faltin, Introduction: The Religious Roots of Contemporary European 
Identity, in THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN IDENTITY, 1-
13, 6 n.14 (Lucia Faltin & Melanie J. Wright, eds., 2007). 
10 Leustean & Madeley, supra note 7 at 1. 
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Many would see Europe’s Christian roots as an obvious necessary 
element of European identity, shaping even secular or “post-
Christian” society.11  The question, then, is how to resolve the 
tension between Europe’s Christian roots, its current diversity, and 
the ambition of liberal states to avoid discriminating in matters of 
religion.  More than half a century ago, the ratification of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) was 
a notable, but incomplete, step toward resolution.  To move forward 
we must now ask whether Europe “can attend to human rights 
claims arising from this cultural and religious diversity in more 
inclusive and egalitarian ways.”12 
Here, I suggest that a more critical view toward the notion of 
“religion” under Article 9 by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR or Court) would take an important step toward a more 
inclusive and egalitarian human rights jurisprudence.  In other work, 
I have shown that “religion” as a legal term of art is generally 
understood by judges to refer primarily to belief, and that this 
understanding privileges Christianity (specifically Protestant 
Christianity, and to a lesser extent other confessional religions such 
as Islam) at the expense of others, such as Judaism and Hinduism,13 
11 Grace Davie, Understanding Religion in Europe: A Continually Evolving 
Mosaic, in RELIGION, RIGHTS AND SECULAR SOCIETY: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 
251-270, 253 (Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis, eds., 2012) (“The role of Christianity 
in shaping European culture is undisputed.”); Camil Ungureanu, Europe and 
Religion: An Ambivalent Nexus, in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW 
EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS 307-333, 309 (Lorenzo Zucca & Camil 
Ungureanu eds., 2012) (“The history of Europe and Christianity are inextricably 
intertwined.”); Danchin, supra note 8 at 689 (quoting Charles Hirschkind, 
Religious Difference and Democratic Pluralism: Some Recent Debates and 
Frameworks, 44 TEMENOS 123, 126 (2008)) (“‘Christian heritage is essential to 
the civilizational identity of Europe.’”)). 
Additionally, this dissonance can be seen in “[t]he quarrel over the exclusion 
of Christianity’s contribution to Europe’s heritage in the proposed European 
constitutional treaty[, which] sparked much debate and commentary.  A reference 
to Christianity was absent from the initial draft of the preamble, which claimed 
that modern European civilization’s values of freedom, equality of persons, 
reason, and the rule of law were derived from Europe’s classical heritage and the 
Enlightenment.  European governments and the late Pope John Paul II raised 
voices of dissent and argued that this represented an attempt by European 
intellectuals and European political leaders to airbrush fifteen hundred years of 
Christian history from Europe’s political memory and was tantamount to ‘an 
exercise in self-afflicted amnesia.’”  See Paul E. Kerry, The Quarrel over the 
Religious Roots of European Identity in the European Constitution and the Nature 
of Historical Explanation: A Catholic Coign of Vantage, in THE RELIGIOUS 
ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN IDENTITY, 168-178, 168 (Lucia Faltin & 
Melanie J. Wright, eds., 2007). 
12 Peroni, supra note 6 at 231.  If nothing else, familiarity with the foundations 
of religious identity in Europe is required for informed discourse in confronting 
ideological extremism.  Faltin, supra note 9 at 2. 
13 I recognize the terms are anachronistic, but for present purposes they are 
sufficient to convey the meaning I intend. 
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that place greater emphasis on community, practice, ethics, or 
ritual.14 
In this paper, I suggest that the notion of “religion” as the term 
is used in Article 9, and as applied by the Court (and previously by 
the European Commission of Human Rights) is biased in favor of 
Christianity. As Timothy Macklem observes, “[w]e are concerned 
here, not to know how the term religion is used, whether in the 
world at large or in the legal community, but to know how the term 
religion should be used, in the interpretation, the application, and the 
justification of a fundamental freedom.”15 
In Part II, I begin by reviewing the position of religion in 
Europe and the special role of religion in the origin of the 
Westphalian system, the emergence of liberalism and, ultimately, 
modern human rights.  In Part III, I turn to the specific right at issue, 
that of religion or belief under the ECHR.  I discuss the origin of the 
Convention, review the structure of the Court and Commission it 
created, and take account of the analytical approach applied in 
addressing claims arising under Article 9.   
Part IV suggests that Christian bias may be observed both in the 
terms of the Convention itself, and in its application by the Court.  I 
begin in Part IV.A with text of the Convention and its traveaux 
préparatoires. I suggest that in addition to the overt religious 
statements of some of the participants in the drafting process, the 
final language used in the text of the Convention introduces 
inequality between religions based on the relative centrality of belief 
by tacitly equating religion with “belief” and with a similarly vague 
and belief-based notion of “conscience.” 
Part IV.B discusses how the Court has exacerbated the 
problems inherent in the convention through Court-made doctrines.  
Part IV.B.1 addresses the forum internum and forum externum, a 
historical theological dialectic the Commission repurposed as a legal 
doctrine.  Here, I suggest that the broad notion of “religion” 
evidenced by some of the Commission’s decisions is seriously 
undermined by the Court’s focus on the forum internum, although 
this could be improved with more nuanced understanding.  Part 
IV.B.2 suggests that other general doctrines the Court follows, 
including the margin of appreciation, consensus, and subsidiarity 
combine to make both a pan-European understanding of religion, 
and judicial remedies for wronged individuals difficult to obtain.  
14 Aaron R. Petty, Accommodating “Religion”, 83 TENN. L. REV. ___, 1-2 & 
5-8 (forthcoming 2016); Aaron R. Petty, The Concept of “Religion” in the 
Supreme Court of Israel, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 211, 254-59 (2014); Aaron R. 
Petty, “Faith, However Defined”: Reassessing JFS and the Judicial Conception of 
“Religion”, 6 ELON L. REV. 117, 135-42 (2014). 
15 Timothy Macklem, Reason and Religion, in FAITH IN LAW: ESSAYS IN 
LEGAL THEORY 69-87, 70 (Peter Oliver, et al. eds., 2000). 
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Part IV.B.3 discusses difficulties in defining religion under Article 
9. 
Part V steps outside of the European perspective to reflect on 
how the current ECHR system reflects a Western and ultimately 
Christian understanding of religion, and suggests that this 
understanding is inherently in tension with the liberal human-rights 
objective of protecting freedom of religion.  Both the modern 
Westphalian state and modern international law—including 
principles of religious freedom—were founded on the understanding 
that religion was primarily a private, internal matter of belief.  The 
protection of freedom of religion by the state is therefore subject to, 
if not contingent on, the degree to which the religion in question 
resembles Protestant Christianity.  Part VI offers a brief conclusion. 
 
II. EUROPE, THE WESTPHALIAN STATE, AND THE 
ORIGIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
A. Religion in Europe 
 
The significance of Christianity in modern Europe is both 
formative and unifying and, simultaneously, marginalized in a 
continuing march toward secularization.  From an American 
perspective, “[i]n a continent divided by many languages, vast 
differences of culture and economic gaps . . . centuries of 
Christianity provide a rare element shared by all of the . . . members 
of the fractious union.”16  American journalists are hardly alone in 
this view.  To the contrary, Western Christianity as a sine qua non of 
European identity is long standing:   
 
The first time medieval chroniclers described an event as 
‘European’ was the victory of Christian Frankish forces 
over a Muslim army at Poitiers in 732 . . . with the crusades 
of the eleventh century, Western Christianity became 
synonymous with a European identity which defined itself 
against the Islamic and Byzantine Orthodox Christian 
civilizations to its south and east.17 
 
Europe “split up into Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox 
communities, with dividing lines that frequently crossed the same 
town or the same region.  But this plurality was contained within a 
16 Higgins, supra note ‡ at A1.  
17 RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 18 (2010).  This continues today, as “some prominent Christian Democrats 
. . . have objected [that] Turkey’s strong Islamic heritage prevents it from sharing 
core Christian values which they insist underlie the whole EU construct.”  
Leustean & Madeley, supra note 7 at 9. 
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shared horizon, defined by reference to the same sacred books.”18  
In more recent years, “[t]his common horizon has become 
progressively weaker” due to “immigration, which brought into 
Europe an increasing number of people who do not know and do not 
share some central features of the European cultural heritage” and 
“individualism, which questions assumptions that used to be taken 
for granted.”19   
On the side of individualism, or liberalism more generally, one 
can see that “[f]rom 1973, when the Copenhagen Declaration on 
European Identity was promulgated, the fundamental elements 
which were identified as corresponding to the ‘deepest aspirations’ 
of Europe’s people were presented in political, legal and 
philosophical terms without prejudice to cultural specificities,” 
which is to say, without express reference to a shared Christian 
heritage.20  Some have claimed that this “failure to acknowledge the 
historic debt can be traced directly to a ‘Christophobic’ mind-set 
which is all of a piece with the progressive marginalisation of 
religious influences in Europe’s public life.”21 
But neither religion generally nor Christianity in particular have 
disappeared even as recognition for its role in European identity and 
culture has been withdrawn. “Religious institutions retain important 
roles in areas such as healthcare and education in almost all [EU] 
Member States, while many states retain official links to particular 
Christian denominations which remain an important element of 
national identities.”22  Moreover, the incorporation of states 
formerly members of the Warsaw Pact has changed the landscape as 
well, and not necessarily in ways that mesh seamlessly with the 
more secular states of Western Europe.23  In short, “at a time when 
18 Ferrari, supra note 6 at 149. “Of course, Jewish and Muslim communities 
have been living in Europe for a long time.  The Jews, however, were faced early 
on with the alternative between assimilation or persecution (and they chose the 
first, without avoiding the second), and the Muslims were confined to a peripheral 
region of Europe after the Catholic ‘reconquista’ of Spain in the fifteenth century. 
As a consequence, religious plurality in Europe has been predominantly intra-
Christian.”  Id. at 149. 
19 Id. In addition, “[t]here is a widespread intolerance of Islam, a re-emergence 
of anti-semitism, and heavily majoritarian cultures, often hostile to minority 
faiths, all over.”  Janis, supra note 1 at 76. 
20 Leustean & Madeley, supra note 7 at 6. 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 MCCREA, supra note 17 at 17.  At least a dozen European states formally 
establish a religion.  Janis, supra note 1 at 80. 
23 “The increase in the significance of religious factors for the explanation and 
interpretation of social, political, and international conflicts and changes also 
applies to Europe, which has changed greatly as a result of the collapse of state 
socialism and the re-entry of Eastern and Central European countries into 
European history.  In particular, the increased status in Eastern Europe of national 
churches, religious movements, and ethnic conflicts within the religious sphere is 
obvious.”  Detlaf Pollack et al., Church and Religion in the Enlarged Europe: 
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Europe needs solidarity and a unified sense of purpose to grapple 
with its seemingly endless economic crisis, religion has instead 
become yet another source of discord.”24 
 
B. The State 
 
Modern Western notions of religious liberty begin with the 
separation of political and religious authority.  Some have claimed 
that “[t]he Western tradition of church-state separation and religious 
freedom is often, and properly, traced back to the dualistic teaching 
of the New Testament, succinctly expressed in Jesus’ admonition to 
‘[r]ender . . . unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s, and unto 
God the things which be God’s.’”25  More immediately, though, the 
role of religion as separate from and generally subordinate to the 
state stems from the Investiture Controversies of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries and the Peace of Westphalia at the conclusion of 
the thirty years’ war in 1648.  “[S]ystematic theorizing about the 
relation between church and state began in earnest with the so-called 
Investiture Controversy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.”26  
The result was that the largely exclusive jurisdictional spheres for 
temporal and spiritual rulers that emerged from the controversy 
“distinguished European civilisation from the Caesaro-Papism of the 
Eastern Orthodox Church and Islamic approaches which did not 
differentiate between the religious and political domains.”27 
Once separated from the authority of temporal rulers, dissident 
religious views could be tolerated without threatening the political 
order.   The Peace of Westphalia “tolled the bell both on the 
Catholic Church’s pretension to be the common faith of Western 
Europe.”28  The Treaty of Münster (one of the constituent treaties of 
the Peace of Westphalia) guaranteed individuals “the free Exercise 
of their Religion, as well in publick Churches at the appointed 
Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for this 
purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their Neighbours, 
preaching the Word of God.”29  “[T]he non-established religious 
Analyses of the Social Significance of Religion in East and West, in THE SOCIAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION IN THE ENLARGED EUROPE: SECULARIZATION, 
INDIVIDUALIZATION, AND PLURALIZATION 1-26, 1 (Detlaf Pollack, et al. eds., 
2012). 
24 Higgins, supra note ‡ at A1. 
25 Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious 
Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1873 (2009) (quoting Luke 20:25). 
26 Id. at 1873. 
27 MCCREA, supra note 17 at 18. 
28 Janis, supra note 1 at 76. 
29 Christenson, supra note 1 at 741 (quoting PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE 
HOLY ROMAN EMPEROR AND THE KING OF FRANCE AND THEIR RESPECTIVE 
ALLIES (Treaty of Münster) Oct. 24, 1648, 1 CTS 271, Art. XXVIII). 
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confessions, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, were given the 
right to assemble and worship as well as the right to educate their 
children in their own faith. Thus a principle of religious toleration 
was established between Lutherans, Calvinists, and Roman 
Catholics.”30   
Toleration of minority religions was a major turning point 
because “until the last few centuries, there was a general assumption 
that minority faiths and religious dissenters posed a threat to the 
very existence of the state.”31  The shift of religion from public to 
private life, as in Grotius’s phrase etsi Deus non daretur, was meant 
to “make possible the coexistence in the same country of subjects 
with a different religious faith” and put an end to the wars of 
religion that engulfed Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.32   
But toleration is a far cry from substantive neutrality.  Under 
this conception of religious toleration, “[t]he state is far from neutral 
about religious doctrine and practice in general, but the strategy of 
toleration in which certain doctrines previously vilified as heretical 
are treated instead as not threatening to public order provided they 
remain in their proper place.”33  But the “proper place” was in 
private, in the spiritual life, in the minds of individual believers.  It 
was not public, did not claim temporal power, and certainly did not 
endanger the religious justifications underpinning the legitimacy of 
temporal rulers.  Thus, “[t]he constitution of the modern state 
required the forcible redefinition of religion as belief, and of 
religious belief, sentiment, and identity as personal matters that 
belong to the newly emerging space of private (as opposed to 
public) life.”34  But while the banishment of religion to the life of 
30 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE 
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 101 (2003). 
31 Peter Cumper, The United Kingdom and the U.N. Declaration on the 
Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 21 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 13, 14 (2007). 
32 Ferrari, supra note 6 at 151. 
33 Janis, supra note 1 at 78 (internal quotation omitted).  See also Ungureanu, 
supra note 11 at 308 (“within this constitutional framework, the state is not 
‘purely’ neutral, but has a positive obligation to protect pluralism and enhance a 
culture of mutual tolerance, respect and dialogue amongst citizens.”). 
34 TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF 
POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 205 (1993); see also Suzanne Last Stone, 
Conflicting Visions of Political Space, in MAPPING THE BOUNDARIES OF LEGAL 
RELIGION: RELIGION AND MULTICULTURALISM FROM ISRAEL TO CANADA 41-55, 
41 (René Provost, ed., 2014) (“Keeping religion and politics apart is an idea with 
a history, and that history is primarily a Christian one, rooted in the experience of 
European Christendom and made possible because Christians, virtually from the 
beginning, viewed church and state as conceptually separate entities, with 
different jurisdictions and powers, and even a different logic.”); Richard Moon, 
Christianity, Multiculturalism, and National Identity: A Canadian Comment on 
Lautsi and Others v. Italy, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
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the mind made room for the modern state to claim a monopoly on 
temporal power, it did not entirely resolve the problem that 




Given that official pronouncements of religious toleration came 
into being in conjunction with the emergence of the modern liberal 
state from under the authority of the church, “Religious Freedom 
may be the oldest as well as the most problematic human right.”36  
The loss of political authority for the church led to “the gradual 
spiritualization of religion.”37  At the same time, official state 
toleration of dissenting beliefs required “the public sphere [be] 
reconceived in terms of a moral theory of justice and religious 
liberty grounded in a complex (and unstable) notion of freedom of 
conscience.”38  This new religious freedom was “premised on 
distinctive (Protestant) conceptions of the individual, freedom, and 
religion.”39  As a result, the privatization of religion became (and 
remains) a feature of the liberal state.40  Accordingly, “the neutrality 
of the public sphere (whether national or supranational) and the 
scope of the right to religious freedom should be understood as 
culturally and historically contingent and neutral toward neither 
religion in general nor distinct religious traditions in particular.”41  
But religious liberty is not, in practice, understood this way. Instead, 
“[t]he ‘secular’ nature of the modern European state and the 
‘secular’ character of European democracy serve as one of the 
foundational myths of the contemporary European identity.”42  
Prima facie official neutrality among religions is assumed, but 
religious liberty assumes a particular type of religion. 
 
REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 251 
(Jeroen Temperman, ed., 2012) (“State neutrality in matters of religion is possible 
only if religion can be treated simply as a private matter—as separable from the 
public concerns addressed by the state.”). 
35 Moon, supra note 34 at 243 
36 Janis, supra note 1 at 75 
37 Danchin, supra note 8 at 670  
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the 
Conflict of Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 252 (2008). 
41 Danchin, supra note 8 at 670 (“historically, secularism has entailed the 
regulation and reformation of religious beliefs, doctrines, and practices to yield a 
particular normative conception of religion (that is largely Protestant Christian in 
its contours)”).  See also Lourdes Peroni, Deconstructing “Legal” Religion in 
Strasbourg, 3 OX. J.L. REL. 235, 246 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). 
42 José Casanova, Religion Challenging the Myth of Secular Democracy, in 
RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CHALLENGES AND TRANSFORMATIONS 19-36, 21 
(Lisbet Christoffersen, et al. eds., 2010). 
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D. The Rise of International Law and Human Rights 
 
Human rights, another foundational element of contemporary 
European identity, has a clear religious heritage and sometimes even 
speaks in what could be heard as religious language.  As Zachary 
Calo observes, “[t]he idea of human rights, particularly the 
underlying idea of human dignity, is replete with echoes of the 
sacred.”43  And like some religious doctrines, “[h]uman rights are 
traditionally understood as . . . universal [and] . . . inalienable. . . .  
Almost by definition, they are supposed to be applicable everywhere 
and anytime, not to depend on a specific political system or 
culture.”44 Yet, again, much like the idea of religion,45 “the notion 
of religious freedom as an ‘international right’ has a particular 
history—a time and place of origin.”46  Human rights “have been 
slowly established and defined in a precise historical and cultural 
context, mainly in England and the United States, in the wake of the 
Enlightenment.”47 
Oliver Roy & Pasquale Annicchino suggest that the Christian 
origin of the idea of human rights is obvious:  
 
we can characterize this Christian anthropology through the 
following criteria: a human being is defined by an 
autonomous individual soul that is not under the control of 
the state or society, both entitled only to control the body; a 
‘for interieur’ (inner core, heart of hearts) that can 
deliberate for itself, the sacred nature of the body as a 
template of the divine creation; the equal dignity (in God, 
not in society) of all human beings; and free will.48   
 
Archbishop Rowan Williams adds that any inherent legal rights 
belonging to all people would “require[] both a certain valuation of 
the human as such and a conviction that the human subject is always 
43 Zachary R. Calo, Religion, Human Rights and Post-Secular Legal Theory, 
85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 495, 495 (2011). 
44 Oliver Roy & Pasquale Annicchino, Human Rights Between Religions, 
Cultures, and Universality, in THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-
25, 13 (Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, ed., 2013). 
45 Petty, Faith, supra note 14 at 254-57; Petty, Israel, supra note 14 at 135-42. 
46 Peter G. Danchin, The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in 
International Law Reconsidered, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 455, 456 (2007-08). 
47 Roy & Annicchino, supra note 44 at 13. 
48 Id. at 15.  See also Calo, supra note 43 at 496 (“There were many 
intellectual sources that shaped the idea of human rights, but none were more 
foundational than Christianity.”); Danchin, supra note 40 at 262 (“International 
human rights law imagines an internal or personal sphere of ‘belief’ that is in 
some sense pre- or extra-social, political, and legal and hence absolutely 
‘inviolable’ or ‘sovereign.’”). 
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endowed with some degree of freedom over against any and every 
actual system of human social life. Both of these things are 
historically rooted in Christian theology.”49 
But from the eighteenth century, European legal systems began 
to see themselves as “potentially universal,” pursuing the law of 
reason of the Enlightenment, unmoored from their Christian 
origins.50  The Christian foundations of the legal systems remained, 
of course, albeit silently. Even into the twentieth century, 
“religion—the history of Christianity, in particular—has been the 
dominant force in the formation and shaping of the international 
legal system.”51 As a result, “mainstream accounts of human rights 
in international law are insensitive, and in some cases even blind, to 
the communal dimensions of goods such as religion.”52  One place 
in which the silent influence Christianity is manifested is in Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
III. THE TREATY FRAMEWORK 
 
A. The Council of Europe 
 
The Council of Europe, founded in 1949, promotes cooperation 
among European countries in the areas of legal standards, human 
rights, democratic development, the rule of law, and advancement of 
culture.  The Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe 
affirmed “the need for greater unity between like-minded European 
countries for the sake of economic and social progress.”53  It exists 
entirely outside the European Union treaty framework (though all 
EU member states are also members of the CoE54) and the EU has 
recognized the CoE’s role in enforcing human rights throughout 
Europe.55 
49 Rowan Williams, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious 
Perspective, 10 ECC. L.J. 262, 272 (2008). 
50 Faltin, supra note 9 at 8 n.18 (citing JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHURCH, 
ECUMENISM AND POLITICS 224 (1987)). 
51 Id. at 501 
52 Danchin, supra note 46 at 460. 
53 Danny Nicol, Original Intent and the ECHR, [2005] PUBLIC LAW 152 at 
155. 
54 EU Relations with the Council of Europe, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/organisations/coe/index_en.htm. 
55 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Council of Europe and the 
European Union, para. 10 (May 23, 2007) (“The Council of Europe will remain 
the benchmark for human rights, the rule of law and democracy in Europe.”), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/international-relations/files/mou_2007_en.pdf 
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“[T]he first and principal achievement of the Council of 
Europe” was the European Convention on Human Rights.56  The 
Convention “was signed in 1950 and has been successively amended 
by several protocols.”57  It “was intended to build upon the work 
undertaken in the United Nations and aims at ‘securing the universal 
and effective recognition and observance of the rights’ contained in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”58   
 
B. The Origin of Article 9 
 
 As the ECHR aimed to implement the rights identified in the 
Universal Declaration, 59 it is appropriate to begin examination of 
Article 9 of the ECHR by reviewing its predecessor in the Universal 
Declaration, Article 18.  “Article 18 of the Universal Declaration is 
the primary article dealing with freedom of religion.”60  Article 18 
reads: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. 
 
Article 18 is limited by Article 29(2), which provides that: 
 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall 
be subject only to such limitations are as determined by law 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting 
the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration reflects “the basic 
approach that has been followed in most other international, and 
56 Javier Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587, 587 
(2005). 
57 Id. 
58 CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8 & 34 (2001) (“One of the purposes of the 
Convention, as set out in the Preamble, was to ‘take the first step for the collective 
enforcement of certain Rights stated in the Universal Declaration.”); see also 
PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF RELIGION: UN AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW AND PRACTICE 7 (2005). 
59 TAYLOR, supra note 58 at 7 (citing the Preamble to the European 
Convention). 
60 EVANS, supra note 58 at 35 
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many other regional, human rights instruments.  That approach is 
based on the idea that religion or belief is essentially a matter of 
individual choice and that everyone should have the freedom to hold 
whatever form of belief (religious or otherwise) that they wish.”61  
Following this approach, the text of Article 9 of the ECHR  
“was drawn almost verbatim from Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”62  And like Article 18, “Article 9 
recognizes the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and 
enumerates the limitations that may be imposed on the 
manifestations of this freedom.”63   
 
Article 9 provides: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.64 
 
Several observations may be made from the text of Article 9 
alone.  First, Article 9 contains “several overlapping terms” with 
“subtle distinctions.”  “Freedom to change one’s ‘religion or belief’ 
is singled out from the right of ‘freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion’ in Article 9(1).  The right under Article 9(2) to manifest 
one’s religion does not extend to manifesting one’s freedom of 
thought or conscience.”65  Second, “Article 9 protects religious 
61 Malcolm Evans, Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Agendas for 
Change, 1 OX. J.L. REL. 5, 8 (2012). 
62 T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, PART 2, 305-330, 308 (John Witte, Jr. & 
Johan D. van der Vyver, eds., 1996); see also TAYLOR, supra note 58 at 7. 
63 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 588.  Although “[t]hree provisions of the 
ECHR deal with religion,” id. at 587, I will address only Article 9. 
64 “[T]he limitations applicable to the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, as described in Article 9, are largely coincident with the limitations 
applicable to the freedoms protected by other Articles of the Convention, namely 
Articles 8, 10 and 11.”  Id. at 589. 
65 REX ADHAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 140 
(2d ed. 2013). 
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freedom as an individual right, but also as a group right; enjoyment 
of religious freedom comprises a right to manifest and practice the 
religion, alone or with others.”66  Third, “[i]n all cases, limitations 
on freedoms must be: 1) prescribed by law; 2) necessary in a 
democratic society; 3) proportionate to reach some of the aims 
itemized in par[agraph] 2 of the corresponding Article, which are the 
only legitimate aims within the ECHR framework.”67  How these 
overlapping concepts are given concrete meaning in individual cases 
is a task assigned to the Court. 
 
C. The European Court and Commission of Human Rights 
 
The interpretation and application of the Convention 
“corresponds, specifically and exclusively, to the European Court of 
Human Rights. . . located in Strasbourg, France, which has 
jurisdiction over every state that has signed the Convention,”68  and 
has been in operation since February 1959.69  “The ECHR system 
has been described, with justice, as the most effective human rights 
regime in the world.”70  
One reason for this level of prestige and success is that the 
judges of the Court are “recruited in a way which provides only a 
66 Mark Freedland & Lucy Vickers, Religious Expression in the Workplace in 
the United Kingdom, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 597, 602 (2009). 
67 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 589-90.  “With regard to freedom of 
religion or belief, the list of permissible aims is even narrower than with regard to 
other freedoms.  Id. at 590. 
68 Id. at 587. 
69 Brett G. Scharffs, Symposium Introduction: The Freedom of Religion and 
Belief Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Legal Moral, 
Political and Religious Perspectives, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 249, 253 (2010-11). 
70 Wojciech Sadurski, Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European 
States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments, 9 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 397, 403 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).  “Generally speaking, the 
Court enjoys a high degree of prestige and support from national judicial 
institutions, the political branches of the CoE, as well as legal academia.”  Id.  
“The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg . . . is probably the court that 
enjoys the most authority and prestige around the globe in the realm of human 
rights.  It is a well-deserved prestige.  By and large, the Court has done a great job 
in the defence of human rights in Europe, both in general and in the particular case 
of freedom of religion and belief.”  Javier Martínez-Torrón, The (Un)protection of 
Individaul Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law, 1 OX. J.L. REL. 363, 
363 (2012).  In the 65 years since it was signed, the ECHR “has evolved into ‘the 
most effective transnational human rights institution on earth.’” Effie Fokas, 
Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the Shadow of the 
European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence, 4 OX. J. L. 
REL. 54, 55 (2015) (quoting W. Cole Durham and David Kirkham, Introduction, 
in ISLAM, EUROPE, AND EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 1, 2 (W. Cole Durham, et al. 
eds., 2012)). 
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partial control of Contracting States over the selection outcomes:”71 
judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe from a list of candidates presented by each member state.72  
And “while on the bench, the judges benefit from guarantees 
providing a real independence from pressure from their (or other) 
governments.”73 As a result, the Court “displays features of a 
genuinely independent supranational tribunal.”74   
Because of its independence and prestige, “[i]t has become 
fashionable to press the claim that the Court has become (or is 
becoming) a sort of ‘constitutional court’ for Europe.”75  “Its 
decisions are binding on Contracting States deemed to have violated 
the Convention,76 and are enjoying, through a growingly accepted 
custom, an authority of erga omnes nature, at least as far as the 
interpretive value of its judgments is concerned.”77  “Judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights . . . . ha[ve] become an 
indelible source of inspiration for judges in national courts around 
the globe.”78 It’s “jurisprudence enlightens not only national judges 
but also judges and committee members of the other international 
human rights organs.”79  Wojciech Sadurski goes as far as 
suggesting that “the Court has successfully staked its claim as the 
final and authoritative interpreter of the Convention.”80  More 
remarkably still, this reputation has developed over a relatively short 
time. 
Until very recently another body, “[t]he European Commission 
of Human Rights[,] served a screening function for the Court and 
was authorized to resolve many of its cases.”81  But in Article 9 
cases, the Commission resembled an impenetrable wall more than a 
screen.  Indeed, “[u]ntil 1989, the Commission concluded in almost 
all cases brought under Article 9 that the facts did not disclose any 
violation; applications were therefore deemed inadmissible and 
71 Sadurski, supra note 70 at 403. 
72 Silvio Ferrari, The Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Quantitative Analysis of the Case Law, in THE 
LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN 
THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 13 & n.2 (Jeroen Temperman, ed., 2012). 
73 Sadurski, supra note 70 at 403. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 398. 
76 George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OX. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 705, 707-08 (2006) (citations omitted) (“a Contracting State that 
breaches the ECHR has a duty under international law to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court and to award just compensation to the victim.”). 
77 Sadurski, supra note 70 at 403-04. 
78 Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal 
Standards, 31 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 843 (1999). 
79 Id.  “It has set standards of protection that have had an impact far beyond 
European borders.”  Martínez-Torrón, supra note 70 at 363. 
80 Sadurski, supra note 70 at 403. 
81 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 253. 
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never reached the Court.”82  Protocol 11 to the Convention, adopted 
in 1998, abolished the Commission and “[f]rom that time, all cases 
have gone directly to the European Court for consideration.”83 
“The role of the Court [with respect to Article 9] is to define 
common standards on religious freedom in a religiously diverse 
Europe.”84 And it is “distinctive, if not quite unique, as an 
international law body in that it provides a mechanism for 
individuals—citizens, nationals, and even visitors—to bring a claim 
in a transnational court that the host country has violated their basic 
human rights.”85  However, “[t]here is no review of national law and 
the determinations of courts under national law, and the asserted 
violation must be caused by a responsible state party: applicants 
cannot bring a complaint against another private or corporate 
party.”86  Furthermore, “the applicant must exhaust local remedies 
82 Julie Ringelheim, Rights, Religion, and the Public Sphere: The European 
Court of Human Rights in Seach of a Theory?, in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN 
THE NEW EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS 283-306, 284-85 (Lorenzo Zucca & 
Camil Ungureanu, eds., 2012). 
83 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 253. See also Fokas, supra note 70 at 60 & n.30 
(“Until 1989, almost all cases brought under art 9 were deemed inadmissible.”). 
One reason for the delay may be that the aim of the ECHR signatories was “solely 
to prevent the descent into dictatorship threated by fascist revival or pro-Soviet 
coup.”  Nicol, supra note 53 at 152.  As Yannis Ktiskakis has argued, “the 
founders of the Strasbourg system were more concerned with constituting a 
political weapon of juxtaposition to the atheistic proposal of Communists than in 
moderating ‘the peaceful coexistence of Christian states.’”  Janis, supra note 1 at 
92 (quoting Yannis Ktiskakis, The Protection of the Forum Internum Under 
Article 9 of the ECHR, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS A 
LIVING INSTRUMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOF L. ROZAKIS 285, 286 
(Dean Speilmann et al. eds., 2011)). 
84 Françoise Tulkens, The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Church-State Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2575, 
2576-77 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). 
85 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 250-51 (“Applications against Contracting Parties 
for human rights violations can be brought before the Court by other states, other 
parties, or individuals.”).  “[I]ndividual access to the Court was rendered 
mandatory for all Contracting Parties only in 1998.”  Sadurski, supra note 70 at 
407.  “The main concern of citizens who chose to ‘go to Strasbourg’ to bring up 
issues for which they could not find a proper remedy in their home countries were 
no longer at the fringes of the rights enshrined in the Convention but right at its 
very core.”  Id. at 408. 
86 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 252.  “A traditional perception of the status and 
reach of the ECtHR’s judgments was that the carried a purely individualised, 
specific implication.  The Court was perceived as a kind of tribunal of last resort, 
whose role was limited to specific cases of rights violations after the exhaustion of 
all domestic remedies.  According to this view, it did not fall on the Court to 
assess the validity of domestic laws themselves.  Its policing role was strictly 
restricted to the consideration of acts and decisions rather than to the laws 
allegedly underlying the latter. . . .  However, this traditional perception was never 
completely accurate.  Indeed drawing a sharp distinction between bad decisions 
and bad laws . . . is not very credible.”  Sadurski, supra note 70 at 412.  In any 
event, to the extent that the Court ever was merely a “‘fine tuner’ of national legal 
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through the national court level, and must file a claim within six 
months of the final disposition of the claim at the national level.”87   
Many commentators have claimed “the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, enshrined in Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is insufficiently 
and erratically protected in the courts.”88  Even a summary history 
of the adjudication of claims under Article 9 reflects significant 
trepidation on the part of the Court in deciding issues of religious 
freedom.  For decades, they were invariably decided under other 
provisions of the Convention.  “Prior to 1993, there were mainly two 
relevant cases, both decided in light of Article 2 of the ECHR’s First 
Protocol—Kjeldsen (1976), related to conscientious objection to sex 
education in school, and Campbell and Cosans (1983), related to the 
opposition to having children physically punished at school.”89  In 
fact, “[i]n its first 34 years of operation as a Court, from 1959 to 
1993, the ECtHR did not issue a single conviction against a state on 
the basis of the main religious freedom provision of the ECtHR, 
Article 9 on the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.”90 It  
“looked for many decades as though it was going to be effectively a 
dead letter.”91 
The last two decades have seen a small and generally cautious, 
but nonetheless active, growth in the Court’s Article 9 
jurisprudence.  “Since 1993, with the Kokkinakis case, which 
involved the right to engage in proselytism, the Court began an 
itinerary of decisions adopted in light of Article 9 or in the light of 
other articles, but with a clear reference to religion.”92  And “[w]hile 
in its first judgments the Court demonstrates great caution in 
approaching religious issues, it has progressively become more 
systems,” the accession of formerly Communist Eastern European states to the 
Council of Europe “radically transformed this situation.”  Id. at 401.  The Court 
“was compelled instead to adopt a role of policing the national systems in which 
serious violations of rights occurred or suffering from important systemic 
deficiencies as far as the [Council of Europe] standards of rights are concerned.”  
Id. 
87 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 252. 
88 Alice Donald, Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and 
Human Rights: Grounds for Optimism?, 2 OX. J.L. REL. 50, 51 (2013).  “For the 
two decades after Kokkinakis, the Strasbourg Court has had very little success in 
charting a steady course for the interpretation and application of Article 9.  It is a 
commonplace to remark that the court’s case law on religious freedom is 
inconsistent.”  Janis, supra note 1 at 76. 
89 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 70 at 364. 
90 Fokas, supra note 70 at 60. 
91 Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European 
Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Architecture, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 321, 321 
(2010-11). 
92 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 70 at 364. 
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assertive in its defence of religious freedom.”93  Carolyn Evans 
suggests that “in a relatively short period, the Court has been pushed 
to develop a jurisprudence of religious freedom to deal with 
increasingly complex and controversial cases.”94  The Court has 
dealt with this complexity and controversy, in part, by relying on a 
standardized analytical process. 
“The analytical approach to Article 9 cases can seem quite 
formulaic, which is helpful to students becoming familiar with the 
Court, but is unsatisfying to more serious scholars because the 
Court’s reasoning comes to seem somewhat mechanical.”95  First the 
Court asks “whether there has been an interference with religion, 
thought or conscience by the state.  If the Court holds in the 
affirmative, the second question is whether the interference was 
prescribed by law (essentially an enquiry into whether the state has 
followed the ‘rule of law.’).”96  If so, then the Court will inquire 
“whether the limitation adopted by the state was enacted to pursue 
and protect a legitimate aim under Article 9.”97  “The final step of 
the analysis asks whether the limitation is ‘necessary in a democratic 
society.’   
 “In analyzing necessity, the Court typically—though not 
always—asks two questions: first, is the limitation justified in 
principle, i.e., does it correspond to a pressing social need?  Second, 
is it proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued?  Perhaps as many 
as seventy-five percent of Article 9 cases turn on this question of 
proportionality.”98 “This multi-part enquiry represents the gravamen 
of most Article 9 jurisprudence.”99 
Lourdes Peroni suggests that “the Court’s track record is at best 
mixed” when it comes to applying the framework to actual 
controversies.100  The limitations of the formulaic approach have 
crystallized “[a]s the case law has multiplied and the issues have 
diversified . . . it has become clear that the Court has not yet 
93 Ringelheim, supra note 82 at 283-84.  Mark Weston Janis has observed that 
“[a]rticle 9 cases after Kokkinakis continue to play a relatively minor role in the 
jurisprudence of the court.”  This overstates the matter.  Article 9 cases occupy 
less than one percent of the court’s docket.  In 2011, only five out of 1,157 total 
judgments rendered concerned Article 9.  In 2013, only six out of 919.  Janis, 
supra note 1 at 90.  See also Ferrari, supra note 72 at 19 (“the case law concerning 
Article 9 is relatively small: about 100 decisions, spread over fifty years, is not a 
high number, especially when compared with the case law that regards other 
articles of the Convention.”). 
94 Evans, supra note 91 at 321-22. 
95 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 258. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 259. 
99 Id. 
100 Lourdes Peroni, The European Court of Human Rights and Intragroup 
Religious Diversity: A Critical Review, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 664 (2014). 
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developed a sufficiently coherent and principled approach to this 
area.”101  Carolyn Evans further notes that “the conceptual 
foundations on which Article 9 case law is built are weak; and 
difficult cases are beginning to expose the cracks in the intellectual 
architecture of the Court's religious freedom jurisprudence.”102  This 
is seen in two general trends.  First, the Court “has shifted its focus 
away from the right of the individual and towards the role of the 
state in matters of religion.”103  Second, it has “taken such a cautious 
approach to protecting the manifestation of religion or belief that the 
law has come to protect ‘only a very restrictive and conservative 
form of religious life,’ that is lived behind closed doors rather than 
in public.”104   
It is this understanding of religion as essentially a private matter 
that is of primary concern.  “‘[T]he Commission and the Court have, 
at times, been accused of being unsympathetic to the claims of those 
from non-Christian traditions, or religions without a long history in 
Europe.’”105 These accusations may flow from “assumptions about 
religion underlying the Court’s understanding of the scope and 
content of freedom of religion.”106 Specifically, there have been 
instances where “implicit assumptions about religion as a set of 
‘theological propositions’ to which people adhere . . . surface in the 
Court’s freedom of religion reasoning.”107 Or, put differently, “the 
Court has some problems in understanding the conceptions of 
religion which stress the elements of identity and practice over those 
of freely chosen belief.”108   
101 Evans, supra note 91 at 321-22.  In particular, “the intellectual framework 
that the Court has built around religious freedom cases is sufficient to deal with 
the relatively simple cases of refusal to treat like with like, but is insufficient to 
tackle the more complex cases where rights come into conflict and the religious 
claim is a right to be treated differently rather than identically.”  Id. at 339-40.  
Part of the difficulty may be the lack of a coherent vision of church-state relations 
across the continent, with different nations employing different models to varying 
degrees.  See generally Paul Cliteur, State and Religion Against the Backdrop of 
Religious Radicalism, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 127-52 (2012). 
102 Id. at 322                     
103 Malcolm D. Evans, Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Approaches, Trends and Tensions, in LAW AND RELIGION IN 
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 291-315, 291 (Peter Cane, et al. eds., 
2008). 
104 Donald, supra note 88 at 51 (quoting RUSSELL SANDBERG, LAW AND 
RELIGION 98 (2011)). 
105 MCCREA, supra note 17 at 126-27 (quoting Peter Cumper, The Rights of 
Religious Minorities: The Legal Regulation of New Religious Movements, in 
MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE “NEW” EUROPE 165, 174 (Peter Cumper & Steven 
Wheatley, eds., 1999)). 
106 Peroni, supra note 100 at 665. 
107 Id. 
108 Ferrari, supra note 72 at 33. 
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In some respects, this is not surprising.  The text of the 
Convention itself favors such an interpretation, which is exacerbated 
by several of the Court’s judge-made doctrines.  But this outcome is 
not inevitable.  The case law of the Strasbourg court “both rejects 
the strictures of the ECHR text in favour of a teleological emphasis 
on effectiveness, and also treats the ECHR as a living instrument, 
the interpretation of which it can update in response to changing 
social conditions.”109  The question is effectiveness in what respect, 
and for whom?  The Court can revisit its jurisprudence, but will it? 
 
IV. THE INHERENT BIAS OF ARTICLE 9 
 
A. Difficulties Internal to the Convention 
 
1. The Process of Adoption 
 
“The Court has accepted that Articles 31-34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties represent customary 
international law and that they are thus applicable to interpreting the 
Convention.”110  It is therefore permissible to review the travaux 
préparatoires in determining the meaning of the Convention text.  
Furthermore, because Article 9 was based in large part upon Article 
18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (and because 
Article 9 was agreed to essentially without debate) “it is necessary to 
look first at the Universal Declaration’s drafting history for any light 
that it can shed on the appropriate interpretation of the 
Convention.”111  Unfortunately, as a general matter, the travaux 
préparatoires are “neither complete nor particularly revealing.”112 
However, they do reflect that many delegates expressly linked 
Christianity and human rights, and understood the protection of 
human rights as a Christian duty.113   
With respect to the Convention itself, not all of the bodies that 
had input into the drafting kept minutes and, of those that did, not all 
of the minutes have been published.114  But the available evidence 
109 Nicol, supra note 53 at 152. 
110 EVANS, supra note 58 at 51 (citing Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1975)). 
111 EVANS, supra note 58 at 34.  See also Janis, supra note 1 at 78 (“The 
wording of Article 9 in the 1950 ECHR was immediately drawn from Article 18 
of the United Nations’ 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). “The 
United Nations continued to develop the right to freedom of religion and belief in 
a number of other international instruments, most notably Article 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the more detailed 
Declaration on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination.”  EVANS, supra note 58 
at 36-37. 
112 EVANS, supra note 58 at 34 
113 Id. at 39.   
114 Id. at 38. 
170
reveals that the drafters rejected a proposal that would have 
expressly protected “freedom of religious practice” in favor of a 
more limited protection “of thought, conscience and religion.”115  
This was “presumably aimed at recognizing the importance of 
religious belief (as compared to practice).”116 
 
2. The Convention Text 
 
Apart from the intent of the drafters in rejecting express 
protection for religious practice, or any religious motivations the 
framers of the Declaration may have had, the text of Article 9 
presents difficulties on its own terms.  Article 31(2) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaties should be 
interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context.”117  This is not much of a 
guide, but it does seem clear that “‘thought and conscience’ must be 
distinct in some way from ‘religion or belief’, as there is a non-
derogable obligation to protect the right to freedom of thought and 
conscience, but there is no right to manifest them.”118  “‘[B]elief’ 
could include relatively individualistic beliefs that are not part of a 
structured religion or organization of believers. . . . the Court has 
explicitly recognized that the protection of the Convention extends 
to ‘free-thinkers’ and ‘the unconcerned.’”119  Alternatively, “belief” 
may be a subset of “thought” or “conscience” or both, the 
manifestation of which is protected,120 although it is far from clear 
115 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES” OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975-85), vol. 1, First Session of 
the Consultative Assembly 168 & 174, (A.H. Robertson, ed., 1985). 
116 EVANS, supra note 58 at 40. But see BM at 388 (“Perhaps the most that can 
be said in regards to its drafting is that delegates considered the issue of freedom 
of religion to be of great importance and that they accepted that the Universal 
Declaration provided an appropriate model for the protection of freedom of 
religion.”). 
117 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, Art 21(2). 
118 EVANS, supra note 58 at 52 
119 Id. at 58 
120 See id. at 63 (“Another, more minor, difficulty in the wording of Article 9 
is the introduction of the world ‘belief’ in the second part of Article 9(1).  It seems 
to cover conveniently groups such as atheists and agnostics . . . Yet, if this is 
correct, the exclusion of belief from the first part of Article 9 seems to suggest the 
strange outcome that an atheist has the right to manifest his or her belief . . . but 
his or her right to hold this belief is not protected.  Probably the best way around 
this apparent anomaly would be to assume that beliefs are a subset of the broader 
category of thought and conscience.”). 
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how protected “belief” could be distinguished from a more general, 
unprotected “thought.”121 
Rather than the differences between these terms, however, the 
more subtle problem lies in their similarity.  Here the difficulty 
stems from the phrase “religion or belief.”  Although this phrase in 
particular appears to have gained currency in international law,122 
and despite its initial appearance of extending the protection offered 
“religion” to include views such as atheism and agnosticism,123 the 
phrase “religion or belief” implicitly limits “religion” to mean 
something akin to “belief.”  The maxim noscitur a sociis—which 
holds that a legal term of art may be understood reference to the 
surrounding terms, so that it is understood to be of the same kind as 
its companions—is à propos.124  Put differently, “[w]ords . . . are 
liable to be affected by other words with which they are 
associated.”125  Essentially, the drafters set up “religion” and 
“belief” as two of a kind.   
This also is not entirely surprising.  “[T]he drafters of the 
Convention . . . tended to assume that the content of religious 
freedom was not controversial, at least in Europe.”126  And religion 
in Europe was obviously centered around Christianity, which was 
(and is) premised on belief.  Even today, the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Religious Freedom apparently understands religion in 
this limited sense,127 and international instruments continue to focus 
on “belief,” employing it as an umbrella term for both (theistic) 
121 Id. at 64 (“the term belief has increased the conceptual confusion in this 
area and the approach that the Commission has taken to the cases has only 
magnified this confusion.”). 
122 GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO RELIGION OR 
BELIEF, 8 (“International standards do not speak of religion in an isolated sense, 
but of ‘religion or belief.’ The ‘belief’ aspect typically pertains to deeply held 
conscientious beliefs that are fundamental about the human condition and the 
world. Thus, atheism and agnosticism, for example, are generally held to be 
entitled to the same protection as religious beliefs.”) 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/13993?download=true  
123 Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The 
Search for a Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385-
400, 385 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans, eds., 1999) (“If the term ‘or belief’ is 
added, perhaps we think of atheism or agnosticism.  Yet the question about what 
links these diverse beliefs and ways of life together, so that we recognise them as 
‘religions’, is far less clear.”); see also EVANS, supra note 58 at 64 (“The addition 
of the term ‘or belief’ to religion in Article 9 of the Convention may clarify some 
issues (particularly whether atheists are entitled to the protection of religious 
freedom)).” 
124 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2014). 
125 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), noscistur a sociis. 
126 Evans, supra note 123 at 388. 
127 Heiner Bielefeldt, Freedom of Religion or Belief—A Human Right Under 
Pressure, 1 OX. J.L. REL. 15, 17 (2012) (“respect is due for the underlying ability 
of human beings to have and develop deep convictions in the first place.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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religion and other beliefs unconcerned with the existence (or 
nonexistence) of supernatural entities.128 
Beyond this, the primacy of belief over practice in Strasbourg 
“is not just presupposed; it is represented overtly in language that 
orders the belief/practice dualism hierarchically.”129 The limitations 
in Article 9(2) apply only to the manifestation; the right to believe is 
absolute.130 And the Court has explained that Article 9 exists 
primarily to protect religion and belief, and that protection of 
manifestation of religion and belief is secondary.  But it is “hard to 
imagine how exactly a state may interfere with people’s religious 
beliefs if not by forcing some form of action upon them.”131   
 
3. The Challenge of “Conscience” 
 
The word “conscience,” which the Convention groups with both 
“religion” and “belief,” presents additional difficulties.  
“Notwithstanding the notorious difficulty of defining religion and 
the consequent effort on the part of jurists and academics to avoid 
embracing any particular definition, one model of religion has 
dominated modern discourse: religion as conscience.”132  But 
“[w]hen we reverently invoke ‘conscience,’ ‘freedom of conscience’ 
or the ‘sanctity of conscience’ . . . do we have any idea what we are 
talking about?  Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for 
rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what ‘conscience’ is 
or why it matters?”133  “More generally, what do we understand 
‘conscience’ to be, exactly?”134   
“Historically, ‘conscience’ has been a protean notion with 
different meanings for different people,” and these different 
meanings have evolved over time.135  “Since the time of Thomas 
Aquinas, when conscience referred to moral judgments about action, 
and [the American] founding era, when ‘freedom of conscience’ 
dominantly referred to individual religious liberty, our 
understanding has evolved.”136  Even today, “there are various ways 
128 See, e.g., Leustean & Madeley, supra note 7 at 5 (discussing “Non-
Confessional Organizations” in Declaration 11 to the Treaty of Amsterdam as 
parallel to churches). 
129 Peroni, supra note 41 at 237. 
130 See Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 590. 
131 Peroni, supra note 41 at 252. 
132 Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1041, 1041 (2010). 
133 Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 325, 326 (2005). 
134 Id. at 327 
135 Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious 
Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 225 (2009). 
136 Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
901, 901 (2010). 
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of conceiving what ‘conscience’ is, for example, Thomist versus 
Protestant versus secular conceptions, and varying views about 
whether conscience is strictly a ‘religious’ faculty or whether it 
encompasses nonreligious beliefs as well.”137 
 As a result of this lack of uniform meaning, “[l]egal theorists 
have been unclear about the relationship between religion and 
conscience and whether one or both should be eligible for legal 
exemptions.”138  Steven D. Smith argues that “the commitment to 
special legal treatment for religion derives from a two-realm world 
view in which religion—meaning the church, and later the 
conscience—was understood to inhabit a separate jurisdiction that 
was in some respects outside the governance of the state.”139  It 
“‘began as an argument that government must ensure a free response 
by the individual called distinctively by the Divine within.’”140  But 
although it was “recognized in medieval Catholic teaching and 
canon law, the Protestant Reformation altered the significance of 
conscience in a way that profoundly affected, and to some extent 
redirected, historical commitments to the separation of church and 
state.”141 
In the “centuries since Thomas More and Roger Williams 
solemnly invoked conscience,” the objective metaethical basis for 
their invocation has been challenged and in some quarters replaced. 
At the same time, freedom of conscience has become “more 
widespread and commonplace—even platitudinous—in our public 
rhetoric.”142  And “if we look closely at the modern invocations of 
conscience we will find uncertainty, confusion, and perhaps even a 
kind of degradation.”143  Conscience now “‘has come to mean very 
little beyond the notion of personal existential decision-making.’”144   
But “what all conceptions that picture religion as conscience 
have in common is the fundamental assumption that religion is a 
species of belief.”145  Nathan Chapman explains, “[r]eligious 
tolerance and cries for liberty of conscience emerged from doctrinal 
differences within the Christian tradition.”146  “Locke thought that 
coercing people into religious beliefs was contrary to Christianity 
and ultimately ineffective because only freely held beliefs led to 
137 Stolzenberg, supra note 132 at 1043. 
138 Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1457, 1460. 
139 Smith, supra note 25 at 1883. 
140 Smith, supra note 133 at 326 (quoting Marie A. Failinger, Wondering After 
Babel: Power, Freedom and Ideology in U.S. Supreme Court Interpretations of 
the Religion Clauses, in LAW & RELIGION, 81, 93-94 (Rex J. Adhar, ed. 2000)). 
141 Smith, supra note 25 at 1876-77. 
142 Smith, supra note 133 at 358. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 326 (quoting Failinger, supra note 140 at 93-94). 
145 Stolzenberg, supra note 132 at 1043. 
146 Chapman, supra note 138 at 1480. 
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salvation.  This liberty of conscience favored members of protestant 
groups that stressed individual responsibility and authority on 
spiritual matters.”147  Today, “[t]here is good reason to be concerned 
that the model of religion as conscience, which relies on the basic 
distinction between practice and belief, privileging the latter over 
the former, threatens to give short shrift to religious practices and 
institutions.”148   
That is not to say that protecting conscience is necessarily a bad 
idea: 
 
As a practical matter, liberty of conscience may advance 
democratic deliberation. It eliminates some disputes over 
moral differences that might otherwise monopolize the 
public life of a pluralistic society . . . . Protecting liberty of 
conscience also limits the government’s pretensions to 
absolute moral authority. Liberty of conscience enables 
nonconformist moral thought that undermines moral 
tyranny.149 
 
Additionally, “[c]onscientious exemptions for those who disagree 
with prevailing norms prolong internal and national dialogues over 
contested moral issues.  This may lead to better public 
understandings and decisions on morally novel issues such as the 
best use of new technology or morally profound issues.”150 
But one difficulty is in the evaluation of claims to legal 
exemptions.  “Even if claimants are sincere, other persons are hard 
put to assess what they mean if they say, ‘This is a fundamental 
conviction of mine.’”151  “Any such claim must rely on assumptions 
about political theory, about morality, and perhaps even about 
theology, but these are rarely stated. ‘Conscience’ has been 
something of a black box.”152  Additionally, “conscience can 
generate exorbitant demands: ‘Both good and evil can emanate from 
conscience: the feeding of the poor, perhaps, but also the 
purification of the caucasian race.’”153 
Another challenge is that it is far from clear that conscience 
fully protects religiously motivated conduct.  “An increasingly 
prominent justification for the reliance on conscience is that 
conscience is entitled to deference because the person in its grip 
147 Id. at 1465. 
148 Stolzenberg, supra note 132 at 1065. 
149 Chapman, supra note 138 at 1499. 
150 Id. at 1500. 
151 Greenawalt, supra note 136 at 906. 
152 Koppelman, supra note 135 at 216.            
153 Id. at 221 (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious 
Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1269 (1994)).  
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cannot obey the law without betraying his deepest, most identity-
defining commitments.”154  But Koppelman notes that  “[t]he 
emphasis on conscience focuses excessively on duty,”155 while 
“most people engage in religious practice out of habit, adherence to 
custom, a need to cope with misfortune, injustice, temptation and 
guilt, curiosity about a religious truth, a desire to feel connected to 
God, or happy religious enthusiasm rather than a sense of obligation 
or fear of divine punishment.”156  In a collective setting, 
“‘[c]onscience’ is a poor characterization of the desire of a church to 
expand its building to be able to hold its growing congregation, as in 
City of Boerne v. Flores.”157  “So conscience . . . fails to fit the cases 
in which most people want to accommodate religion. It is both 
overinclusive and underinclusive.”158 
 
B. Problems of Application and Doctrine 
 
In addition to the problems already inherent in Article 9, the 
Court has added to difficulties in its application through judicial 
doctrines.  Parlaying sixteenth-cenutury theology into legal jargon, 
the forum internum/forum externum divide artificially splits religion 
into constituent components, privileging belief over other modes of 
religiousity.  The margin of appreciation, a doctrine of deference to 
judgments of individual states, and the related doctrine of consensus, 
which is seen as a prerequisite to announcing Europe-wide legal 
rules, together diminish uniformity and render judgments 
concerning the ECHR in one state difficult to enforce in another.  
Finally, the Court’s general avoidance of Article 9 altogether (and 
its rote analysis when it has addressed it) has impoverished what has 
the potential to be a substantially richer, more nuanced 
jurisprudence. 
 
1. Judicial Focus on the Forum Internum 
 
“It is almost inconceivable to consider freedom of religion or 
belief without coming across at least one reference to forum 
internum and forum externum.”159  “The case law of Strasbourg 
emphasizes that it is necessary to distinguish between the internal 
and external aspects of religious liberty.  The former is the freedom 
154 Id. at 216. 
155 Id. at 222. 
156 Id. at 222-23. 
157 Id. at 223. 
158 Id. at 223-24. 
159 Peter Petkoff, Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and 
Public International Law with a Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 7 RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 183, 184 
(2012). 
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to believe, which embraces the freedom to choose one’s beliefs—
religious or non-religious—and the freedom to change one’s 
religion.”160  “This ‘inner freedom’ (forum internum) is 
complemented by the freedom to act in accordance with the beliefs 
that one holds, this being achieved by recognizing the additional 
right to ‘manifest’ one’s religion or belief in a number of ways—
through teaching, worship, observance and practice.”161  The forum 
internum “can be exteriorized through rites and acts of cults, but 
these are in principle accomplished within the family and ‘the circle 
of those whose faith one shares.’”162   
The dichotomy between the forum internum and forum 
externum was first introduced in the Councils of Trent (1545 and 
1563),163 and originally a part of Latin canon law.164  In the last 
century, the two forums were implicitly included “in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, emerge implicitly within 
the ECHR narrative and then are confidently rearticulated in the 
context of the ICCPR, in numerous reports of the UN Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion and Belief, and in Strasbourg 
and domestic Article 9 jurisprudence.”165   
 As the Court has made clear, “[t]he internal dimension of 
religious freedom is absolute, which the external dimension is by its 
very nature relative.  Indeed, Article 9(2) clearly states that the 
limitations specified therein may be applied only to the ‘[f]reedom 
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs.’”166  In short, “[t]he Court has 
construed freedom of religion in terms of a binary opposition 
160 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 590. 
161 Evans, supra note 61 at 8. 
162 Ringleheim, supra note 82 at 293 (citing Sahin v. Turkey [GC], App. No. 
44774/98, [2005-XI] Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, para. 105). 
163 Petkoff, supra note 159 at 201. 
164 Id. at 183.  “It is interesting to consider why a concept developed by 
medieval canon law has been adopted by one of the most powerful International 
Human Rights enforcement systems.” Id. at 198. 
165 Id. at 184-85     
166  Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 590.  See also Ringleheim, supra note 
82 at 285 (The Commission emphasized “the distinction drawn in Article 9 
between two aspects of religious freedom: whereas its internal dimension, namely 
the right to have or change religion or belief, cannot be subject to any limitation 
whatsoever, its external aspect, that is, ‘the freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance’ may be restricted in some circumstances, under 
the conditions set forth in the second paragraph of Article 9.”).  In addition, “the 
forum internum is a narrower concept than the commonly understood meaning of 
the term ‘private sphere.’  It encompasses the internal sphere of personal thought, 
conscience, or belief and not those external spheres, even if nonstate and therefore 
technically ‘private,’ such as places of worship, the school, or the family, where 
religious belief may be communicated or acted upon.”  Danchin, supra note 40 at 
261. 
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between belief and practice,”167 and “views individual religious 
freedom as a right that is principally private in nature and focuses on 
an individual right to develop and adhere to a religious identity.”168 
The difficulty is that dividing religiousity between the forum 
internum and forum externum presents the question in a biased, 
historically contingent way without justifying that choice.  It “is not 
religiously neutral” but instead depends upon a priori assumptions 
about “the ordinary forms of religious practice and the proper scope 
of political action.”169  “The Court and Commission have chosen to 
emphasise the internal realm in their interpretation of Article 9.”170  
This construct “implicitly creates an oppositional and hierarchical 
relationship between the two.”171  Peter Danchin explains: 
 
In the conditions of the modern state, religion is thus 
imagined as having two dimensions: insofar as religion 
involves actual manifestations of belief and actions in the 
world, it is subject to regulation and control by the public 
(political and legal) spheres; insofar as it involves matters 
of conscience, it is imagined as occupying—in a state of 
inviolable freedom—the private sphere of personal belief, 
sentiment, and identity.172 
 
“Whether this is a conscious choice or merely an assumption about 
the ‘real’ nature of religion is not clear from the cases.  What is clear 
is that the Court and Commission have never justified their approach 
or shown any awareness that this view is anything but self-
evident.”173   
As Javier Martínez-Torrón sardonically notes, this binary and 
hierarchical understanding of religion “is not the most desirable.”174  
It erects an artificial boundary “between two different ways of 
conceiving and experiencing religion” without a sufficient 
justification for the choice in privileging one over the other, 
167 Peroni, supra note 41 at 236. 
168 MCCREA, supra note 17 at 103.  See also Ringleheim, supra note 82 at 293 
(“Underlying the Court’s case law is the idea that religion is primarily an inward 
feeling; a matter of individual conscience.”) (internal quotation omitted); 
Martínez-Torrón, supra note 70 at 365 (“Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, as all fundamental rights, is primarily an individual right but also has a 
very significant and visible collective dimension.”). 
169 Moon, supra note 34 at 256. 
170 Evans, supra note 123 at 396. 
171 Peroni, supra note 6 at 233. 
172 Danchin, supra note 40 at 262. 
173 Evans, supra note 123 at 396.  But see Petkoff, supra note 159 at 185-86 
(“In Kosteski (2006) the Strasbourg Court explained that ‘the notion of the State 
sitting in judgment on the state of a citizen’s inner and personal beliefs is 
abhorrent and may smack unhappily of past infamous persecutions.’”). 
174 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 70 at 370. 
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recognizing that belief and practice are mutually dependent, or 
recognizing that they cannot be neatly separated from each other.175   
In his analysis of law and literature, James Boyd White 
distinguished between characters—believable, full, and complex—
and caricatures, which reduce subjects to exaggerations, labels, and 
single roles.  The law, he writes, is a literature of caricature.176  The 
dubious proposition that all of religion can be neatly packaged into 
the forum internum and forum externum may be a prime example.177 
 
2. The Difficulties with Doctrine: Margin of 
Appreciation, Subsidiarity and Consensus 
 
Although not tied directly to Article 9 in the same way as the 
forum externum and forum internum, the Court’s general doctrines 
of margin of appreciation, subsidiarity, and consensus also play a 
significant role in how the Court is able to shape its Article 9 
jurisprudence.   
“The margin of appreciation has a complex role in European 
Convention case-law.”178  It “is in a way a logical result of the 
position of the Court being a supranational institution.”179  Generally 
speaking, it is “a rationale for deferring to State decision-making in 
areas of controversy or complexity,”180 which “gives the flexibility 
needed to avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and 
Contracting States over their respective spheres of authority and 
enables the Court to balance the sovereignty of Contracting Parties 
with their obligations under the Convention.”181 
175 Silvio Ferrari, Law and Religion in a Secular World: A European 
Perspective, 14 ECC. L.J. 355, 367 (2012). 
176 Lourdes Peroni, Religion and Culture in the Discourse of the European 
Court of Human Rights: The Risks of Stereotyping and Naturalising, 10 INT’L J.L. 
CONTEXT 195, 195 (2014) (citing JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 
113-14 (1985)). 
177 Caylee Hong & René Provost, Let Us Compare Mythologies, in MAPPING 
THE BOUNDARIES OF LEGAL RELIGION: RELIGION AND MULTICULTURALISM FROM 
ISRAEL TO CANADA 1-21, 2 (René Provost, ed., 2014) (“Lawyers, for whom the 
erection of such intellectual scaffoldings presents a largely irresistible urge, may 
be more at risk than most of falling prey to this illusion of coherence in the 
process of creating and interpreting legal norms meant to regulate diversity in our 
societies.”). 
178 Evans, supra note 91 at 332. 
179 Carla M. Zoethout, Rethinking Adjudication Under the European 
Convention, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 422 (Jeroen 
Temperman, ed., 2012). 
180 Evans, supra note 91 at 332. 
181 R. St. J. MacDonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123 (R. St. J. MacDonald, et al. 
eds., 1993).  See also Letsas, supra note 76 at 720 (“Many commentators view the 
margin of appreciation as a feature of a supranational judicial system, designed to 
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The margins doctrine “initially responded to concerns of 
national governments that international policies could jeopardize 
their national security.”182  The “rationale later was expanded to 
allow each country wide discretion to select policies that would 
regulate potentially harmful activities, such as incitement to violence 
or racist speech, by means benefitting each State’s unique 
circumstances and societal constraints.”183  Today, however, the 
doctrine has expanded beyond the unique security concerns of 
individual states to areas “such as the allocation and management of 
its natural resources, length of national statutes of limitations, or 
restriction of speech due to public morals.”184  This “reflect[s] an 
altogether different philosophy, one which is based on notions of 
subsidiarity and democracy and which significantly defers to the 
wishes of each society to maintain its unique values and address its 
particular needs.”185   
Thus, today, one aspect of the doctrine is that “the European 
Court should often defer to the judgment of national authorities on 
the basis that the ECHR is an international convention, not a 
national bill of rights.  The ideas of subsidiarity and state consensus 
are usually invoked to support the structural use of the margin of 
appreciation.”186 Thus, “the role of national decision-making bodies 
has to be given special consideration and domestic authorities 
should enjoy a large margin of appreciation.”187  At the same time, 
“certain standards must be universally observed by all contracting 
states.”188  “[T]he Court developed the doctrine of the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ to reconcile the potential tension between universality 
and subsidiarity.”189 
balance the sovereignty of the Contracting States with the need to secure 
protection of the rights embodied in the Convention.”) & 721 (“It is the idea that 
the Court’s power to review decisions taken by domestic authorities should be 
more limited than the powers of national constitutional court or other national 
bodies that monitor or review compliance with an entrenched bill of rights.”); 
“[T]he dynamics of the European Court are very different from, and much more 
complex than, the dynamics of national constitutional courts.”  Martínez-Torrón, 
supra note 70 at 364. 
182 Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 845; see also Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, 
Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. J. INT’L L. 1, 48 (1995) (noting the doctrine “is 
particularly generous with regard to actions which domestic authorities regard as 
critical to the prevention of disorder or crime.”). 
183 Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 845-46. 
184 Id. at 846 
185 Id. 
186 Letsas, supra note 76 at 706.   
187 Tulkens, supra note 84 at 2577-78. 
188 Fokas, supra note 70 at 58. 
189 Id. Until quite recently, both the subsidiarity principle and the margin of 
appreciation were established only in the Court’s case law.  “But as of 2013 both 
formally entered the ECHR with the introduction of Protocol 15 that inserts a 
reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of 
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Subsidiarity “‘refers primarily to the subsidiary role of the 
Convention machinery and entails first of all what may be termed a 
‘procedural relationship’ between the national authorities 
responsible for implementing the Convention and deciding human 
rights issues on the one hand and the Convention institutions on the 
other.”190  “This is the principle that it falls primarily upon the 
Contracting States to ensure that the rights embodied in the 
Convention are protected.”191 The Maastricht Treaty provides in 
Article 1 that decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen, while “‘Article 2 then asserts the principle by name: ‘The 
objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty . 
. . while respecting the principle of subsidiarity.’”192 
In addition, the Court has concluded that it “must defer to the 
national authorities whenever they are ‘better placed’ than an 
international judge to decide on human rights issues raised by the 
applicant’s complaint.”193  In other words, “national authorities are 
not only the first ones to deal with complaints regarding the 
Convention rights and provide remedies, but also the ones who have 
. . . more legitimacy . . . to decide on human rights issues.”194  Paola 
Carozza explains: 
 
Even though the word ‘subsidiarity’ entered our political 
lexicon only in the twentieth century, the idea has an 
intellectual history as old as European political thought. 
Chantal Millon-Delsol, whose study of subsidiarity is one 
of the most comprehensive available and one of the first 
standard sources for any study of the concept, traces its 
origins as far back as classical Greece, and finds it later 
taken up by Thomas Aquinas and medieval scholasticism. . 
. . It was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
that Catholic social theorists became the principal 
proponents of the idea of subsidiarity, as they sought some 
sort of middle way between the perceived excesses of both 
appreciation into the Convention’s preamble pending ratification by contracting 
states.”  Id. at 60.  However, subsidiarity was adopted as Community policy not 
long after “Pope John XXIII issued his 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra.”  
Leustean & Madeley, supra note 7 at 3. 
190 Letsas, supra note 76 at 722.   
191 Id. at 721; see also Fokas, supra note 70 at 58 (“each contracting state is, in 
the first place, responsible for securing the rights and freedoms protected by the 
Convention”). 
192 Paola G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 50 (2003) (quoting Treaty on European 
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253, Arts. 1 & 2)). 
193 Letsas, supra note 76 at 721. 
194 Id. at 722. 
181
laissez-faire liberal capitalist society and Marxian socialist 
alternatives.195   
 
“Subsidiarity is therefore a somewhat paradoxical principle. It limits 
the state, yet empowers and justifies it. It limits intervention, yet 
requires it. It expresses both a positive and a negative vision of the 
role of the state with respect to society and the individual.”196 
“There are two broad categories of cases in which the Court has 
taken national authorities to be better placed and has deferred to 
their judgment.  The first category includes cases where there is no 
consensus among Contracting States on what human rights 
individuals have.”197  Consensus is inversely related to the margin of 
appreciation.  “[T]he less a court is able to identify a European-wide 
consensus on the treatment of a particular issue, the wider the 
margins a court is prepared to grant to the national institutions. 
Minority values, hardly reflected in national politics, are the main 
losers in this approach.”198   
“The second category comprises cases where the Court defers to 
the decision of the national authorities because the latter are better 
placed to decide on politically sensitive issues within a particular 
Contracting State.”199  With respect to the extent of the margin of 
appreciation: 
 
some aims are more susceptible to an objective analysis 
than others; a bigger objectivity calls for a lesser discretion 
on the part of national authorities.  Second, the nature of 
the activities subjected to limitation; when they concern 
strictly an individual’s private life—and not so much the 
community—the State’s margin of appreciation lessens 
while the ECtHR’s power of control increases, and, at the 
same time, ‘particularly serious reasons’ are required to 
consider that a State interference has been legitimate.200 
 
The margin of appreciation tends to be particularly wide in 
religious freedom cases.201  This should not be surprising.  “The 
195 Carozza, supra note 192 at 40-41. 
196 Id. at 44. 
197 Letsas, supra note 76 at 722. 
198 Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 851. 
199 Letsas, supra note 76 at 723; see also id. at 706 (noting the substantive 
element of the margin doctrine “is to address the relationship between individual 
freedoms and collective goals”). 
200 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 601. 
201 Fokas, supra note 70 at 58; see also EVANS, supra note 58 at 143 (“While 
in theory there is no difference between the margin of appreciation in relation to 
particular Articles, State respondents in Article 9 cases tend to be given a wider 
margin of appreciation.”).  Specifically,  “The ‘margin of appreciation’ has 
paradigmatically figured in judgments concerning the limitation clauses; the 
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discretion the Court grants to national authorities on religious issues 
is symptomatic of the difficulty in dealing with them.”202  And 
especially given that “the countermajoritarian role of the European 
Court of Human Rights . . . is not unconditionally accepted,”203 it 
“enables the European Court to take account of local sensibilities 
when making rulings in particular cases”204 and “provides an exit for 
the Court from certain culturally and politically sensitive issues.”205 
Although the doctrine “allows states a certain, variable, leeway 
to interpret religious rights and freedoms within the broader context 
of their national cultures and traditions”206 its application is not 
without difficulty.  To begin, some question whether the doctrine 
undercuts the universality of the rights protected by the Court to an 
unacceptable degree.207  Additionally, many have charged that the 
Court relies on the doctrine inconsistently, and that the degree to 
which the Court will defer to national institutions is 
unpredictable.208  Functionally, application of the doctrine 
“especially when coupled with the consensus rationale, essentially 
reverts difficult policy questions back to national institutions, in 
complete disregard of their weaknesses.”209 
More problematically, “the doctrine is inappropriate when 
conflicts between majorities and minorities are examined.”210  In 
addition to leaving unanswered “some of the more philosophically 
taxing questions about the accommodation of religious belief,”211 
the doctrine burdens minorities, including religious minorities, in 
important ways.  Eyal Benvenisti explains: 
 
doctrine is being used in particular where the Convention enables a balancing of 
interests by the Member state, notably under Articles 8-11 . . . which contain in 
the second paragraph the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ clause.”  Zoethout, 
supra note 179 at 418. 
202 Fokas, supra note 70 at 58. 
203 Zoethout, supra note 179 at 421. 
204 Cumper & Lewis, supra note 2 at 15. 
205 Fokas, supra note 70 at 58 
206 Id. 
207 Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 843 (“The ECHR’s “universal aspirations are, 
to a large extent, compromised by the doctrine of margin of appreciation.”) & 844 
(“Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral relativism, is at 
odds with the concept of the universality of human rights.”). 
208 Fokas, supra note 70 at 55 (noting the “variable ‘margin of appreciation’ it 
allows individual states on religious issues, particularly when concerning Islam.”); 
Letsas, supra note 76 at 705 (“Most commentators complain about the lack of a 
uniform or coherent application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights.”); Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 844 
(“Inconsistent applications in seemingly similar cases due to different margins 
allowed by the court might raise concerns about judicial double standards.”). 
209 Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 853. 
210 Id. at 847 
211 Cumper & Lewis, supra note 2 at 15. 
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a wide margin of appreciation is appropriate with respect to 
policies that affect the general population equally, such as 
restrictions on hate speech (which are aimed at protecting 
domestic minorities), or statutes of limitations for actions in 
tort.  On the other hand, no margin is called for when the 
political rights of members of minority groups are curtailed 
through, for example, restrictions on speech or on 
association, when their educational opportunities are 
restricted by the State, or when the allocation of resources 
creates differential effects on the majority and the minority. 
Acquiescing to the margin of appreciation in the latter 
cases assists the majorities in burdening politically 
powerless minorities.212 
 
He continues, noting that the consensus doctrine similarly: 
 
puts quite a heavy burden on the advocates of the 
promotion of individual and minority rights who must 
spread their resources among the diverse national 
institutions in their efforts to promote human rights.  Only 
if they succeed in a sufficient number of jurisdictions will 
the court be convinced that the status quo has been changed 
and react accordingly.  Such a policy cannot be said to 
promote human rights, especially not minority rights.213 
 
In Carla Zoethout’s view, “it is time for the Court to develop a new 
mode of adjudication—a form of review which makes it possible to 
act as a countermajoritarian institution and set a European standard, 
without infringing state sovereignty.”214 
 
3. Defining Religion (or Not) 
 
a. The Problem of Definition 
 
When the Court does address Article 9 head-on, it must face, as 
an initial matter, a question of definition or classification.  And 
“[t]he definition of religion—how it is organized, the rituals it 
employs, the beliefs it transmits—is a central determinant of the 
degree to which religious liberty is protected.”215  “Although many 
international and regional human rights instruments guarantee rights 
212 Benvenisti, supra note 78 at 847. 
213 Id. at 853 
214 Zoethout, supra note 179 at 413. 
215 Lori G. Beaman, The Courts and the Definition of Religion: Preserving the 
Status Quo Through Exclusion, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE SACRED AND SECULAR 203, 210 (Arthur L. Greil & 
David G. Bromley, eds., 2003). 
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related to freedom of religion or belief, none attempts to define the 
term ‘religion,’” and it “remains undefined as a matter of 
international law.”216  There is no “commonly agreed definition of 
what ‘religion’ means in EU law and policy.”217  Whether and how 
religion ought to be defined for legal purposes are “increasingly 
contested and divisive questions.”218  Yet “because religion is much 
more complex than other guaranteed rights, the difficulty of 
understanding what is and is not protected is significantly 
greater.”219  And this difficulty is perhaps even more acute in the 
legal field that in others.  “While academics have the luxury of 
debating whether the term ‘religion’ is hopelessly ambiguous, 
judges and lawyers often do not.”220 
“The word ‘religion’ has a fairly long pedigree in European 
languages. . . . its use dates back at least to Roman times” but its 
antiquity does not “mean that the word has always had the same 
meaning throughout history; rather the opposite is the case.”221  
“Religio” in Roman times referred primarily to the monastic life (as 
“Religious” still does within the Roman Catholic Church, as seen in 
the division between the “religious” clergy who belong to orders, 
and “secular” diocesan clergy, who do not).  Moreover, “to the 
degree that ‘religio’ designated a wider quality or domain, this 
sphere . . . denoted those matters having to do with God or gods” 
and human devotion to them generally; it was “singular and not 
plural.”222  Today, however, religion exists as a reified “thing” that 
exists in the world.  “Religion in the West is understood both as a 
personal judgment about what is true and right . . . and a group 
216 T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of 
“Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189-90 (2003).  See 
also Danchin, supra note 8 at 675-76 (“none of the major international and 
regional human rights instruments define the term ‘religion.’”); Arthur L. Greil & 
David G. Bromley, Introduction, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE SACRED AND SECULAR 3 (Arthur L. Greil & David G. 
Bromley, eds., 2003) (“it is probably safe to venture the proposition that no 
consensus has yet been reached with regard to this subject.”); EVANS, supra note 
58 at 51 (“No human rights treaty, including the Convention, has ever defined 
religion or belief.”).  
217 Sergio Carrera and Joanna Parkin, The Place of Religion in European 
Union Law and Policy: Competing Approaches and Actors Inside the European 
Commission, RELIGARE Working Document No. 1, September 2010, at 3. 
218 Danchin, supra note 46 at 456. 
219 Gunn, supra note 216 at 190. 
220 Id. at 191. 
221 Peter Beyer, Defining Religion in Cross-National Perspective: Identity and 
Difference in Official Conceptions, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE SACRED AND SECULAR 163, 166 (Arthur L. Greil & 
David G. Bromley, eds., 2003). 
222 Id. 
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identity that is deeply rooted.”223  As such, there is a general 
assumption that religion is capable of definition. 
But with respect to Article 9 in particular, “the issue has proved 
so controversial that it has been difficult to achieve any consensus as 
to the meaning of the term.”224  Defining religion, especially as a 
legal term of art, is no simple task.  As Eisgruber and Sager explain: 
 
The problem goes something like this: in order to protect 
religious liberty we have to define what religion is, and 
once we are in the business of saying that some beliefs, 
commitments, and projects are entitled to special treatment 
as ‘religious’ while others are not, we are creating a sphere 
of orthodoxy of exactly the sort that any plausible 
understanding of religious liberty should deplore.225   
 
Moreover, “any attempt to define the scope and content of the 
right to religious liberty will necessarily involve assumptions about 
the underlying nature of religion itself.”226  Legal definitions may 
incorporate attitudes and assumptions that reflect cultural attitudes 
about religion generally or toward individual religions specifically.  
For example, with respect to religion generally, “[t]he right to 
religious freedom is often referred to simply as ‘freedom of 
conscience or belief.’  This subtle shift in terminology is in fact the 
product of two deeply entangled historical and normative 
transformations that have occurred in modern secular discourse on 
religious freedom.”227   
Thus, rather than viewing religion as an entity, it is better to 
speak of it as “a ‘category of discourse,’ whose precise meaning and 
implications are continually being negotiated in the course of social 
interaction.”228 “The practical task of defining religion is one that 
involves a large number of social actors in a variety of social 
223 Moon, supra note 34 at 258. 
224 Evans, supra note 58 at 51. 
225 Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What 
Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 807 (2009). 
226 Danchin, supra note 8 at 676 (quoting Gunn, supra note 216 at 195). 
227 Id. at 675 
228 Greil & Brombley, supra note 216 at 4; see also Meredith B. McGuire, 
Contested Meanings and Definitional Boundaries: Historicizing the Sociology of 
Religion, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE 
SACRED AND SECULAR 127, 127 (Arthur L. Greil & David G. Bromley, eds., 
2003) (“Definitional boundaries are the outcomes of contested meanings.” 
(emphasis in original)). Even biases within “sociology of religion  . . . ha[ve] 
underwritten conceptions of ‘religion’ as essentially fixed, rather than existentially 
variable.”  William H. Swatos, Jr., Differentiating Experiences: The Virtue of 
Substantive Definitions, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN THE SACRED AND SECULAR 39, 43 (Arthur L. Greil & David G. 
Bromley, eds., 2003). 
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contexts and that has important social, political and cultural 
consequences.  This is perhaps most obvious if we look at the 
courts.”229  The ECtHR in particular has addressed the definitional 
issue in a unique way, by beginning with a broad, inclusive 
definition, but then differentiating between religious beliefs qua 
beliefs, on the one hand, which are inviolable, and manifestations of 
belief on the other, which are entitled to far less protection.  The 
underlying problem is that this approach is not neutral between 
religions. 
First, the Court has responded to the problem of defining 
religion by adopting a “a broad, inclusive approach to the question 
of what ‘counts’ as a religion or belief for the purposes for the 
second sentence of Article 9(1).”230  For example, “[t]he Church of 
Scientology was accepted as falling under the protection of Article 9 
with no discussion of the issues that have concerned domestic 
courts.”231  And “[p]acifism has been accepted as a belief even when 
it is not linked to a particular religion.”232   
But the Court has been far less accommodating in its protection 
of religion as it is actually lived.  It has “moved from a very liberal 
definition of ‘religion or belief’ to a very restrictive view of what 
freedom of religion and belief entail. . . . they have in fact developed 
a conservative conception of these notions that belies the expansive 
approach taken at the definitional stage.”233 And “the way in which 
the Court and Commission have dealt with the substance of the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief subtly prefers some 
conceptions of religion to others.”234 
229 Greil & Bromley, supra note 216 at 3. 
230 Evans, supra note 103 at 295; see also Evans, supra note 123 at 389-90 
(“The basic approach of the Commission has been to define religion or belief 
liberally and inclusively.  It has rarely been determined that something that is 
alleged to be a religion or belief does not fall within the protection of the 
Convention.”) & 392 (“the tendency of the Court and Commission at the 
definition stage of Article 9 cases has been to adopt a philosophy of 
inclusiveness.”).  However, “[a]lthough the Court has been relatively liberal in its 
definition of religion, its insistence that its views, rather than those of the 
applicants, should decide what is required by the relevant religion has meant that. . 
. there is a risk that the Court ‘will single out for protection religious rites and 
practices with which the members of the Court are familiar and feel 
comfortable.’”  MCCREA, supra note 17 at 126 (quoting EVANS, supra note 58 at 
125). 
231 EVANS, supra note 58 at 55 (citing X & Church of Scientology v. Sweden, 
App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68, 70 (1978)). 
232 EVANS, supra note 58 at 55 (citing Le Cour Grandmaison & Fritz v. France, 
App. Nos. 11567/85 & 11568/85, 53 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 150 (1987) 
and Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 5, 19 (1978)).  Both of these cases understand “belief” to mean 
“conviction.” 
233 EVANS, supra note 58 at 66. 
234 Evans, supra note 123 at 392. 
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Specifically, “the emphasis in the interpretation of Article 9 is 
on the internal: the private thought, conscience, and religion of the 
individual.”235  Therefore, as William Arnal explains: 
 
[O]ur definitions of religion, especially insofar as they 
assume a privatized and cognitive character behind religion 
(as in religious belief), simply reflect (and assume as 
normative) the West’s distinctive historical feature of the 
secularized state.  Religion, precisely, is not social, not 
coercive, is individual, is belief-oriented, and so on, 
because in our day and age there are certain apparently 
free-standing cultural institutions, such as the Church, 
which are excluded from the political state.236 
 
Additionally, the Court has held that “‘religious freedom is 
primarily a matter of individual conscience’ though one that implies 
a right to some manifestation.”237  The problem is that “[t]he 
primacy that the Court has given to the internal role of conscience 
and the notion that freedom of religion or belief is mainly about 
being able to hold a particular set of beliefs is relevant to the 
conception of who or was is entitled to freedom of religion or 
belief.”238  “The ‘norm’ in Strasbourg freedom of religion case law 
appears to be a Protestant, belief-centered conception of religion. 
This conception favours internal and disembodied forms of religion 
over external and embodied ones.”239  Although the Court has not 
attempted to define religion comprehensively, (assuming such a 
definition is possible),240 “background assumptions about religion as 
primarily a matter of conscience or belief appear throughout its 
freedom of religion case law.”241   
Finally, there are lurking behind the legal issues, questions of 
diversity, toleration, and cultural identity.  Apart from the 
difficulties in defining religion generally, and the special hardships 
in defining it for legal purposes, it may be that the Court’s 
uneasiness with Article 9 as a whole “reflects a deep-seated 
European uneasiness about how far to tolerate religious 
diversity.”242 Veit Bader has found that among European states, 
235 EVANS, supra note 58 at 72. 
236 William E. Arnal, Definition, in GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION 21, 31 
(Willi Braun & Russell T. McCutcheon, eds., 2000). 
237 Evans, supra note 123 at 393 (quoting Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), para 33 (1993)). 
238 Id. at 394. 
239 Peroni, supra note 6 at 233.  
240 Petty, supra note 14 at __ (Tenn. L. Rev.). 
241 Peroni, supra note 41 at 236. 
242 Janis, supra note 1 at 76.  In addition, “There is always a danger in 
attempting to apply a concept as complex and controversial as religious freedom, 
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domestic courts in France, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal face 
challenges “in finding defensible definitions of ‘religion’ under 
conditions of greater and manifestly visible religious diversity.”243  
The Strasbourg court has therefore avoided addressing Article 9 
when it found such avoidance to be expedient. 
 
b. Avoiding the Issue 
 
“It is fairly common for legal analyses of freedom of religion or 
belief to avoid a serious discussion of the definitional problem, even 
among the most important works.”244  Because Article 9 was almost 
completely the domain of the Commission for many years, “[t]he 
task of defining religion or belief in the context of Article 9 has 
generally been performed by the Commission.”245  Both the 
Commission and, later, the Court “have taken a generous approach 
to defining religion or belief.”246   They “have refrained from 
defining, or even listing, the essential criteria of the word 
‘religion.’”247  “And [t]he Commission has, by and large, not 
entered into that controversy as it has rarely determined that 
something that is alleged to be a religion or belief is not.”248   
“The reluctance of the European Commission or Court formally 
to define the word ‘religion’ is understandable.”249  A workable 
legal definition would have to be specific enough to provide 
practical guidance to courts on inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
while at the same time accounting for the wide diversity of religious 
belief and practice and distinguishing religious behaviors that could 
also be classified as cultural, philosophical, or otherwise non-
religious.  “Such a balance would be almost impossible to strike and 
explains why definitions of religion have also been avoided in the 
past by the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant 
that those charged with applying it will simply draw on their own experiences or 
notions of ‘common sense’ and thus give deference to systems of belief with 
which they are familiar or comfortable, but fail to adequately protect that which 
seems foreign or strange.”  EVANS, supra note 58 at 18. 
243 Veit Bader, Religion and the Myths of Secularization and Separation, 
RELIGARE Working Paper no. 8, March 2011, at 3 & n.1. 
244 Gunn, supra note 216 at 190-91. 
245 EVANS, supra note 58  at 53 
246 Id. at 55 
247 Adhar & Leigh, supra note 65 at 152 (“It is a frequent criticism of the 
jurisprudence on Article 9 of the European Convention that it has failed almost 
entirely to confront the issue of defining religion.”); Cumper, supra note 105 at 
173.  But see Freedland & Vickers, supra note 66 at 601 (noting the “ECHR 
suggests that beliefs must have sufficient ‘cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance’ to warrant protection.”). 
248 EVANS, supra note 58 at 54.  “Often the Commission tried to simply ignore 
the issue by dealing with controversial cases on different grounds.”  Id. at 56. 
249 Cumper, supra note 105 at 173. 
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on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) and the UN’s Special 
Rapporteur on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance.”250 
In addition to simply avoiding the definitional question, the 
Court went to greater lengths in avoiding Article 9 entirely. The 
ECtHR developed its jurisprudence of the permissible limitations on 
rights in the context of Articles 8, 10 and 11, rather than Article 9 
because, until 1993, Article 9 cases were almost entirely deemed 
inadmissible by the Commission. “By the time the Court began to 
judge on the merits of applications based on religious freedom, there 
was a well-established doctrine on the permissible limitations on the 
freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and association, 
and the right to private and family life.”251   
In recent years, the Court has changed course.  The Court “has 
been engaging seriously with the freedom of religion and belief 
under Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” for the last fifteen 
years.252  “Article 9 of the Convention explicitly protects freedom of 
religion or belief.  Yet there are a wide variety of conceptions as to 
what this freedom entails.”253  “[T]he Court may be considered to be 
in the process of developing a ‘theory’ on the proper place of 
religion in the public sphere.”254  But the Court still must overcome 
a variety of structural and doctrinal hurdles to do so, particularly in a 
way that is both coherent and equitable. 
 
V. EUROPEAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY: RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY AS A WESTPHALIAN PARADOX 
 
European societies have assumed that being modern and secular 
requires the privatization of religion.255  As Robert Yelle has said, 
“we inhabit a particular political theology.”256 “[W]hat we call 
‘secular law’ has been shaped by Christian soteriology and 
supersessionism” involving “[t]he separation of a spiritual ‘religion’ 
from both civil law and ceremonial ‘religion.’”257 The result of this 
separation is that “[t]he practical application of human rights 
approaches to the freedom of religion is structurally biased towards 
those forms of religious belief which are essentially voluntarist, 
250 Cumper, supra note 105 at 173. 
251 Martínez-Torrón, supra note 56 at 594. 
252 Scharffs, supra note 69 at 249. 
253 EVANS, supra note 58 at 18. 
254 Fokas, supra note 70 at 55 (noting the jurisprudence of the ECHR reflects 
the “extreme state of flux currently characterizing the place of religion in the 
European sphere, both at the European and national level.”). 
255 Casanova, supra note 42 at 26. 
256 Yelle, supra note 3 at 25. 
257 Id. 
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private and individualist—one might say pietistic—rather than 
communitarian in organisational orientation.”258 
Yelle continues: 
 
Indeed, Christianity arguably created a separation between 
the religion and political domains with its distinctions 
between the ‘Two Kingdoms (Cities, Swords)’ and, even 
earlier, between Christian ‘grace’ and Jewish ‘law.’  The 
original version of the Great Separation’ was the founding 
narrative of Christianity, which, according to Saint Paul, 
effected a fundamental break with its own Jewish past. 
Following Christ’s redemptive sacrifice on the Cross, the 
laws that prescribed sacrifice and other rituals were 
ineffective as a means of salvation and were abrogated. 
Religion was no longer a matter of law, but of grace; no 
longer of the flesh, but of spirit.259   
 
This understanding of religion is privatized and ultimately Christian 
“‘because . . . it emphasizes the priority of belief as a state of mind 
rather than as constituting activity in the world.’”260  Religion thus 
became “an internal discipline superior because invisible, 
ubiquitous, and transcendent: in a word, spiritual.”261  And while 
ritual continued to play an important part in the early church, “the 
‘interiorization of religion’ following the Reformation . . . made 
belief the measure of what religion is understood to be.”262  
“Privileging belief over practice . . . rests on a conception of religion 
that has emerged out of a particular historical trajectory and that, as 
a result, is largely Protestant.”263 
But this is hardly the only way that one can understand religion.  
It need not be principally spiritual, and “there is nothing ‘natural’ or 
‘universal’ in describing religion as fundamentally a matter of 
belief.”264  Indeed, this understanding of religion is not necessarily 
applicable outside of its own Western milieu.  “Many non-Western 
traditions . . . cannot conceive of, nor accept, a system of rights that 
excludes religion.  Religion is for these traditions inextricably 
258 Evans, supra note 103 at 313. 
259 Yelle, supra note 3 at 24 (internal quotation omitted) 
260 Danchin, supra note 8 at 676-77 (quoting TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF 
RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 47 
(1993)). See also Stone, supra note 34 at 42. (“Western liberalism’s very 
definition of religion as being about belief and not custom or law has a distinctly 
Protestant cast that does not suit religions such as Judaism or Islam.”). 
261 Yelle, supra note 3 at 26. 
262 Peroni, supra note 41 at 249 (internal quotations omitted). 
263 Id. at 248-49. 
264 Id. at 249. 
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integrated into every facet of life.”265  For those who see themselves 
as “‘born into’ some religious group rather than religiously ‘born 
again’” religion is not a matter of voluntary assent.266   These are 
“collectivistic religions that are ‘public in character and defin[e] 
people’s group identity.’”267  But “more communitarian-oriented 
religious traditions tend to challenge the state’s ordering of society 
in a manner which more individually focused religions do not.”268 
Therefore, “the ‘choice’ of religion is also established as a legal 
principle: it serves to define what religion is.”269  It is a choice: 
voluntary assent to certain propositions.   
Accordingly, “any non-Christian or non-Western religion such 
as Islam which deviates from this notion of religion as private belief 
and subjective experience thus faces a double charge: not only is it a 
threat to the secular political order but it is also not religion in its 
true, modern form.”270  So it should be no surprise “that Western 
Christianity has found it easier to cohabit plural liberal democracies 
than some other forms of religious traditions.”271  Christianity fits 
the forum internum left to it by the state, and the state defines 
religion as generalizations based on Christianity.272  Western 
secularism: 
 
presupposes a Christian civilisation that is easily forgotten 
because, over time, it has silently slid into the background. 
Christianity allows this self-limitation, and much of the 
world innocently mistakes this rather cunning self-denial 
265 John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (1996). 
266 Ferrari, supra note 175 at 368 (quoting SLAVA JAKELIC, COLLECTIVISTIC 
RELIGIONS: RELIGIONS, CHOICE, AND IDENTITY IN LATE MODERNITY 1-3 (2010)).  
See also Russell T. McCutcheon, The Category “Religion” and the Politics of 
Tolerance, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
THE SACRED AND SECULAR 139, 144 (Arthur L. Greil & David G. Bromley, eds., 
2003) (quoting MADAN SARUP, IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE POSTMODERN 
WORLD 3 (1996) (“‘[F]or members of many ethnic-minority groups, their religion 
is an aspect of their culture, a valuable support in a hostile environment.’”)); 
Evans, supra note 123 at 396 (“For some religious minority groups, their ability to 
retain a distinctive lifestyle may be essential to the survival of a community that is 
supportive of their beliefs.”). 
267 Ferrari, supra note 175 at 368. 
268 Evans, supra note 103 at 314.  
269 Ferrari, supra note 175 at 368 (quoting JAKELIC, supra note 266). 
270 Danchin, supra note 8 at 689. 
271 Evans, supra note 103 at 314. 
272 Peroni, supra note 41 at 236 (“the Court has valorized disembodied, 
autonomous, and private forms of religiousity identified with mainstream 
Protestantism, while sidelining embodied, habitual, and public forms.”) & 244 
(“aspects of applicant’s practices that the Court has tended to de-emphasize 
include those that cannot be neatly separated from daily actions or everyday life. . 
. . manifestations outside the domains of home, family and places of worship are 
of secondary importance.”). 
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for its disappearance. But if this is so, this ‘inherently 
dogmatic’ secularism cannot coexist innocently with other 
religions . . .  it can live comfortably with liberal, 
Protestantized, individualized, and privatized religions but 
has no resources to cope with religions that mandate greater 
public or political presence or have a strong communal 
orientation. This group-insensitivity of secularism makes it 
virtually impossible for it to accommodate community-
specific rights and therefore to protect the rights of 
religious minorities.273 
 
But, like religion, neither secularism nor religion is a universal 
category: they need to be contextualized, as they are the product of 
different and particular histories and cultures. Once applied to 
Europe, this conclusion means that European secularism is the 
outcome of European history, in which Christianity has played a 
central role.274  But “once European secularism is placed in its 
context, its Christian roots become evident and prevent the claim of 
the neutrality of the secular public sphere from being taken 
seriously: this sphere is an exclusionary space where some selected 
religions feel at home while others are left out in the cold.”275    
Paradoxically, European secularism “remains intrinsically and 
inevitably Christian—to be fair to non-Christian religions.”276  José 
Casanova suggests: 
 
Rather than recognizing the “really existing” religious and 
secular pluralisms and the multiple European modernities, 
the dominant discourses in Europe prefer to hold on to the 
idea of a single secular modernity, emerging out of the 
Enlightenment.  Only secular neutrality is supposed to 
guarantee liberal tolerance and pluralist multicultural 
recognition in an expanded European Union. Thus, the 
secularist paradox, that in the name of freedom, individual 
autonomy, tolerance, and cultural pluralism, religious 
people—Christian, Jewish, and Muslim—are being asked 
to keep their religious beliefs, identities, and norms 
273 Rajeev Bhargava, Rehabilitating Secularism, in RETHINKING SECULARISM 
92-113, 101 (Craig Calhoun, et al. eds., 2011). 
274 Ferrari, supra note 175 at 360. 
275 Id. at 361-62 
276 Id. at 361.  See also id. at 362 (internal quotation omitted) (“the liberal 
model of toleration results from an internal Christian dynamic of secularization, 
which reproduces theological principles in secular guise.”) 
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“private” so that they do not disturb the project of a 
modern, secular, enlightened Europe.277   
 
But as JFS revealed, this is not really possible.278  Secular 
modernity guarantees religious freedom only by the privatization of 
religion.  The space that the modern state has left to religion is 
shaped like Christianity, and when other religions do not fit, they are 
not treated equally.  “[T]he claim of religious neutrality, on the basis 
of which secularism asserted the authority to adjudicate the limits of 
the various religions, especially vis-à-vis the secular, stands revealed 
as myth.”279 
In a nominally post-Christian Europe, there is little to be gained 
by failing to “acknowledge these roots and to recognize that the art 
of separation—and, with it, the privatizing of religion—is nothing 
by an imposition of secular liberalism’s Christian cultural heritage 
on non-Christian religions whose basic terms of reference are 
entirely different.”280 The “[l]ack of sensitivity and respect for the 
needs of others are becoming really dangerous for management 
processes of religious and cultural diversity in European states. We 
seem to be violating principles of equality in questionable efforts to 
force unequals to . . . become like us.”281 
This can be seen in the text of the Convention and in the Court’s 
dichotomy between belief and practice.  “The ECtHR has, despite 
Article 9’s protection of the right to ‘manifest’ one’s religion, seen 
protection of individual religious freedom as being largely confined 
to the private sphere.”282  And “[i]n the Strasbourg representational 
discourse, the relationship between the two terms appears 
unidirectional: belief is imagined as pre-existing and practice as its 
subsequent manifestation. . . . this suggests that there is an actual 
belief lying beneath practice that comes first.”283  But this need not 
be the case.  “[N]either practice nor belief is foundational, as the two 
are mutually dependent.”284  “The difficulty with the interpretive 
methodology of the European Court of Human Rights . . . is that any 
277 José Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European 
Integration, in RELIGION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPE, 65-92, 66-67 (T.A. Byrnes & 
P.J. Katzenstein, eds., 2006). 
278 See generally Petty, Faith, supra note 14.  See also Ferrari, supra note 175 
at 359 (noting Western secularism “penalises non-Christian religions in 
particular.”). 
279 Yelle, supra note 3 at 35. 
280 Stone, supra note 34 at 41-42. 
281 Werner Menski, Fuzzy Law and the Boundaries of Secularism, RELIGARE 
Lecture, June 2010, at 9. 
282 MCCREA, supra note 17 at 122. 
283 Peroni, supra note 41 at 255. 
284 Id. at 256; ADAM B. SELIGMAN, ET AL., RITUAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: 
AN ESSAY ON THE LIMITS OF SINCERITY 106-07 (2008) (discussing ritual and 
belief as mutually reinforcing). 
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assertion of universal authority in the form of ‘free-standing’ reason 
. . . tacitly subsumes majoritarian cultural norms . . . into the 
meaning and scope of Article 9.”285  In the end, “the ECHR has been 
interpreted so as to permit the use of coercive state power to 
promote the interests of certain religions.”286 
 
As Lourdes Peroni suggests:  
 
moving towards a more inclusive European Human Rights 
Convention Law may require reaching and challenging 
deep-rooted  assumptions and conceptions underpinning the 
Court’s legal reasoning.  In particular, the move may 
involve rethinking those assumptions and conceptions, 
which all too often pass for natural and universal, but 




“Religion and church continue to have a marked significance in 
European countries at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of 
the twenty-first century.”288  And while European states test 
“different models of democracy, law and religion,”289  “states not 
only cannot avoid considering religion, but have an interest in doing 
so in an increasingly multicultural environment. Europe cannot just 
disregard religion in all its various manifestations in the 21st 
century.”290   
In particular, “Christianity continues to shape significant 
aspects of both the state and state law.  This is an embarrassment for 
liberal theories of rights and their assumption of state neutrality.”291  
It is also, to a significant extent, inevitable.  The understanding of 
285 Danchin, supra note 8 at 745.  “Of course, the collective culture within 
which individual religious freedom is asserted is inevitably influenced by cultural 
norms to which particular faiths have disproportionately contributed.  Therefore, 
the protection of private religious freedom may allow adherents to culturally 
entrenched religious a greater degree of freedom to adhere to their faith in public 
situations, not because the Court accords them a more extensive right to religious 
freedom, but because there is no clash between the collective norms and structures 
of the society in which they live and the requirements of their faith.”  Peroni, 
supra note 41 at 104. 
286 Peroni, supra note 41 at 105. 
287 Peroni, supra note 6 at 234.  See also Martínez-Torrón, supra note 70 at 
365 (“Among the improvable aspects of its case law is the protection of individual 
religious or moral identity, especially when it is expressed in particular actions in 
ordinary life, beyond traditional expressions of religiousity such as rites or 
preaching.”). 
288 Pollack, et al., supra note 23 at 1. 
289 Ungureanu, supra note 11 at 307. 
290 Menski, supra note 281 at 1. 
291 Danchin, supra note 8 at 670-71. 
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religion that underlies the state’s claim to neutrality and perhaps 
even the Westphalian system itself is predicated on the privatization 
of religion and the transfer of jurisdiction over temporal matters to 
the state.  Redefining religion as something broader than 
propositional belief calls into question the state’s goal of neutrality 
and to a certain (now extremely limited) extent the raison d’être of 
the state itself. 
But “unless it faces these issues explicitly, challenging its own 
assumptions and looking at the consequences of its approach, the 
European Court of Human Rights is unlikely to provide an example 
to the international community as it continues to struggle with the 
complex implications of religious freedom.”292  Focusing on belief 
in considering issues of religion is not “necessarily wrong or useless. 
It is merely culturally dependent on 1700 years of Christian history, 
so ingrained as to be invisible.”293 This is where the Court can do 
better. “Religious freedom is best measured on the margins: it is 
those groups who don’t ‘fit’ into definitions of religious normalcy 
who are the best indicator of a society’s commitment to religious 
expression in its widest possible form.”294   
It seems likely that “the tacit background assumptions shaping 
the public-private divide—religion as primarily a matter of belief or 
conscience whose proper place in the private sphere—become more 
visible when it is a Muslim who seeks to manifest a non-Christian 
belief or practice in the public sphere.”295  But “this is not only an 
issue about Islam but about other faith groups, including Orthodox 
Judaism; and indeed it spills over into some of the questions that 
292 Evans, supra note 123 at 396-97. 
293 James V. Spickard, Cultural Context and the Definition of Religion: Seeing 
With Confucian Eyes, in DEFINING RELIGION: INVESTIGATING THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN THE SACRED AND SECULAR 189, 191 (Arthur L. Greil & David G. 
Bromley, eds., 2003). 
294 Beaman, supra note 215 at 216. 
295 Danchin, supra note 8 at 672.  For example, Joseph Dan suggests that 
“[t]he political consequences of the mis-use of the term ‘religion’ are most 
obvious today concerning the image of ‘fundamentalist’ Islam in the West.  If 
Islam is a ‘religion,’ it should be confined to individual spiritual life, and not try to 
become the Law of the Land of modern countries and see everything outside of 
itself as evil, and to be fought against as a dangerous cultural and political enemy. 
 Yet this is exactly the meaning of Islam since its beginnings; it never recognized 
a culture outside of itself (except as subordinated, tolerated minorities which are 
denied full political rights).  Islam was always a political entity, and the 
expectation that it will conform to the Christian definition of ‘religion’ is the 
result of the process of the attempt to universalize the concept of religion in its 
particular meaning in Christianity.” Joseph Dan, Jewish Studies and European 
Terminology: Religion, Law and Ethics, in JEWISH STUDIES IN A NEW EUROPE: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF JEWISH STUDIES IN COPENHAGEN 1994 
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR JEWISH STUDIES xxiii-
xxxvi, xxviii n.9. (Ulf Haxen, et al. eds., 1998). 
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have surfaced . . . about the right of religious believers in general to 
opt out of certain legal provisions.”296 
“[C]itizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the 
abandoning of religious discipline, any more than religious 
discipline should deprive one of access to liberties secured by the 
law of the land”297 “[H]uman rights law regarding the freedom of 
religion in Europe today is developing in a fashion which is as likely 
to hinder as it is to assist the realisation of the goals of tolerance and 
religious pluralism which are said to be what it is seeking to 
achieve.”298  To do so, “[r]eligion . . . needs to be categorised within 
a wider frame than ‘religion and belief.’”299 
296 Williams, supra note 49 at 263. 
297 Id. at 268. 
298 Evans, supra note 103 at 291. 
299 Maleiha Malik, The “Other” Citizens: Religion in a Multicultural Europe, 
in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: DEBATES AND DILEMMAS 93-




This dissertation began five years ago with an observation: The highest 
court in Britain had held, as a matter of law, that religion and ethnicity were 
separate things.  And not only separate, but incompatible.  The court 
claimed that to the extent a religious community defined itself by descent 
rather than by affirmation of faith, it was invalid.1   
What appeared to underlie much of the court’s reasoning was an 
unstated assumption that membership in a religious group depends 
primarily, if not exclusively, on faith—adherence to particular theological 
propositions.  That understanding of how membership of a religion must be 
understood, and by extension how religion as a whole must be understood, 
troubled me.   
I looked first at the linguistic and ontological history of the word 
“religion,” noting that it appears to have originally connoted actions or, 
collectively, a way of life.  Only later, especially after the Reformation, did 
it come to mean the institutions and doctrines intended to facilitate those 
actions and ways of life.2  Later still, the Enlightenment, with its 
systematization of an ever-expanding world, reified religion into its modern 
form, allowing us to speak of multiple “religions.”3   
Furthermore, the history of the idea revealed that the conception of 
religion-as-belief privileged Christianity.   Most ancient peoples had a 
national cult; Christianity, a religious community connected by common 
belief rather than common ancestry was a novel form of religious 
collectivism.4  Now it is taken as given—a sociological axiom.  The U.K. 
Supreme Court’s insistence that “real” religion concerns matters of belief 
assigned legal consequences to its reproduction of a Christian worldview.5 
The British courts were not alone in their assumptions about the nature 
of religion.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Israel had also 
found faith to be critical in determining who qualified as a “Jew” under 
Israeli law.  Here, though, while belief was immaterial to determining who 
qualified as a Jew for religious purposes, the Israeli court concluded that 
rather than a religious definition, it must accord a “secular” meaning to the 
term in the application of Israeli civil law.6   But, as we have seen, the 
 
1 R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS & Others, [2009] UKSC 15 
(U.K.). 
2 See, e.g., GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, HISTORY, RELIGION, AND ANTISEMITISM 70 (1990). 
3 Michael L. Satlow, Defining Judaism: Accounting for Religions in the Study of 
Religion, 74 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 837, 841 (2006); JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, 
WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA 23-24 (1985). 
4 WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION 23, 26 (1963). 
5 DANIEL BOYARIN, BORDER LINES: THE PARTITION OF JUDAEO-CHRISTIANITY 8 
(2004). 
6 HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of the Interior 43(4) PD 793 [1987] (Isr.), 
translated in Jewish Law Association Studies XI: Law, Judicial Policy, and Jewish Identity 
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history of the idea of religion reveals that there is little about it that is 
religiously neutral.  The Israeli court’s approach is understandable, 
however, in light of the young state’s desire to avoid charges of theocracy 
and the unique role of religion in the creation of the Westphalian system 
itself. 
Religion is a common legal term of art used in a large number of 
constitutions, statutes, regulations, and judicial pronouncements.  If 
“religion” is not itself religiously neutral, how is neutrality to be 
maintained?     
One possibility is to define it.  But this poses tremendous problems.  
Religion, as a category, is difficult to define precisely because it is a 
generalization of Christianity that fits very little else with any degree of 
fullness or accuracy.  This leaves essentialist definitions in a double-bind.  
The criteria employed will either be so restrictive that the definition remains 
biased, or so elastic as to be useless.  Multifactor approaches perhaps fare 
marginally better, but still depend on comparisons to what is readily 
apparent as religion.   
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of 
Human Rights have avoided the task of defining religion with great care.  
Both prefer to adjudicate cases under more general provisions if it is 
possible to do so.  This is perhaps the best course of action.  Defining 
religion in a way that is both comprehensive and utilitarian is likely an 
impossible task, and even understanding religion in a reasonably inclusive 
way is still a challenge. 
Much work, of course, remains to be done.  In particular, a normative 
question arises about the extent to which law imbued with a Christian 
understanding of religion may be defensible.  Most jurisdictions, even those 
with an officially-recognized religious establishment such as the U.K., 
purport to offer legal protection to adherents of all religions on an equal 
basis.  So it should not be terribly surprising that the legal systems of 
Western states understand religion in a Western way, reflecting centuries of 
Christian influence.  Laws and court rulings are not made in a vacuum, but 
by legislators and judges—people who, for the most part, share in the same 
common cultural background.   
But it would be at least somewhat surprising for a legal system that 
claims to be neutral among religions to define religion in a way that 
advantages some over others, antithetically to its stated purpose.  That is, 
unless the stated neutrality is contingent on a belief-based conception of 
religion, and to the extent that some religions go beyond belief, the state is 
not interested in offering protection.  There may be something to this.  The 
modern Westphalian state and the modern conception of religion grew up 
together, and in many respects remain intertwined.   
 
in the State of Israel 27, 56-62 (Daniel B. Sinclair, ed., 2000); Ralph Slovenko, Brother 
Daniel and Jewish Identity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 15 (1964).  
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More likely, however, is simple ignorance on the part of legislators and 
judges that many non-Christian religions define themselves and their 
membership in ways that may have comparatively little to do with belief.  
Ensuring that the legal understanding of religion does not inadvertently 
exclude religious practices or commitments that may not seem necessarily 
religious under a narrower, belief-based approach would aid in giving effect 
to laws guaranteeing freedom of religion and in protecting non-Christian, 
often minority, religions.  At the same time, a broader legal understanding 
of religion would likely have little detrimental impact on the majority.    
Recognition of the difficulties inherent in some international 
instruments pertaining to religious freedom is just beginning.  And while 
there is some good historical work that has been done on the importance of 
religion in the emergence of the Westphalian system, the extent of its 
continuing importance in how modern states understand religion more 
generally would add substantially to our understanding of how courts 
conceive of religion as an object of legal protection.  For now, it is perhaps 
enough to say that courts understand religion as essentially a matter of 
belief; the primacy of belief, and the idea of religion more generally, 
reflects a Christian heritage; and this heritage presents great difficulties 
today in adjudicating matters of religious freedom.  Courts should tread 
carefully, and with a substantial degree of self-awareness when dealing with 
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 In accordance with Article 13(2) of the Leiden University Doctorate PhD 
Regulations 2015 and the Memorandum on PhD Dissertations Consisting of Articles, 
dated 30 March 2010, this dissertation is comprised of an unpublished introduction, four 
substantive chapters each of which has been (or will be shortly) published in a law review 
or journal, and an unpublished conclusion.  Thematically, the first and second chapters 
may be read together as “Part One,” and the third and fourth chapters as “Part Two.” 
 Part One begins with an in-depth analysis of the JFS case in the United Kingdom.  
In that case, a claim was raised that JFS, a state-sponsored Jewish school, improperly 
refused admission to an applicant who practiced liberal Judaism, but who was not a Jew 
under the Orthodox view of the school, because his mother was not Jewish and he had 
not converted. 
The opinions of many of the judges in that case expressed a view that membership 
in a religious community is (or should be) based on the individual beliefs of its members.  
And because the applicant believed himself to be Jewish and practiced liberal Judaism, 
the judges concluded that the Orthodox definition based on matrilineal descent violated 
the Race Relations Act.  I suggest that by focusing on the applicant’s beliefs, the courts 
introduced a Christian normativity.  The courts then penalized the school for deviating 
from that norm in its application of Orthodox Jewish law to determine which applicants 
were Jewish. 
 One might be tempted to think that the courts of Israel, a self-described Jewish 
state, would be less susceptible to introducing Christian bias into their legal 
understanding of religion.  In Chapter Two, I critically review three cases from the Israeli 
Supreme Court concerning who qualifies as a Jew under Israeli civil law.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, I found that Israeli courts not only took the same position as the British 
courts, but that they did so on the premise that treating belief as the sine qua non of 
religion was religiously neutral.  I propose several theories for why this may have come 
to pass and suggest how these findings fit into the secularization debate. 
 Given the findings in Part One, Part Two asks how “religion” as a legal term of 
art could be applied in less biased manner.  Chapter Three explores various types of 
definitions, and the shortcomings of each, in defining religion as a general matter, and in 
defining it for legal purposes, primarily in the context of U.S. law. I conclude that none of 
the available options are particularly attractive, and suggest avoiding relying on explicit 
protections for religious liberty when other legal guarantees, such as freedom of speech, 
will suffice. 
 Chapter Four addresses the same issue in the context of Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  I note that even before judicial decisions are reached, the 
text of Article 9 itself is biased in favor of confessional religions because of its equation 
of religion with belief and conscience.  Some of the court’s doctrines have exacerbated 
this bias, while others have made remedies difficult to obtain.  I locate part of the 
difficulty in the nature of Westphalian system, which reduced the legitimate reach of 








In overeenstemming met artikel 13, lid 2 van het promotiereglement van de 
Universiteit Leiden en het Memorandum on PhD dissertations consisting of articles (dd 
30 maart 2010) kan een proefschrift bestaan uit artikelen. Het onderhavige proefschrift 
bestaat uit een niet-gepubliceerde inleiding, vier inhoudelijke hoofdstukken die elk 
gepubliceerd zijn in een juridisch tijdschrift (of dat zullen worden) en een onuitgegeven 
conclusie. 
Thematisch, kunnen de eerste en het tweede hoofdstuk samen gelezen worden als 
“Part One,” en de derde en vierde hoofdstuk als “Part Two.” 
Deel I begint met een grondige analyse van de zaak JFS uit het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk. In dat geval werd JFS aangeklaagd, een door de staat gesteunde joodse 
school, omdat de school ten onrechte geweigerd had een leerling aan te nemen die tot het 
liberale jodendom kan worden gerekend, maar die geen jood was volgens de orthodoxe 
opvattingen van de school. Volgens de school was hij geen jood omdat zijn moeder niet 
joods was en hij zich ook niet had bekeerd. 
Een kritische analyse van de opvattingen van de rechters in deze zaak maakt 
duidelijk dat de meerderheid van de rechters ervan uitgingen dat lidmaatschap van een 
religieuze gemeenschap gebaseerd is (en moet zijn) op de individuele geloofsopvattingen 
van de leden. En omdat de aanvrager zelf de overtuiging was toegedaan dat hij als joods 
zou moeten worden gekwalificeerd en dat hij een vorm van liberaal Jodendom 
praktiseerde, concludeerden de rechters dat de orthodoxe definitie van jodendom, waarbij 
de afstamming van de moeder centraal staat in strijd is met de Race Relations Act. De 
conclusie van deze dissertatie is dat door de focus geheel te richten op de opvattingen van 
de aanvrager een christelijke normativiteit wordt geïntroduceerd door de rechters. 
Vervolgens werd de school bestraft omdat deze afweek van deze norm door het toepassen 
van de orthodox-joodse criteria om uit te maken wie joods is en wie niet. 
Men zou geneigd zijn te denken dat de rechters in Israël, dat zichzelf typeert als 
een Joodse staat, minder geneigd zouden zijn om het christelijk vooroordeel in hun 
juridische opvattingen van wat religie is als uitgangspunt te nemen. In hoofdstuk twee 
behandel ik drie uitspraken van het Israëlische Hooggerechtshof die ingaan op de vraag 
wie als “joods” kwalificeert onder het Israëlische burgerlijk recht. Tegengesteld aan wat 
men zou verwachten, blijkt dat de Israëlische rechters geen andere benadering kiezen dan 
de Britse rechters, maar dat deden zij gebaseerd op de premisse van een religieus-neutrale 
benadering. Ik behandel verschillende theorieën waarom dit gebeurd zou kunnen zijn en 
ik suggereer ook hoe deze resultaten passen in het secularisatie debat. 
Gezien de bevindingen in het eerste deel, vraagt het tweede deel zich af hoe 
“religie” als een juridische vakterm zou kunnen worden toegepast in een minder 
bevooroordeelde zin. Hoofdstuk drie onderzoekt verschillende soorten definities, en de 
tekortkomingen van elk, in het definiëren van religie als een algemeen verschijnsel. Ook 
wordt hier religie als een juridische term behandeld, voornamelijk zoals deze term 
gehanteerd wordt in de context van het Amerikaanse recht. Ik concludeer dat geen van de 
beschikbare opties bijzonder aantrekkelijk is en ik stel voor om, zoveel als maar mogelijk 
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is, een beroep op godsdienstvrijheid te vermijden wanneer andere wettelijke garanties, 
zoals de vrijheid van meningsuiting, ook mogelijk zijn. 
Hoofdstuk vier richt zich op dezelfde kwestie, maar dan in het kader van artikel 9 
van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens. Ik stel vast dat zelfs vóór 
rechterlijke beslissingen worden bereikt, de tekst van artikel 9 zelf bevooroordeeld is, 
namelijk ten gunste van de confessionele religies. Dat blijkt uit de identificatie van 
godsdienst met geloof en geweten. Sommige van de doctrines zoals die door het Hof 
worden onderschreven hebben dit vooroordeel versterkt, terwijl andere het moeilijk 
hebben gemaakt om oplossingen te bedenken. Ik zoek een deel van de problemen in de 
aard van het Westfaalse systeem, dat het legitieme bereik van religie beperkte tot het 
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